In APPLICATION BY JR 222 FOR JUDICIAL Review (2024) UKSC 35 the Supreme Court from para 72 considers statutory interpretation, including the principle that Courts should seek to avoid an interpretation that produces an ABSURD result. They say that absurdity is to be given a “ very wide meaning “. It covers, amongst other things, unworkability, impracticality, inconvenience, anomaly or illogicality. The Supreme Court also considers when reliance may be put on Hansard.

In PAN v MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2024) UKPC 31 Lady Simler said at paragraphs 37-39 on the duty to provide reasons that, whilst there is no general duty universally imposed on all decision-makers to give reasons, the Courts have recognised ” many circumstances ” in which procedural fairness requires that reasons should be given to a person  adversely affected by a decision, even in a statutory context in which no express duty to give reasons is imposed. Lady Simler said that the benefits of giving reasons are clear : they concentrate the mind and impose a discipline which may contribute to better, more transparent decision-making. The trend of the law has been towards an increase d recognition of the duty to give reasons. There has been a ” strong momentum” in favour of greater openness and transparency in decision-making. The touchstone for what fairness requires in this context is often judged by the ability to make effective the right to challenge an adverse public law decision by judicial review. Even where reasons are given voluntarily, they should be reviewed by reference to the same standards as are applied to reasons given in accordance with an established duty to provide them. Lady Simler added at para 40 that there is no uniform standard or threshold which reasons must satisfy in every case. What is required inevitably depends on the context and the circumstances of the individual case. The nature of the decision itself will affect what is required by reasons.

In THURROCK COUNCIL v ADAMS  ( 2024 ) EWHC 2576 ( KB ) a precautionary injunction was continued against persons unknown to prevent apprehended future obstruction of the highway and trespass by climate change activists. The fact that they were exercising their ECHR rights of freedom  of expression and freedom  of peaceful assembly could not normally justify a trespass. However, where these rights were engaged, the Court had to consider the proportionality of the draft injunction sought.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in McAlleenon (2024) UKSC 31 concerns the exercise of discretion by a Court where the public authority defendant argues that the claimant has an adequate alternative remedy such that judicial review should be refused. The Supreme Court holds that a private prosecution or civil claim in nuisance did not constitute suitable alternative remedies to judicial review. The Supreme Court says that judicial review is concerned with  examining whether a public authority has acted lawfully. The Court has a supervisory role only. Its task is not typically to resolve disputes of fact but to determine the legal question of whether the public authority had proper grounds for acting as it did on the basis of the information available to it. As such, usually, judicial review claims can and should be be determined without the need for procedures which are directed to resolving disputed questions of fact, such as cross-examination of witnesses. Moreover, in human rights cases the Court’s role remains essentially one of review; and complaint to an Ombudsman does not constitute a suitable alternative remedy.