In R (AOX) v SoS for Health & Social Care (2026) EWHC 1217 (Admin) a claim that the SoS had breached the ARTICLE 3 INVESTIGATIVE DUTY was dismissed by Eyre J. When identifying the proper defendant it is not sufficient to identify a general emanation of the State with responsibility in the relevant field and assert that it owed the Article 3 investigative duty in the abstract. Further, the prospect that lessons would be learned from an investigation could not operate as a freestanding trigger for an obligation to investigate under Article3. The Judge addressed (1) the applicable principles relating to Article 3 ( paras 35-64 ), ( 2 ) status as an emanation of the State ( paras 65-74 ), ( 3 ) what constitutes INHUMAN & DEGRADING TREATMENT ( paras 75-96 ), ( 4 ) the proper defendant ( paras 97-101 ), ( 5 ) the adequacy of systems for investigation and oversight ( paras 102-105 ), (6 ) the operational duty and the procedural obligation ( paras 106-108 ), and ( 7 ) the timing of the claim ( paras 109/110 ).

On deprivation of liberty and mental capacity, the Supreme Court has, in (2026) UKSC 16, overruled its majority decision in CHESHIRE WEST ( 2014) AC 896.

Section 12 of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 applies when a Court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the ECHR right to freedom of expression. Section 12(3) provides that no such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial UNLESS the Court is satisfied that the application IS LIKELY TO ESTABLISH THAT PUBLICATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. The standard required by Section 12(3) has been considered by the Court of Appeal in the trade mark case of BARGAIN BUSTING LTD v SHENZHEN SKE TECHNOLOGY CO LTD, between rival suppliers of economic cigarettes and threats of trade mark infringement proceedings. The case concerns the applicable threshold under Section 12(3). It is that the applicant has to be MORE LIKELY THAN NOT TO SUCCEED AT TRIAL. The whole point of Section 12(3) is to require the Court to apply a MERITS THRESHOLD before granting INTERIM RELIEF that affects freedom of expression. It necessarily follows that the Court hearing such an application has to take a view as to which party is more likely to prevail at trial, based on the available evidence and arguments. It does not mean that the Court should not exercise CASE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINE to ensure that the time and expense devoted to such applications are appropriate. There is nothing about an interim injunction to restrain allegedly unjustified threats that would prevent the application of that approach.

Re T ( INHERENT JURISDICTION : DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY ) ( 2026 ) EWCA Civ 307 addresses deprivation of liberty for the purposes of ECHR Article 5, the statutory regime under Children Act 1989 for secure accommodation, and the meaning of “ harm “.

R ( HUDA AMMORI ) v SSHD (2026) EWHC 292 ( Admin0 is a successful challenge to the decision  by the SSHD to proscribe Palestine Action. The grounds of challenge included ECHR rights, specifically Article 10, freedom of expression with respect to which there was very significant interference ( paras 106. 135 & 140), Article 11, freedom of association, with respect to which there was very significant experience, paras 105, 135 & 140, and Article 14. What needed to be justified (para 109) was the restriction on action comprising PEACEFUL PROTEST.

In HUTCHINSON v COUNTY DURHAM & DARLINGTON NHS FOUNDATION TRUST (2026) WL 00177607, at paras 425-446,  it is held that , by permitting a biological male, transgender woman, to use a female changing room, the only space made available to them, the Trust, as a public body, had infringed the Claimants’ right to respect for private life, under ECHR ARTICLE 8, and bodily autonomy. The Trust had been unable to demonstrate PROPORTIONALITY.

In R ( WILLIAMS ) v NATURAL RESOURCES WALES and CONWY COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCIL ( 2026 ) EWHC 9 ( Admin ) the Claimants unsuccessfully challenged the decision of Natural Resources Wales ( NRW ) that it would no longer exercise its power, under Section165 of the water resources Act 1991, to carry out works and maintenance to a embankment. The 4 grounds of challenge included that the decision placed an unfair and disproportionate burden on adjacent landowners for maintenance of the embankment and its associated structures, and constitute “ control or interference “ with the landowners’ property rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. This is discussed by Judge Keyser KC at paras 66-82. “ Possessions “ is construed broadly, but the matter complained of did not violate the claimants’ rights. They were not deprived of their land. NRW is neither purporting to exercise control over the claimants’ land nor controlling the use to be made of it. Their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was not infringed. There was no public obligation to maintain flood defences. Article 1 was not engaged.

The 179 para Judgment in  IA and Others v SSHD EWCA Civ 1516 concerns, amongst other matters, (1) the meaning of ECHR Article 8, in the contexts of family life between adult siblings and (2) the rights of persons outside the jurisdiction ( Gaza ) and (2 ) the weighing of the proportionality balance. The Court of Appeal says, at paras 60, 68 and 77, that “ family life “, within the autonomous meaning of article 8(1), is to be found, between adult siblings, only where “ additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties “ are to be found. The Court, at para 100, says that, whilst persons seeking to enter an ECHR State from outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR will not have their own rights under Article 8, if they have pre-existing family life with a person within the territory of the ECHR, Article 8 may impose a positive obligation on a State to admit those people, if they have family life with a person within the jurisdiction. The concept of family life does not however mean that the State is under a positive obligationto admit every member of the wider family of the persons within the territory of the UK.

In R ( JWANCZUK ) v SoS for WORK & PENSIONS ( 2025 ) UKSC 42 the Supreme Court addresses Article 14 of the ECHR read in conjunction with Articles 8 and A1P1. The Court considered “ other status “, justification and the Human Rights Act interpretative interpretation. It observes that there are limits on the concept of “ other status”. As to justification, the Court applies the standard BANK MELLAT test, and refers to the wide margin of appreciation. As to the interpretative obligation, the Court considers this in the context of an exception to a general rule.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission has, on 21 November 2025, found that the Welsh Government failed to comply with the PSED in deciding to discontinue funding ( for free school meals ) without conducting and publishing EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS for many policies likely substantially to affect PSED compliance, and has taken formal enforcement action.