Section 12 of the HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 applies when a Court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the ECHR right to freedom of expression. Section 12(3) provides that no such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial UNLESS the Court is satisfied that the application IS LIKELY TO ESTABLISH THAT PUBLICATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. The standard required by Section 12(3) has been considered by the Court of Appeal in the trade mark case of BARGAIN BUSTING LTD v SHENZHEN SKE TECHNOLOGY CO LTD, between rival suppliers of economic cigarettes and threats of trade mark infringement proceedings. The case concerns the applicable threshold under Section 12(3). It is that the applicant has to be MORE LIKELY THAN NOT TO SUCCEED AT TRIAL. The whole point of Section 12(3) is to require the Court to apply a MERITS THRESHOLD before granting INTERIM RELIEF that affects freedom of expression. It necessarily follows that the Court hearing such an application has to take a view as to which party is more likely to prevail at trial, based on the available evidence and arguments. It does not mean that the Court should not exercise CASE MANAGEMENT DISCIPLINE to ensure that the time and expense devoted to such applications are appropriate. There is nothing about an interim injunction to restrain allegedly unjustified threats that would prevent the application of that approach.

Re T ( INHERENT JURISDICTION : DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY ) ( 2026 ) EWCA Civ 307 addresses deprivation of liberty for the purposes of ECHR Article 5, the statutory regime under Children Act 1989 for secure accommodation, and the meaning of “ harm “.

R ( HUDA AMMORI ) v SSHD (2026) EWHC 292 ( Admin0 is a successful challenge to the decision  by the SSHD to proscribe Palestine Action. The grounds of challenge included ECHR rights, specifically Article 10, freedom of expression with respect to which there was very significant interference ( paras 106. 135 & 140), Article 11, freedom of association, with respect to which there was very significant experience, paras 105, 135 & 140, and Article 14. What needed to be justified (para 109) was the restriction on action comprising PEACEFUL PROTEST.

In HUTCHINSON v COUNTY DURHAM & DARLINGTON NHS FOUNDATION TRUST (2026) WL 00177607, at paras 425-446,  it is held that , by permitting a biological male, transgender woman, to use a female changing room, the only space made available to them, the Trust, as a public body, had infringed the Claimants’ right to respect for private life, under ECHR ARTICLE 8, and bodily autonomy. The Trust had been unable to demonstrate PROPORTIONALITY.

In R ( WILLIAMS ) v NATURAL RESOURCES WALES and CONWY COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCIL ( 2026 ) EWHC 9 ( Admin ) the Claimants unsuccessfully challenged the decision of Natural Resources Wales ( NRW ) that it would no longer exercise its power, under Section165 of the water resources Act 1991, to carry out works and maintenance to a embankment. The 4 grounds of challenge included that the decision placed an unfair and disproportionate burden on adjacent landowners for maintenance of the embankment and its associated structures, and constitute “ control or interference “ with the landowners’ property rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. This is discussed by Judge Keyser KC at paras 66-82. “ Possessions “ is construed broadly, but the matter complained of did not violate the claimants’ rights. They were not deprived of their land. NRW is neither purporting to exercise control over the claimants’ land nor controlling the use to be made of it. Their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions was not infringed. There was no public obligation to maintain flood defences. Article 1 was not engaged.

The 179 para Judgment in  IA and Others v SSHD EWCA Civ 1516 concerns, amongst other matters, (1) the meaning of ECHR Article 8, in the contexts of family life between adult siblings and (2) the rights of persons outside the jurisdiction ( Gaza ) and (2 ) the weighing of the proportionality balance. The Court of Appeal says, at paras 60, 68 and 77, that “ family life “, within the autonomous meaning of article 8(1), is to be found, between adult siblings, only where “ additional elements of dependence involving more than the normal emotional ties “ are to be found. The Court, at para 100, says that, whilst persons seeking to enter an ECHR State from outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR will not have their own rights under Article 8, if they have pre-existing family life with a person within the territory of the ECHR, Article 8 may impose a positive obligation on a State to admit those people, if they have family life with a person within the jurisdiction. The concept of family life does not however mean that the State is under a positive obligationto admit every member of the wider family of the persons within the territory of the UK.

In R ( JWANCZUK ) v SoS for WORK & PENSIONS ( 2025 ) UKSC 42 the Supreme Court addresses Article 14 of the ECHR read in conjunction with Articles 8 and A1P1. The Court considered “ other status “, justification and the Human Rights Act interpretative interpretation. It observes that there are limits on the concept of “ other status”. As to justification, the Court applies the standard BANK MELLAT test, and refers to the wide margin of appreciation. As to the interpretative obligation, the Court considers this in the context of an exception to a general rule.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission has, on 21 November 2025, found that the Welsh Government failed to comply with the PSED in deciding to discontinue funding ( for free school meals ) without conducting and publishing EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS for many policies likely substantially to affect PSED compliance, and has taken formal enforcement action.

In SMITH v MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWHC 2987 ( KB ) the Claimants are a married couple, with strong evangelical Christian beliefs, who wanted to foster children, and approached the Council, but did not make it past the first stage of the ASSESSMENT of their SUITABILITY. One of the reasons given for rejecting their application was that the Claimants would find it difficult to be proactive in promoting DIVERSITY. The relevant legal framework is Section 22 of the Children Act 1989, the Fostering Services ( England ) Regulations 2011, together with National Minimum Standards and Guidance, which must be taken into account, the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR and case law relating to Article 9 and proportionality, notably BANK MELLAT and SHIVIDLER, and Sections 10 and 13 of the Equality Act 2010 and case law thereon. The claim was dismissed by Turner J. Examination of attitudes to homosexuality and same sex relationships of a person who has applied to be a foster care is not unreasonable : para 76. Local authorities must remain vigilant to consider any ways in which the manifestation of the religious belief of prospective foster parents may affect the welfare of the child, which is the paramount consideration : para 78.

See R (ARC Time Freehold Income Authorised Fund)v SoS for HCLG (2025) EWHC 2751 (Admin ) at paras 78-182 on the principles in relation to Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention.