The Judgment of Fordham J in R (EXR) v SSHD (2026) EWHC 1568 (Admin) contains a passage as follows:-

“The rubric of judicial review

7. Decisions of public authorities must be lawful, in a public law sense. That means – in broad terms – that they must be legal, reasonable and fair. To decide whether they are, the judicial review Court applies objective legal standards. Legality is really concerned with two things: whether the public authority has performed its substantive legal duties; and whether it has made correct conclusions on questions of Fairness is concerned with the legal legitimacy of the public authority’s decision-making process. Reasonableness asks whether an outcome of a decision was beyond the range of responses open to the public authority; and whether the reasoning process involved any recognisable public law error of approach. Sometimes there are nuances and overlaps. There is a species of public law error which involves a material error of an established fact, but nobody says that is relevant to the present case. There is a species of public law error which involves a decision as to a factual question whose lawfulness depends on its correctness, which is highly relevant to the present case.

Reasonableness standard of review

8. Deeply embedded in the philosophy of judicial review, where the Court is concerned with evaluative questions entrusted to the primary judgment of the public authority, is the reasonableness standard of review. The public authority’s decisions and conclusions depend, for their lawfulness, on whether they are The standard of review is not substitutionary. There is a margin for error. The reasonableness standard of review also conventionally carries with it a restrained approach to evidence, judging reasonableness by reference to the evidence available to the public authority at the time of the impugned decision. …”

“Correctness standard of review

9. In some situations, a public authority’s decisions and conclusions depend, for their lawfulness, on whether they are correct. That includes decisions and conclusions on questions of law. But it can include decisions and conclusions on questions of fact. …”

“The distinction between interpretation and application

10. Whenever public authorities and the Courts are considering an instrument having a legal effect – whether it is primary legislation or a set of rules or policy guidance – there is always an important basic distinction between interpretation and application. The interpretation of the instrument is a question of law, attracting the correctness standard of review. The application of the instrument is an evaluative question for the public authority as primary decision-maker, attracting the reasonableness standard of As Lady Hale explained in R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8 [2009] 1 WLR 2557 (at §§21, 23), “[t]he court decides what the words mean”; but “the authority decides whether the facts fit those words”, “subject to the scrutiny of the courts on the ordinary principles of judicial review”. The same distinction applies to policy guidance. As Lord Reed explained in Begum at §124: public authority decisions can be “successfully challenged on the ground that the relevant authority … misdirected itself as to the meaning of its policy”; whereas “the question how the policy applies to the facts of a particular case is generally treated as a matter for the authority, subject to the … requirement of reasonableness”.

11. Importantly, this distinction between interpretation (correctness standard) and application (reasonableness standard) has been recognised in cases which are about Home Office policy in which there are protections for a “child” …”

“Knock-on effect unlawfulness

12. The unlawfulness of public authority action can depend on the unlawfulness of previous public authority action. If a decision to deport or remove a person is unlawful, the exercise of the power to detain them for deportation or removal is in consequence unlawful. The detention is “for the express purpose of facilitating deportation”. It is “artificial and unwarranted” to “divorce the detention from the deportation”. The deportation decision is “a prerequisite to” the detention and “the edifice on which the detention is founded”. The lawfulness of the detention is “referable back to the legality of the decision to deport”. It “depends for its legality on the lawfulness of the deportation”. … Another example is where a local authority’s decision that accommodation is suitable is unlawful because it is based on an unlawful prior assessment: see R (Norton) v Haringey LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 746 [2026] PTSR 49 at §§29-31.”

Fordham J went on to consider the application of these principles in various contexts, especially whether a person is a “child” and age assessment and issues, including (paragraphs 13-55) the UK-France Treaty on readmissions (and its exclusion of unaccompanied children), the Home Office Inadmissibility Guidance, the Home Office Assessing Age Guidance, and other p

The Court of Appeal summarises the law on the proper interpretation of Policies in R ( Ammori ) v SSHD ( 2026 ) EWCA Civ 721, at paras 80/81 : (1) Policies in the field of public administration are to be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in the proper context; (2) The Context includes that they are not statutory texts; (3) They are not rules, but guides; (4) Policies are not to be read in a complicated or excessively analytical way; (5) Some polcies engage relatively specific language and others are expressed in much broader terms which may not require or lend themselves to the same level of legal analysis. The Court also addresses the correct approaches to the proportionality balance and the margin of appreciation at respectively paras 98-103and 104-116.

R ( GOULD ) v DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL (2026) EWCA Civ 687 concerns decisions by the Council to close non-statutory drop-in centres. The Court of Appeal holds that that the Council had been no legal obligation to refer in the Officers Report to obligations in the Care Act 2014 which were not alleged to have been breached. An authority does not have in every case to have regard to a wide range of statutory duties which were (or arguably were) relevant in a broad sense, although not identified in the governing legislation.

On liability and sanctions for contempt of court by a public authority in failing to comply with a FTT Order to disclose information pursuant to FoIA 2000, see CLEASBY v ESSEX UNIVERSITY (2026) UKUT 187 (AAC).

The public law principles of LEGALITY and PROPORTIONALITY do NOT provide an independent free-standing ground for challenging SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION. They are a rule of construction, pursuant to which AMBIGUOUS statutory language can be construed in amanner that preserves FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, including human rights. So held by Saini J in ISMAILOV v SoS (2026) EWHC 1188 (Admin).

R ( GVH ) v Leicester Care Board & Leicester Council ( 2026 ) EWHC 1016 ( Admin ) holds that a COMPLAINTS PROCESS, governed by the Local Authority Social Services & NHS Services Complaints ( England ) Regulations 2009, may be an ALTERNATIVE REMEDY to Judicial Review, leading to a ( discretionary ) refusal of permission to apply for Judicial review. The PROCESS could offer a more effective redress than a quashing order.

In SHAUN THOMPSON v METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER (2026) EWHC 915 ( Admin ) a Divisional Court reaffirms that a measure, such as a Policy, must have the “ quality of law “, that is be (1) accessible to the persons concerned, (2) foreseeable as to its consequences, and (3) compatible with the RULE OF LAW. As to foreseeability, the measure MUST NOT CONFER A DISCRETION SO BROAD that its scope is in practice dependent on the will of those who apply it, rather than on the law itself.. It must have sufficient clarity and foreseeability so as NOT to allow ARBITRARINESS, that is decision-making by a public authority on the basis of whim, caprice, malice or predilection. A challenge to the foreseeability of a measure, or its alleged arbitrariness, does NOT, however, a challenge to the PROPORTIONALITY of that measure or its application to a particular case.

In ZHB v CARDIFF COUNCIL (2026) EWHC 913 ( Admin ) Coppel J (1) identifies at paras 17-40 the legal principles to be derived from relevant Strasbourg case law on age assessment processes and (2) holds that the Council was not under an obligation to have regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child when conducting an assessment.

In HARRON v ROTHERHAM MBC ( 2026 ) UKUT 48 ( AAC ) Judge Stout rules that is for the Information Commissioner to decide whether a response to a substituted decision is compliant with FoIA. The FTT is NOT empowered to compel compliance with substituted decision notices. The law of contempt does NOT create any secondary cause of action or open up any new substantive jurisdiction.

Chamberlain J, the Judge in charge of the Administrative Court, has issued an important Administrative Court PRACTICE STATEMENT, in relation to OPPOSED APPLICATIONS FOR  EXTENDING TIME. It sets out the PROCEDURE that will apply to Administrative Court work in London, except in Planning Court cases and in specified circumstances. The Statement indicates that, following feedback, the new procedure may be extended to Administrative Court centres outside London and to Planning Court claims.