Regulation 65(1) of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 sets a time limit within which levy liability notices have to be issued. Revised liability notices then can by Regulation 65(5) be granted at any time. Regulation 65(8) provides that on the issuing of subsequent liability notices any earlier notice “ ceases to have effect “. The Court of Appeal holds in R ( Braithwaite etc Properties ) v East Suffolk Council (2022) EWCA Civ 1716 that the issuing of a revised liability notice does NOT operate retrospectively to nullify the legal effect of an earlier liability notice. It cannot be treated automatically as having been a nullity and of no effect from the outset. Legal consequences follow. The point at which the earlier liability notice ceases to have effect is when the authority issues another liability notice in respect of the same chargeable development.

This is an illustration and application of the principle that a decision issued by a public authority is legally valid unless and until quashed. Those affected by decisions made by statutory authorities exercising their statutory functions are not generally entitled to disregard the legal consequences of such decisions on account of the decision-making procedure having allegedly been unlawful They must challenge them by appropriate means. This includes, where appropriate, by a timely claim for judicial review.

A liability notice is extant unless and until superseded by a revised liability notice or quashed by a Court.

Is it lawful for a planning authority, in granting a planning permission for a development, to impose a planning condition that the developer will dedicate land within the development site to be a public highway? Answer: it would be unlawful. So reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in DB Symmetry Ltd v Swindon Borough Council (2022) UKSC 33.

R ( Arthur ) v BARNET LBS ( “)”” ) EWHC 2933 ( Admin ) holds that Section 92 ( 3 ) of TCPA 1990 inserts a time limit condition on commencement of development into a planning permission that lacks any such condition.

It does not enable the remedy of a time limit consultation that is unlawful.

Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, read together with Regulations, imposes a duty on the Home Secretary to provide “ support” for asylum seekers who appear to her to be, or to be likely to become destitute. Someone who does not have adequate accommodation is destitute. Support includes accommodation. Under Section 98 she is under a duty to provide temporary support in the form of accommodation to an asylum seeker, as defined, who appears to be destitute, until a Section 98 decision is taken.

Cases brought by Ipswich Borough Council and East Riding of Yorkshire Council (2022) EWHC 2868 (KB) concerned the lawful planning use  Hotels for which the Councils were local planning authority.  The Councils sought to take planning enforcement action. This was on the basis that use to accommodate asylum seekers would involve the use of the buildings as a  hostel, rather than a hotel, and thereby a material change of use without planning permission and  a breach of planning control. However, Holgate J refused the Councils injunctions under Section 187B of TCPA 1990. Read more »

The Appeal to the Supreme Court in HILLSIDE PARKS LTD v SNOWDONIA NATIONAL PARK AUTHORITY (2022) UKSC 30 raised issues of importance in planning law about the relationship between successive grants of planning permission for development of the same land. In particular, it concerned the effect of implementing one planning permission on implementing another planning permission relating to the same site. The case was concerned with operational development rather than change of use.

The Supreme Court made from para 19 observations on planning control and planning permissions, the duration of the latter, and the fundamental feature that a planning permission runs with the land. From para 22 the Court considered powers to vary a planning permission; at paras 26/27 the objective interpretation of a planning permission and what documents are significant in that connection, and from para 28 the position in relation to inconsistent planning permissions, and the leading case of PILKINGTON. Read more »