Cabinet Office Guidance relates to ( 1) contractual modifications, (2) time limits, and ( 3 ) the process for assessment of tenders, under the Procurement Act 2023.
COMMUNITY ENERGY PROJECTS
July 1st, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalThe Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is consulting on barriers to community energy projects in England, being solar panels, wind farms, hydro power, rural heat networks, electric vehicle charging points and car clubs, and fuel poverty alleviation schemes. The National Association of Local Councils (NALC) has responded. Its key messages include:-
- In general, Government should bring planning laws and guidance in line with Government policy, by making it conditional for energy saving and carbon neutral measures to be included in all relevant planning applications and building control matters;
- Improvements to the current regime of Government support and investment in electricity transmission infrastructure could be made by facilitating action by communities to undertake small-scale projects themselves;
- Local Councils should be given a more-specific power to operate community energy projects than the current power in Section 20 of the Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006 (the 2006 Act).
What the NALC says in response to the consultation questions includes that lack of funding, lack of technical expertise and a lack of political support from their principal authority are the main barriers (financial and non-financial), preventing the establishment, development and scaling of community energy projects in their areas, and that this reinforces the need for the Government to make it much easier for local Councils to apply for specific funding to deliver community energy projects, to source specific technical guidance for them (and in partnership with other community groups), as well as removing the unsustainable mechanism of local councils having to apply for any such funding at all through their principal authority, and that a lack of access to direct funding to deliver community energy projects for local Councils, and an ongoing need for local Councils to be given a more-specific power to operate community energy projects in their areas, remain the main two barriers.
The 2006 Act makes provision about the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases, the alleviation of fuel poverty, the promotion of microgeneration and the use of heat produced from renewable sources, compliance with building regulations relating to emissions of greenhouse gases and the use of fuel and power, the renewables obligation relating to the generation and supply of electricity and the adjustment of transmission charges for electricity; and for connected purposes. The principal purpose of the Act is by Section 1(1) to enhance the UK’s contribution to combating climate change. In performing functions under the 2006 Act, the relevant persons and bodies (including any public authority) shall have regard to the principal purpose set out in subsection (1), the desirability of alleviating fuel poverty, and the desirability of securing a diverse and viable long-term energy supply.
Section 20 of the 2006 Act gives parish councils and community councils power to “encourage or promote” local energy saving measures.
The 2006 Act must be considered in conjunction in particular with the Energy Act 2004 and the Climate Change Act 2008. There is separate legislation in Wales, notably the Environment (Wales) Act 2016 and Regulations thereunder.
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
June 28th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsTwo decisions on legitimate expectation. The first is R (BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL) v SoS for TRANSPORT (2024) EWHC 1487 (Admin). It concerned both substantive and procedural legitimate expectation. The terms of a letter from the SoS to the Council confirming that Private Finance Initiative credits had been issued towards the capital costs of a highway project, and the Local Government PFI Project Support Guide (2009-10), had not created a legitimate expectation that if the PFI contract was terminated or varied the Government would withdraw credits only in exceptional circumstances. However, the SoS had acted unfairly by withdrawing the credits without offering the Council a further opportunity to make representations. On substantive legitimate expectation, it was reasonably to be expected that the Council would rely on the guidance in the July 2010 letter and in Section G of the Guide on the topic of termination or variation of PFI contracts. The Government had intended that the claimant should rely on Section G of the Guide for that purpose. However, the examples in Section G offered practical advice and guidance to local authorities on the application of the government’s policy to possible scenarios and were not intended to be read as an unqualified commitment by the Government as to how it would proceed in the circumstances of any actual case. The language was deliberately qualified in its terms. The July 2010 letter and Section G para 2.1 of the Guide did not give rise to the substantive legitimate expectation for which the claimant contended. However, as to procedural legitimate expectation/fairness, there had ben a clear shift in the Government’s position following the Council’s submission of its Full Business Case in August 2023, which had not been made known to the Council and upon which the Council had no opportunity to reflect or to engage, but which had very significantly affected the outcome of the process. In the light of what had gone before, fairness demanded that the Council should have been given the further opportunity to engage and respond.
The second decision is R (DONALD) v SSHD (2024) EWHC 1492 (Admin), again concerned with both substantive and procedural legitimate expectation, amongst other matters. A decision by the SoS not to implement two of the 30 recommendations made in the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, an independent assessment of the events leading up to the “Windrush” scandal, was unlawful. The decision breached a legitimate expectation that the Home Office would not decline to implement any of the recommendations without first consulting relevant stakeholders; breached the public sector equality duty; and indirectly discriminated against the Windrush community. As to substantive legitimate expectation, the Home Office had published a plan of future action in relation to a policy that was to be kept under review and would continue to develop. It contained no explicit statement that all 30 recommendations would be implemented, and nor was that implied. Although its focus was on how, and not whether, the recommendations would be implemented, that did not amount to a sufficiently clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation as to give rise to a substantive legal expectation that all of the representations would be implemented. Indeed, it indicated that some of the Recommendations would be the subject of further investigation and deliberation. Moreover, it had been published to the world at large. While a substantive legitimate expectation could arise from a promise made to the world at large, the cases in which that happened were ones in which the main beneficiaries of the promises formed a relatively small group. It was difficult to envisage a case in which the Government would be bound by a representation made generally or to a diverse class. As to procedural legitimate expectation, there was a legitimate procedural expectation that the SoS would consult with relevant stakeholders, including the Windrush community. Although there was no explicit statement to that effect, the prospect of a lack of consultation was so conspicuously unfair as to give rise to a legitimate expectation that there would be consultation.
TUPE
June 27th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in GeneralCan a reorganisation/ mergers, involving the transfer of functions between public authorities, constitute a TUPE transfer? No : says the EAT in the NHS case of BICKNELL. This followed the EAT’s decision in NICHOLLS v CROYDON LBC (2019) ICR 542. The purchasing or commissioning of goods or services not on the market is held not in itself to be capable of constituting an “ economic activity “ within the TUPE definition of a “ business transfer”. If the Croydon Council case is wrong, it requires the Court of Appeal to correct that.
EMPLOYMENT
June 27th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsIn TAYLORS SERVICE LTD v HMRC (2024) EAT 102 the appellants are employers of workers on zero hours contracts. They provide transport by minibus for their workers from and too home. Judge Stout holds that the travel time is not “ time work “ for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage.
ABUSE OF PROCESS
June 27th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationIn TINKLER v ESKEN (2024) EWHC 1490 (Ch) the defendant succeeded in an application to strike out a claim. The claim alleged an unlawful means conspiracy. It raised the same or very similar issues as those raised between the same parties in an earlier fraud claim. The strike out succeeded on two bases. First, the claimant had previously admitted that the conspiracy claim was parasitic on the fraud claim and that it would be an abuse of process for him to proceed with it if the fraud claim failed. A party can be bound by an admission of law in the same way that they could be bound by an admission of fact. To allow him to withdraw the admission would significantly prejudice the defendant and would not be in the administration of justice. Second, in any event, the conspiracy claim would be struck out as a collateral attack on the findings made in the fraud judgment. This was an abuse contrary to the HENDERSON v HENDERSON principle.
POSSESSION
June 27th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Land, Goods and ServicesIn UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM v PERSONS UNKNOWN (2024) EWHC 1529 (KB) the Claimant is granted possession of part of its land that is being used as a protest camp. The order is to prevent persons unknown from entering and using the land. Acts of vandalism and intimidation had occurred there. Once a protest turned into a base account for criminal activity any licence to enter and use the land ceased to apply; para 51.
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLEs OF ASSOCIATION
June 25th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Capital Finance and CompaniesIn SYSPAL CAPITAL LTD v TRUMAN ( 2024 ) EWHC 1561 ( Ch) Roth J at paras 23-26 inc summarised the principles of interpretation by reference to the Supreme Court in WOOD v CAPITA )2017) UKSC 24 and in SARA & HOSSEIN ASSET HOLDINGS LTD v BLACKS OUTDOOR RETAIL LTD (2023) UKSC 2, and added that, when it comes to the background facts, the Articles of Association of a Company are in “ somewhat special category “ as compared to a private contract. As explained by Snowden J, as he then was, in RE EURO ACCESSORIES LTD (2021) EWHC 47 (Ch), approved by the Court of Appeal in VENTURA CAPITAL GP LTD v DNANUDGE LTD (2023) EWCA Civ 1142, the process of interpretation to arrive at the meaning of a provision in a Company’s Articles of Association must concentrate on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, when viewed in light of the scheme and purpose of the Articles in general, any extrinsic facts about the company or its membership that would reasonably be ascertainable by any reader of the Company’s constitution and public findings at Companies House and commercial common sense.
COUNTY COURT APPEALS
June 25th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationIn JARVIS v METRO TAXIS ( (2024) EWHC 1452 (KB) it is held that where a Circuit Judge in the County Court has allowed an Appeal against a District Judge’s decision refusing a claim, and goes on to rehear and dismiss the claim, an Appeal against the Circuit Judge’s decision lies to the Court of Appeal, and not to any other Court. That is because it is a second Appeal.
Save in contempt cases, Appeals from a Circuit Judge sitting in the High Court ordinarily lie to the High Court. Permission to bring such an Appeal can be given where the Court considers that the Appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other compelling reason for the Appeal to be held.
On the other hand however Appeals from County Court decisions that are themselves made on appeal lie only to the Court of Appeal. Moreover, permission to bring them is subject to more exacting requirements. These are that the Appeal has a real prospect of success or would raise an important point of principle or practice, or there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. In other words, parties in civil cases who have already enjoyed access to one appeal should be granted a further right of appeal only exceptionally.
CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
June 24th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsIn CANTOR FITZGERALD v YES BANK ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 695 the Court of Appeal, at paras 33 and 34, reaffirms the principles to apply in construing a contract, in that case an engagement letter. The Court is required to consider the ordinary meaning of the words used in the context of (1) the words used in the context of the contract as a whole and (2) the relevant (i) factual and (ii) commercial background. This excludes prior negotiations. The objective is to identify the parties, but in an objective sense, That is what (i) a reasonable person (ii) having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using in the contract to mean. Interpretation is an iterative process. Rival interpretations should be tested against (i) the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences.