Community infrastructure levy

March 4th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Capital Finance and Companies

In R (Orbital Shopping Park Swindon Ltd) v Swindon BC [2016] EWHC 448 (Admin) Patterson J summarised, so far as relevant to the case before her, the statutory scheme with respect to the Community Infrastructure Levy (“the CIL”), charged by a local authority under Section 206(1) of the Planning Act 2008 (“PA 2008”) and the CIL Regulations 2010, as amended, in respect of development in the authority’s area, as follows:-

  1. A local authority’s power to charge CIL in respect of development within its area arises when development is commenced in reliance on a planning permission involving chargeable development: Section 208 of PA 2008;
  2. The ability to charge CIL is a discretionary one on the part of a charging authority: Section 206 of PA 2008;
  3. The CIL Regulations can provide for works of a specified kind not to be treated as development;
  4. That is what Regulation 6 of the CIL Regulations is concerned with;
  5. Regulation 6(1) sets out expressly which works are not to be treated as development for the purposes of Section 208 of PA 2008;
  6. That includes work in respect of an existing building for which planning permission is required only because of Section 55(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“TCPA 1990”);
  7. Section 55(2)(a) of TCPA 1990 sets out uses of land or operations which are not to be taken to involve development;
  8. Section 55(2)(a)(i) states that works which affect only the interior of the building do not involve development;
  9. Section 55(2A) empowers the SoS, by Development Order, to specify or describe circumstances in which Section 55(2) does not apply to operations set out in Section 55(2)(a);
  10. The SoS has made the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015;
  11. CIL can be imposed only when both the liability and the amount of the liability are clearly defined.

The Council had acted unlawfully by interpreting two separate planning permissions as one. The Claimants had taken advantage of a legislative scheme which permitted it to submit two separate planning applications for each act of operational development that it wished to pursue. There was no manipulation of the system for any ulterior and/illegal motive in splitting the operational works.

 

Extensions of time

March 4th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

There is no special rule for public authorities when it comes to applications for an extension of time. The principles applicable derive from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Mitchell v NGN (2013) EWCA Civ 1537 and Denton v White (2014) EWCA Civ 906.  A Judge must approach an application for relief from sanction in three stages, as follows:-

  1. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply with the rules. The focus should be on whether the breach has been serious or significant. If a Judge concludes that a breach is not serious or significant, then relief will usually be granted and it will usually be unnecessary to spend much time on the second or third stages; but if the Judge decides that the breach is serious or significant, then the second and third stages assume greater importance.
  2. The second stage is to consider why the failure occurred, that is to say whether there is a good reason for it. If there is a good reason for the default, the Court will be likely to decide that relief should be granted. However, even if there is a serious or significant breach and no good reason for the breach, this does not mean that the application for relief will automatically fail. It is necessary in every case to move to the third stage.
  3. The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable the Court to deal justly with the application. The two factors specifically mentioned in CPR rule 3.9 are of particular importance and should be given particular weight. They are (a) the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and (b) the need to enforce compliance with Rules, Practice Directions and Court Orders. The Court must, in considering all the circumstances of the case so as to enable it to deal with the application justly, give particular weight to these two important factors. In doing so, it will take account of the seriousness and significance of the breach (which has been assessed at the first stage) and any explanation (which has been considered at the second stage). The more serious or significant the breach the less likely it is that relief will be granted unless there is good reason for it.


In SSHD v Razia Begum (2016) EWCA Civ 122 the Court of Appeal has reaffirmed, at paragraphs 14/15 and 23, that there is no special rule for public law cases.  However, the “importance of the issues to the public at large” can properly be taken into account at the third stage.

 

Model Code of Conduct (Wales)

March 3rd, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Standards

Section 50(2) of the Local Government Act 2000 requires a Model Code to be issued by Order as regards the conduct which is expected of members, and co-opted members, of “relevant authorities” (as defined) in Wales. These are County Councils, County Borough Councils, Community Councils, Fire and Rescue Authorities and National Park Authorities.  There was duly made the Local Authorities (Model Code of Conduct) (Wales) Order 2008, S.I. 2008/788 (W.82), (“the 2008 Order”).  The Schedule to the 2008 Order sets out such a Model Code of Conduct.

This is now amended by the Local Authorities (Model Code of Conduct) (Wales) (Amendment) Order 2016, S.I. 2016/84 (W.38), (“the 2016 Order”), coming into force on 1 April 2016. The 2016 Order recites that the Welsh Ministers (i) have carried out the requisite consultation and (ii) are satisfied that the amendments are consistent with the principles specified in the Conduct of Members (Principles) (Wales) Order 2001, S.I. 2001/2276.

Article 2 of the 2016 Order amends the following paragraphs of the Model Code set out in the Schedule to the 2008 Order:

paragraph 1(1), by inserting a definition of “register of members’ interests”;

paragraph 1(2), by inserting a definition of “proper officer” and providing clarification with regard to references to Standards Committees in relation to a Community Council;

paragraph 3(a), by omitting the reference to police Authorities;

paragraph 6(1)(c), by removing the requirement for members to report potential breaches of their Code of Conduct to the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales;

paragraphs 11(4), 15(2), 16(2) and 17, by transferring some functions from Monitoring Officers to the proper officers of Community Councils:

paragraph 12(2)(b)(iv), to reflect the new provisions contained in Part 8 of the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2011 in relation to allowances and payments;

paragraph 14, by inserting new sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B) which permit members to submit written submissions to a meeting which is dealing with a matter in respect of which a member has a prejudicial interest: written submissions are permitted only in those circumstances in which a member would otherwise be permitted to make oral representations to a meeting in relation to a matter, and if the member’s authority adopts a procedure for the submission of written submissions, members must comply with that procedure;

paragraph 15 is restated. The restatement clarifies that any interest disclosed, whether that interest is disclosed in accordance with paragraphs 11 or 15 of the Model Code, should be registered in the authority’s register of members’ interests, by giving notification to the Monitoring Officer, or, in relation to a Community Council, to the proper officer of that authority.

Article 2 of the Order omits paragraph 10(2)(b) of the Model Code set out in the Schedule to the 2008 Order. This clarifies that a member of a relevant authority is not to be regarded as having a personal interest in a matter when making, or participating in, decisions on behalf of the authority simply for the reason that the business being considered at the meeting affects that member’s ward.

 

Local Authority co-operation

March 3rd, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

A Judge recently struck out a claim brought by two dogs. He did not see how a dog could give instructions for a claim to be brought on its behalf.  Nor did he see that it could be liable for any orders made against it.  Another limitation on litigating is that you cannot sue yourself.  If there is a dispute it must be resolved without recourse to litigation when the disputants do not have separate legal personalities.  A local authority has only one legal personality. So for example the client side of the authority cannot sue the contractor side or vice versa; and the department, say the social services department, cannot sue another department of the same authority, say the housing department.  This is a somewhat anomalous situation, because it means that in the case of a unitary authority the departments have to resolve any differences without going to Court, whereas in a two-tier area, with the functions split between the tiers, the potential is there for the authorities to litigate with each other.

Section 27 of the Children Act 1989 is headed “Co-operation between authorities”. It contains a power: where it appears to a local authority that any other authority could help in the exercise of their functions with respect to the provision of services for children in need, the first authority may request the help of that other authority.  The Section also contains a duty: an authority whose help is so requested shall comply with the request (if it is compatible with their duties and obligations and does not unduly prejudice the discharge of any of their functions).

The case of M&A v Islington LBC [2016] EWHC 332 (Admin) was an application on behalf of two severely autistic children for judicial review of a failure to rehouse them, in accordance with Section 17 of the Act, where the sole authority involved was a London Borough, a unitary authority, both social services and housing authority.  Therefore Section 27 could not apply directly in the way it would as between a county council as social services authority and a district council as housing authority.

However, Collins J ruled that the requirements of Section 27 did apply indirectly. This was because the Council was statutorily required to act under the general guidance of the Secretary of State, and such guidance required the same degree of co-operation between departments in a unitary authority.

 

Unpaid council tax, court costs and lawful expenditure

February 29th, 2016 by Peter Oldham QC in Council Tax and Rates, Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

On Thursday 25th February, the Divisional Court gave judgment in the case of Rev Paul Nicolson v Grant Thornton.  This was Rev Nicolson’s appeal under the Audit Commission Act 1998 against the refusal of LB Haringey’s auditor to make a declaration of an unlawful item of account or issue a public interest report.

Rev Nicolson is an anti-poverty campaigner. He refused to pay council tax, and when he was taken to the magistrates’ court he lost and was ordered to pay costs of £125. The council’s right to claim costs was given by the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992. Haringey had a standard costs claim of £125 in such cases.  In a prior judicial review claim,  R ota  Nicolson v Tottenham Magistrates [2015] PTSR 1045, it had been held that the magistrates’ order had been unlawful as, at the hearing of the summons, there had been insufficient information for the magistrates to say whether £125 was a reasonable estimation of the costs incurred.

However, when Rev Nicolson also, and separately, objected to the auditors, they decided that the local authority had had sufficient information on which to decide that £125 was a proper charge.  The sum included aggregated costs, both direct and indirect, divided by the number of council tax summonses which Haringey had to deal with per year.   Accordingly the auditors decided that the item of account was lawful.  Rev Nicolson appealed.  The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal.  It declined to say that the auditors’ decision was unlawful, since they had considered the relevant factors,  and had given cogent reasons explaining their view.

Peter Oldham QC

 

 

Local authority boycotts

February 22nd, 2016 by Peter Oldham QC in Best Value, Decision making and Contracts, Non Judicial Control

A House of Commons briefing paper of 19th February 2016, which can be found here, notes that the Government is introducing new rules and guidance to limit the extent to which local authorities in England and Wales can use boycotts in their procurement and pensions investment policies.

On procurement, the Government has published Procurement Policy Note 01/16 on 17th February 2016 here which says:-

“Public procurement should never be used as a tool to boycott tenders from suppliers based in other countries, except where formal legal sanctions, embargoes and restrictions have been put in place by the UK Government.”

On pensions, the briefing paper refers to the DCLG’s consultation on the draft Local Government Pension Scheme (Management and Investment of Funds) Regulations 2016 (here), which closed on 19th February 2016, and to proposed guidance from SoS that environmental, social and corporate governance factors in investment decisions should reflect foreign policy.  The power to give guidance is in draft reg 7(1) and an authority’s investment strategy “must be in accordance” with it.

 

 

Benefit fraud

February 19th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Local Authority Powers

A DWP Consultation, for response by 31 March 2016, seeks views on a revised “Social Security Fraud Act 2001 Code of Practice on Obtaining Information”. The current Code is from 2002.  The Welfare Reform Act 2007 (Sections 46 to 48) extended local authority investigation powers to enable local authorities to investigate and prosecute fraud against certain DWP benefits alongside offences committed against Housing and Council Tax Benefit. These sections commenced in April 2008 and empower local authorities to investigate and prosecute certain DWP benefits providing there is a linked Housing/Council Tax Benefit claim. The required changes have been incorporated into Appendix 3 of the Code.

The Welfare Reform Act 2012 (Sections 122 and 123) extended the definition of social security benefits to include tax credits and child tax credits, for the purposes of Sections 109A (Authorisations for investigators) and Section 109B (Power to require information) of the Administration Act, when investigating benefit offences. These Sections commenced in April 2013, therefore tax credits and child tax credits are treated as social security benefits and are subject to those provisions and the revised Code.

Other amendments due to operational changes in the DWP have been incorporated into the Code, mainly the creation of DWP’s Fraud and Error Service, which will enable a single fraud investigation to be undertaken to investigate all social security benefits, including those currently administered by local authorities and HMRC. The reference to local authority powers in the Code is relevant whilst individual local authorities still have Authorised Officers or investigation staff undertaking social security benefit fraud investigations. Once a local authority benefit investigation team transfers into DWP that local authority will no longer be bound by the Code.

There are changes to the layout of the Code, with the aim of making it clearer and simpler to use. This includes the introduction of five new appendices providing the more detailed information on who can be required to provide information, examples of the type of information that may be requested, when and about whom may Authorised Officers require information, details to be included in requests for information, and contact details

The Code outlines the important safeguards that exist and penalties against misuse of the powers, including confidentiality, security and data retention arrangements, and legal professional privilege.

 

Compulsory Purchase

February 12th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Land, Goods and Services

In Phoenix Developments v Lancashire County Council [2016] UKUT 38(LC) it was held in the Upper Tribunal (Lands) that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section 1 of the Land Compensation Act 1961 to determine compensation for land in Accrington acquired by compulsory purchase from a property development company, notwithstanding that an expert had previously determined a price for the land, under an option agreement.  The Council had entered into an option agreement to purchase land at a price, to be determined by an expert as the market value of the land plus all other sums the landowner would be entitled to if the land was acquired compulsorily.  The Council sought to exercise the option and the expert determined a price.  However, the sale was not completed as the landowner was dissatisfied with the expert’s determination and sought to withdraw.  The Council then acquired the land through the use of its compulsory powers.  The Council submitted that (1) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to determine the compensation payable for the land, as the expert’s binding determination of the contractual purchase price meant that there was no question of “disputed compensation” capable of being referred to the Tribunal; (2) there was an implied term of the option agreement that any price determination by the expert would remain binding between the parties in the event of compulsory purchase.  Martin Rodger QC, Deputy President, refused the application.  He held that the expert’s determination was irrelevant to the question whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the reference.  The land was acquired by the exercise of compulsory powers and there had been no agreement between the parties on the compensation payable in respect of that acquisition.  The expert’s determination had been made for a different purpose.  Even if the price determined by the expert included a sum reflecting statutory compensation, there had been no agreement by the landowner to treat that determination as conclusive of the value of its entitlement. The Deputy President further held that there was no implied term. It was neither necessary nor obvious that the expert’s determination of the contractual purchase price would have been intended by reasonable people in the position of the parties to be determinative also of the claimant’s statutory entitlement in the event of the land being acquired by the exercise of compulsory powers.  It could not be said that the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence without such an implied term.

As to (1), the position was the converse of that in BP Oil UK Ltd v Kent County Council [2003] EWCA Civ 798.  The question in that case was whether an agreement entered into after an acquiring authority had entered and taken possession of land had the effect that the landowner’s statutory entitlement to compensation had become a contractual right to a purchase price which, in default of agreement, was to be determined by the Lands Tribunal applying the statutory compensation code; the question was significant because the reference had been made to the Tribunal after the expiry of the limitation period for a statutory claim arising on the date of entry.  Carnwath LJ, as he then was, observed that the fact that the contractual method of calculating the consideration payable for the land would replicate the method that would apply under the statutory code, “did not deprive the clause of contractual effect” (as the acquiring authority had argued). The Court of Appeal was not dealing with a case such as the present, in which an enforceable contractual right to acquire land at a determined price had been put on one side by the acquiring authority in favour of the exercise of compulsory powers.

As to (2), the Deputy President applied the Supreme Court decision in Marks & Spencer v BNP Paribas Securities (2015) UKSC 72.  A term can be implied only if, without the term, the contract would lack “commercial or practical coherence”.

 

Funding Obligations

February 8th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

In Forge Care Homes Ltd v Cardiff & Vale University Health Board, Cardiff City Council and Others [2016] EWCA Civ 26 the Court of Appeal was concerned with the respective funding obligations of local authorities and NHS Local Health Boards with respect to the cost of the provision by registered nurses of nursing care to residents in care homes who require some nursing care, but for whom this is not a primary need.  At issue was the proper construction of Section 49 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001, which is applicable in Wales and England and prohibits local authorities from providing nursing care by a registered nurse.  The case arose in circumstances where the registered nurse recruited by the care home provided both nursing care, in the sense of medical and clinical care, and social care, in the sense of care of a kind which does not depend upon the skill and experience of a registered nurse and can be provided by non-specialist care workers.  The Court of Appeal ruled that a distinction required to be drawn between these two types of services, with the former being paid for by the NHS and the latter by the local authority.  Lord Justice Laws said that it does not follow from the fact that a nurse needs to be on call at all times that everything she or he does on duty has to be treated as a service which needs to be provided by a registered nurse.  What matters is the actual work being done.  The question is as to the various and changing factual circumstances and the extent to which the registered nurse’s activities and individual tasks in the care home need to be provided by a registered nurse.  Lloyd Jones LJ agreed.  Elias LJ dissented.  Therefore the NHS can lawfully set the rate they pay to care homes to reflect time spent, directly or indirectly, on nursing tasks that have to be carried out by a nurse, but excluding time spent on social care.  The latter has to be funded by the care homes or local authorities, or, subject to their means, the residents of the care homes.

 

Exit Payments

February 8th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

On 5 February 2016 HMG has issued (1) a Consultation Paper on “Limiting Public Sector Exit Payments”, and (2) a Guidance Note on “Public Sector Pay and Terms”.

 

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