In PAN v MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2024) UKPC 31 Lady Simler said at paragraphs 37-39 on the duty to provide reasons that, whilst there is no general duty universally imposed on all decision-makers to give reasons, the Courts have recognised ” many circumstances ” in which procedural fairness requires that reasons should be given to a person  adversely affected by a decision, even in a statutory context in which no express duty to give reasons is imposed. Lady Simler said that the benefits of giving reasons are clear : they concentrate the mind and impose a discipline which may contribute to better, more transparent decision-making. The trend of the law has been towards an increase d recognition of the duty to give reasons. There has been a ” strong momentum” in favour of greater openness and transparency in decision-making. The touchstone for what fairness requires in this context is often judged by the ability to make effective the right to challenge an adverse public law decision by judicial review. Even where reasons are given voluntarily, they should be reviewed by reference to the same standards as are applied to reasons given in accordance with an established duty to provide them. Lady Simler added at para 40 that there is no uniform standard or threshold which reasons must satisfy in every case. What is required inevitably depends on the context and the circumstances of the individual case. The nature of the decision itself will affect what is required by reasons.

In THURROCK COUNCIL v ADAMS  ( 2024 ) EWHC 2576 ( KB ) a precautionary injunction was continued against persons unknown to prevent apprehended future obstruction of the highway and trespass by climate change activists. The fact that they were exercising their ECHR rights of freedom  of expression and freedom  of peaceful assembly could not normally justify a trespass. However, where these rights were engaged, the Court had to consider the proportionality of the draft injunction sought.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in McAlleenon (2024) UKSC 31 concerns the exercise of discretion by a Court where the public authority defendant argues that the claimant has an adequate alternative remedy such that judicial review should be refused. The Supreme Court holds that a private prosecution or civil claim in nuisance did not constitute suitable alternative remedies to judicial review. The Supreme Court says that judicial review is concerned with  examining whether a public authority has acted lawfully. The Court has a supervisory role only. Its task is not typically to resolve disputes of fact but to determine the legal question of whether the public authority had proper grounds for acting as it did on the basis of the information available to it. As such, usually, judicial review claims can and should be be determined without the need for procedures which are directed to resolving disputed questions of fact, such as cross-examination of witnesses. Moreover, in human rights cases the Court’s role remains essentially one of review; and complaint to an Ombudsman does not constitute a suitable alternative remedy.

IN PYANEANDEE v LEAN (2024) UKPC 27 Lady Simler observes at para 44 that , although there is a difference between the continuing duty of candour and the continuing duty of disclosure , the latter is often, in the broadest sense unnecessary, if the former duty is discharged to its fullest extent.

RIDLEY v KIRTLEY  ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 884 holds that the exercise of discretion to extend time for the lodging of an appeal to the EAT should recognize the legally significant decision between the case of an appellant who lodged a notice of appeal and nearly all the required documents within the time limit, and one who lodged nothing until after the time limit had expired.

In BICKNELL v NHS NOTTINGHAM (2024) EAT 103, applying NICHOLLS V CROYDON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2019) ICR 542, it is held that the commissioning of services is not itself an economic entity for the purposes of TUPE following a reorganisation, unless the person commissioning the services is also providing those services on the market. For commissioning to be an economic activity, the commissioner had to supply goods and services on the market. If NICHOLLS was wrong, that had to be corrected by the Court of Appeal.

The question arising on the appeal in DJ v BARNSLEY MBC (2024) EWCA Civ 841 was whether a local authority can be vicariously liable for torts committed against a child by a foster carer who is also a relative of the child. This question was left open by the Supreme Court in ARMES v NOTTINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (2018) AC 355. The Court of appeal in the Barnsley case held that, on the specific facts of that case, the authority was liable. That was on the basis that the relationship between the authority and the carers was akin to employment. The Court of Appeal did not however lay down a general rule that a local authority will always be vicariously liable for torts committed by foster carers who are related to the child.  Nor did they give any indication about the circumstances in which vicarious liability might arise under the present legislation and regulatory regime.

The Supreme Court in LIPTON v BA CITY FLYER LTD ( 2024 ) UKSC 24 addresses important questions regarding the status of accrued EU law rights. An important question raised by the appeal was what law applied to a cause of action that accrued under an EU regulation prior to Brexit. The Supreme Court was required to examine the domestic legislation which implemented Brexit, notably the European Union ( Withdrawal ) Act 2018. The Supreme Court states that a basic principle of the rule of law is that the applicable law is that in force at the time an event occurs. It is not some different version introduced at a later date.

The owner of a watercourse has a property right in the watercourse. That includes a right to preserve the quality of the water. That right is protected by the common law. The discharge of polluting effluent is an actionable nuisance if the pollution interferes with the use or enjoyment of the property.

A body which exercises statutory powers, such as a sewerage undertaker, is liable in the same way as any other person if it is responsible for a nuisance, trespass or other tort, unless either it: (i) is acting within its statutory powers, or (ii) has been granted some statutory immunity from suit. If a sewerage undertaker interferes with a person’s rights, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between interferences which Parliament has authorised, which are lawful, and interferences which Parliament has not authorised, which are unlawful. When drawing this distinction, two principles are relevant. First, a person’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of its property and to access the courts are protected by both the common law and the Human Rights Act 1998. The principle of legality holds that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. A statute will, therefore, only authorise what would otherwise be an unlawful interference with property rights, or deprive a person of the right to bring a legal claim, if this is clear from or a necessary implication of the express language used by Parliament. Secondly, Parliament will not be taken to have intended that statutory powers should be exercised, or duties performed, in a way which interferes with private rights, unless the interference is inevitable.

The issue before the Supreme Court in MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL COMPANY LTD v UNITED UTILITIES WATER LIMITED (2024) UKSC was whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Water Industry Act 1991 excluded common law rights of action in nuisance and trespass. The Supreme Court held that it did not.

In TINKLER v ESKEN (2024) EWHC 1490 (Ch) the defendant succeeded in an application to strike out a claim. The claim alleged an unlawful means conspiracy. It raised the same or very similar issues as those raised between the same parties in an earlier fraud claim. The strike out succeeded on two bases. First, the claimant had previously admitted that the conspiracy claim was parasitic on the fraud claim and that it would be an abuse of process for him to proceed with it if the fraud claim failed. A party can be bound by an admission of law in the same way that they could be bound by an admission of fact. To allow him to withdraw the admission would significantly prejudice the defendant and would not be in the administration of justice. Second, in any event, the conspiracy claim would be struck out as a collateral attack on the findings made in the fraud judgment. This was an abuse contrary to the HENDERSON v HENDERSON principle.