In EDGE TELECOMMUNICATIONS V OFCOM (2025) EWHC 2758 (KB) Linden J reaffirms that most statutory duties in the public context are owed to the public at large.. In cases of legislation establishing an administrative system to promote social welfare, “ exceptionally clear statutory language “ is necessary to create any right to damages for breach of statutory duty.

HART v WING-SAN CHIN (2025) UKPC 51 summarises at para 32 the law on when a person should receive NOTICE in advance of ADVERSE COMMENTS OR FINDINGS as a matter of natural justice and procedural fairness :

1. The standards of fairness are not immutable;
2. They are not to be applied identically in every situation;
3. The requirements in any case depend, crucially, upon the particular facts and circumstances;
4. Fairness will very often require that a person who may be ADVERSELY AFFECTED by the decision will have an OPPORTUNITY to make representations on his own behalf, either before the decision is taken, with a view to producing a favourable result, or, after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification, or both;
5. Fairness will often require that the person affected is INFORMED OF THE GIST of the case that he/she has to answer;
6. The more finality there is in the conclusions reached by an inquiry and reflected in its report and the greater the strength of their expression, the more that is required to be done to ENSURE THAT THE PROCESS IS FAIR;

Breach of the requirement of fairness is a serious matter, even if it is devoid of practical consequences.

Public authorities and public sector professionals are prima facie subject to the same general principleas as private persons. In KHAMBA v HARROW LBC (2025) EWHC 2803 (KB) Foster J holds, at para 40, that when a local authority is exercising statutory functions under the Mental Health Act 1983 there is NO ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY unless such a duty of care would be imposed under conventional principles of tort. Public authorities and public sector professionala are, in the same way as private individuals, generally not under any DUTY TO PREVENT the occurrence of harm to third parties. At para 55 she says that the mere foreseeability of harm is not a sufficient basis for a duty of care to arise.

On tortious liability, see MARPLES v SoS for EDUCATION (2025) EWHC 2794 (Ch) : (1) on misfeasance in public office, including targeted malice, at paras 158-177; and (2) on negligence, including assumption of responsibility and pure economic loss, at paras 178-210.

The law on liability for the tort of misfeasance in PUBLIC OFFICE is set out at paras 181-186 inc in WILKINSON v HMRC (2025) EWHC 2773 (KB).

An award of COSTS is NOT intended to provide compensation for loss in the same way as awards of DAMAGES in tort or for breach of contract. In relation to TORT, the purpose of damages is to place the successful claimant, so far as money can achieve, in the position he or she would have been in if he or she had not been injured by the wrongful act. In cases of BREACH OF CONTRACT, the award of damages is aimed at putting the claimant in as good a position as he or she would have been in if the contract had been performed. In contrast to an award of damages, by which the Court is giving effect to a party’s legal right to reparation, an ORDER FOR COSTS is a DISCRETIONARY remedy ( with a statutory basis). The Court has regard to ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. It is NOT an attempt to restore a party to the position it would have been in if it had not had to litigate to assert its rights. A Costs Order is “very different” from an award of damages. The Court is not addressing loss. The award of costs is not an entitlement. There is an entitlement to reparation of loss. So stated in PROCESS & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS LTD v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2025) UKSC 36.

In R(SAG) v WINCHMORE SCHOOL (2025) EWCA Civ 1335 Edis LJ at paras 44-46 described as “ compelling” Chamberlain J’s analysis in R(KP) v SoS FOR FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH & DEVELOPMENT AFFAIRS (2025) EWHC 370(Admin) at paras 55-57 and 60/61 of (1) the nature of rationality review and (2) the relevance of the standard of review, as regards PROCESS IRRATIONALITY and OUTCOME IRRATIONALITY, and ANXIOUS SCRUTINY.

Adequate alternative remedies to Judicial Review are addressed in R ( AMMORI ) v SSHD ( 92025) EWCA Civ 1311 at paras 42-49.

In NORTH WARWICKSHIRE v DEFENDANTS LISTED AT SCHEDULE A to JUDGMENT ( 2025 ) EWHC 2403 ( KB) the Court emphasises the importance of a REVIEW HEARING, particularly in cases involving PERSONS  UNKNOWN. At para 13, the Judge says that a review hearing is NOT an opportunity to review the merits of the original hearing afresh. The proper focus of the review is to consider whether anything material has changed since the injunction and power of arrest were granted.

In MACPHERSON v SUNDERLAND CITY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 1159 the Court of Appeal emphasizes that the fact that someone profoundly disagrees with a Court Order does not entitle them to choose not to comply with it : paragraph 33. A sentence of immediate imprisonment was “ plainly right “ , “ proportionate “ and “ appropriate “ , having regard to “ serious and repeated “ flouting of the Order: repeated breaches of Orders will “ almost inevitably  lead to custodial sentences being passed “ : para 37.