In ABACUS v SoS (2024) EWHC 2753 (Admin) Chamberlain J refused to stay judicial review proceedings challenging provisions of primary legislation. The legislation itself  had completed its Parliamentary process and received Royal Assent. However, it had not yet been commenced. In the particular circumstances, the balance of convenience test applied and favoured allowing the claims to proceed, at least until the stage of determining whether permission to apply for Judicial Review should or should not be granted.

In THURROCK COUNCIL and ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL (2024) EWHC 2750 (KB) Bourne J considered, at paras 40-58 inc,  principles emerging from the case law which are relevant to disputes about PROTEST ACTIVITY taking place on or affecting the USE OF THE HIGHWAY. Whilst the public generally has a licence to to be on the highway, if they exceed that licence by doing something on that land which they do not have permission to do, such as TUNNELLING, they commit TRESPASS. Trespass is a tort of STRICT LIABILITY. A Claimant does NOT have to show that have to show damage. The exercise of ECHR rights pursuant to Arts 10 & 11 cannot normally justify a trespass. It is a PUBLIC NUISANCE to obstruct or hinder the FREE PASSAGE of the public along the highway.

In APPLICATION BY JR 222 FOR JUDICIAL Review (2024) UKSC 35 the Supreme Court from para 72 considers statutory interpretation, including the principle that Courts should seek to avoid an interpretation that produces an ABSURD result. They say that absurdity is to be given a “ very wide meaning “. It covers, amongst other things, unworkability, impracticality, inconvenience, anomaly or illogicality. The Supreme Court also considers when reliance may be put on Hansard.

In PAN v MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2024) UKPC 31 Lady Simler said at paragraphs 37-39 on the duty to provide reasons that, whilst there is no general duty universally imposed on all decision-makers to give reasons, the Courts have recognised ” many circumstances ” in which procedural fairness requires that reasons should be given to a person  adversely affected by a decision, even in a statutory context in which no express duty to give reasons is imposed. Lady Simler said that the benefits of giving reasons are clear : they concentrate the mind and impose a discipline which may contribute to better, more transparent decision-making. The trend of the law has been towards an increase d recognition of the duty to give reasons. There has been a ” strong momentum” in favour of greater openness and transparency in decision-making. The touchstone for what fairness requires in this context is often judged by the ability to make effective the right to challenge an adverse public law decision by judicial review. Even where reasons are given voluntarily, they should be reviewed by reference to the same standards as are applied to reasons given in accordance with an established duty to provide them. Lady Simler added at para 40 that there is no uniform standard or threshold which reasons must satisfy in every case. What is required inevitably depends on the context and the circumstances of the individual case. The nature of the decision itself will affect what is required by reasons.

In THURROCK COUNCIL v ADAMS  ( 2024 ) EWHC 2576 ( KB ) a precautionary injunction was continued against persons unknown to prevent apprehended future obstruction of the highway and trespass by climate change activists. The fact that they were exercising their ECHR rights of freedom  of expression and freedom  of peaceful assembly could not normally justify a trespass. However, where these rights were engaged, the Court had to consider the proportionality of the draft injunction sought.

The appeal to the Supreme Court in McAlleenon (2024) UKSC 31 concerns the exercise of discretion by a Court where the public authority defendant argues that the claimant has an adequate alternative remedy such that judicial review should be refused. The Supreme Court holds that a private prosecution or civil claim in nuisance did not constitute suitable alternative remedies to judicial review. The Supreme Court says that judicial review is concerned with  examining whether a public authority has acted lawfully. The Court has a supervisory role only. Its task is not typically to resolve disputes of fact but to determine the legal question of whether the public authority had proper grounds for acting as it did on the basis of the information available to it. As such, usually, judicial review claims can and should be be determined without the need for procedures which are directed to resolving disputed questions of fact, such as cross-examination of witnesses. Moreover, in human rights cases the Court’s role remains essentially one of review; and complaint to an Ombudsman does not constitute a suitable alternative remedy.

IN PYANEANDEE v LEAN (2024) UKPC 27 Lady Simler observes at para 44 that , although there is a difference between the continuing duty of candour and the continuing duty of disclosure , the latter is often, in the broadest sense unnecessary, if the former duty is discharged to its fullest extent.

RIDLEY v KIRTLEY  ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 884 holds that the exercise of discretion to extend time for the lodging of an appeal to the EAT should recognize the legally significant decision between the case of an appellant who lodged a notice of appeal and nearly all the required documents within the time limit, and one who lodged nothing until after the time limit had expired.

In BICKNELL v NHS NOTTINGHAM (2024) EAT 103, applying NICHOLLS V CROYDON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL (2019) ICR 542, it is held that the commissioning of services is not itself an economic entity for the purposes of TUPE following a reorganisation, unless the person commissioning the services is also providing those services on the market. For commissioning to be an economic activity, the commissioner had to supply goods and services on the market. If NICHOLLS was wrong, that had to be corrected by the Court of Appeal.

The question arising on the appeal in DJ v BARNSLEY MBC (2024) EWCA Civ 841 was whether a local authority can be vicariously liable for torts committed against a child by a foster carer who is also a relative of the child. This question was left open by the Supreme Court in ARMES v NOTTINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (2018) AC 355. The Court of appeal in the Barnsley case held that, on the specific facts of that case, the authority was liable. That was on the basis that the relationship between the authority and the carers was akin to employment. The Court of Appeal did not however lay down a general rule that a local authority will always be vicariously liable for torts committed by foster carers who are related to the child.  Nor did they give any indication about the circumstances in which vicarious liability might arise under the present legislation and regulatory regime.