The law on liability for the tort of misfeasance in PUBLIC OFFICE is set out at paras 181-186 inc in WILKINSON v HMRC (2025) EWHC 2773 (KB).

An award of COSTS is NOT intended to provide compensation for loss in the same way as awards of DAMAGES in tort or for breach of contract. In relation to TORT, the purpose of damages is to place the successful claimant, so far as money can achieve, in the position he or she would have been in if he or she had not been injured by the wrongful act. In cases of BREACH OF CONTRACT, the award of damages is aimed at putting the claimant in as good a position as he or she would have been in if the contract had been performed. In contrast to an award of damages, by which the Court is giving effect to a party’s legal right to reparation, an ORDER FOR COSTS is a DISCRETIONARY remedy ( with a statutory basis). The Court has regard to ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES. It is NOT an attempt to restore a party to the position it would have been in if it had not had to litigate to assert its rights. A Costs Order is “very different” from an award of damages. The Court is not addressing loss. The award of costs is not an entitlement. There is an entitlement to reparation of loss. So stated in PROCESS & INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS LTD v FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2025) UKSC 36.

In R(SAG) v WINCHMORE SCHOOL (2025) EWCA Civ 1335 Edis LJ at paras 44-46 described as “ compelling” Chamberlain J’s analysis in R(KP) v SoS FOR FOREIGN, COMMONWEALTH & DEVELOPMENT AFFAIRS (2025) EWHC 370(Admin) at paras 55-57 and 60/61 of (1) the nature of rationality review and (2) the relevance of the standard of review, as regards PROCESS IRRATIONALITY and OUTCOME IRRATIONALITY, and ANXIOUS SCRUTINY.

Adequate alternative remedies to Judicial Review are addressed in R ( AMMORI ) v SSHD ( 92025) EWCA Civ 1311 at paras 42-49.

In NORTH WARWICKSHIRE v DEFENDANTS LISTED AT SCHEDULE A to JUDGMENT ( 2025 ) EWHC 2403 ( KB) the Court emphasises the importance of a REVIEW HEARING, particularly in cases involving PERSONS  UNKNOWN. At para 13, the Judge says that a review hearing is NOT an opportunity to review the merits of the original hearing afresh. The proper focus of the review is to consider whether anything material has changed since the injunction and power of arrest were granted.

In MACPHERSON v SUNDERLAND CITY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 1159 the Court of Appeal emphasizes that the fact that someone profoundly disagrees with a Court Order does not entitle them to choose not to comply with it : paragraph 33. A sentence of immediate imprisonment was “ plainly right “ , “ proportionate “ and “ appropriate “ , having regard to “ serious and repeated “ flouting of the Order: repeated breaches of Orders will “ almost inevitably  lead to custodial sentences being passed “ : para 37.

Non-material damage is intangible harm that is not financial. That includes distress and anxiety. On recoverable non-material damage, in FARLEY v EQUINITI ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 1117, a data protection case, the Court of Appeal reaffirms that a claimant has to establish, on an objective standard of reasonableness, that he/she has experienced and suffered non-material damage.

SURREY COUNTY COUNCIL v BC  ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 719, a case on Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 and the provision of accommodation, addresses delay in the bringing of judicial review proceedings. The Court says at para 18 that “ in recent times there has been a greater emphasis on the tight time limits in judicial review”; and at para 43 that “ judicial review is not a regime where a claimant is entitled to wait, dotting every available ”i” and crossing every possible “ t “ before making a claim for judicial review.” “ If documents are potentially important and outstanding, then one possibility is for a claimant to issue proceedings, and then seek to delay the hearing of the permission application until after disclosure. What a claimant cannot do is to delay issuing proceedings in the hope that something might turn up on disclosure.”

In DARWALL v DARTMOOR NATIONAL PARK AUTHORITY (2025) UKSC 20 the appeal to the Supreme Court, on whether there was a public right to camp, turned on a short print of statutory construction (regarding the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985). The Supreme Court stated, at paragraph 15: “Normal principles of statutory interpretation are engaged. The courts in conducting statutory interpretation are seeking to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the light of their context and the purpose of the statutory provision.” From para 17 to para 38 the Court considered the ordinary meaning of Section 10(1) and its legislative context in the 1985 Act and earlier.

The Supreme Court then addressed other aids to interpretation of Section 10, (1) Hansard material (paras 39-43), (2) the principle of legality where there is no ambiguity (paras 44-47), (3) Committee Reports (paras 48-51), and (4) Devon County Council byelaws (paras 52-53).

On the nature of the relief sought and the procedure used, the Supreme Court observed that it was a “striking feature” of the proceedings that the public was not represented. Consideration should have been given to the joinder of the Attorney General.

See the decision of Jefford J in NEW LOTTERY CO v GAMBLING COMMISSION (2025) EWHC 1058 (TCC) on loss of LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE arising from INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE of documents during disclosure in litigation and the doctrine of “ honest mistake “, which would prevent LPP being lost, in the context of a heavy disclosure and review exercise.