PROPORTIONALITY

January 27th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

The Supreme Court in Samin v Westminster City Council, Mirga v SSWP [2016] UKSC 1, was concerned with the rights of residence in the UK and benefit rights in the UK of “persons from abroad”, specifically EU nationals (from Austria and Poland), pursuant to the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003 (“the EEA Regulations”), made under EU Directive 2004/38/EC.  Mr Samin was born in Iraq in 1960. In 1992 he and his family were granted asylum in Austria.  He was granted Austrian citizenship the following year. He then became estranged from his wife and children and came to the UK in December 2005 Since then he has lived in the UK alone.  He is socially isolated.  He suffers from poor mental and physical health.

Mr Samin occupied private accommodation until 2010. He then applied to Westminster City Council (“the Council”) for housing under the homelessness provisions of the Housing Act 1996 (“the Housing Act”).  The Council decided that he was “a person from abroad who is not eligible for housing assistance” within the meaning of Section 185(1) of the Housing Act, because he did not have the right of residence in the UK under EEA Regulations. That decision was affirmed in the Central London County Court, whose decision was in turn upheld by the Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed his appeals.

The Supreme Court held first that the domestic law did not infringe Mr Samin’s EU Treaty rights. It held second (paragraphs 58-70) that there was no lack of proportionality on account of individual consideration not having been given to the individual case.  The important point of principle is that a proportionality exercise is not required in every case where the right of residence and/or the right against discrimination under the EEA Regulations is invoked.

On the same day, 27 January 2016, the Supreme Court also gave Judgment in Youssef v SSFCO [2016] UKSC 3, in which the issues that arose included the standard of review.  Lord Carnwath, giving the Judgment, said, having referred to Kennedy v Information Commissioner [2015] AC 455 and Pham v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 1591:

“55.      In Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 69; [2015] 3 WLR 1665 (decided since the hearing in this appeal) this court had occasion to consider arguments, in the light of Kennedy and Pham, that this court should authorise a general move from the traditional judicial review tests to one of proportionality. Lord Neuberger (with the agreement of Lord Hughes) thought that the implications could be wide-ranging and “profound in constitutional terms”, and for that reason would require consideration by an enlarged court. There was no dissent from that view in the other judgments. This is a subject which continues to attract intense academic debate …  It is to be hoped that an opportunity can be found in the near future for an authoritative review in this court of the judicial and academic learning on the issue, including relevant comparative material from other common law jurisdictions. Such a review might aim for rather more structured guidance for the lower courts than such imprecise concepts as “anxious scrutiny” and “sliding scales”.

  1. Even in advance of such a comprehensive review of the tests to be applied to administrative decisions generally, there is a measure of support for the use of proportionality as a test in relation to interference with “fundamental” rights (Keyu paras 280-282 per Lord Kerr, para 304 per Lady Hale). Lord Kerr referred to the judgment of Lord Reed in Pham (paras 113, 118-119) where he found support in the authorities for the proposition that:

 “… where Parliament authorises significant interferences with important legal rights, the courts may interpret the legislation as requiring that any such interference should be no greater than is objectively established to be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of the interference: in substance, a requirement of proportionality.” (para 119)

 See also my own judgment in the same case (para 60), and those Lord Mance (paras 95-98) and Lord Sumption (paras 105-109), discussing the merits of a more flexible approach in judging executive interference with important individual rights, in that case the right to British citizenship.

  1. On the other hand, in many cases, perhaps most, application of a proportionality test is unlikely to lead to a different result from traditional grounds of judicial review. …”

Lord Carnwath further observed, in paragraph 61:

“… Judicial review is a discretionary remedy.  The Court is not required to ignore the appellant’s own conduct, or the extent to which he is the author of his own misfortunes. …”

 

 

Consultation

January 15th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

The Government has replaced its Code of Practice on Consultation issued in July 2008. The new guidance includes that “consultations should last for a proportionate amount of time”, rather than prima facie for a 12 week period.

 

Reducing the risk of Contractual Non-Performance

January 15th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

A contracting authority must verify the suitability of its potential service providers. That verification is intended, in particular, to enable the authority to ensure that a tenderer, if successful, will have the means necessary to perform the contract, and to enable the authority to be confident that, throughout the period of the contract, the successful tenderer will be able to use whatever resources it relies upon, including the capacities of other entities.

That gives rise to two questions: first, as to what proof the authority can call for that these resources will be at the economic operator’s disposal; and, second, as to the nature of the links between that operator and those other entities. EU policy is that the tenderer is free to choose the legal nature of the links it intends to establish with those other entities.

In a case from Latvia, C-234/14, the ECJ has on 14 January 2016 held that Directive 2004/18/EC precluded a Latvian local authority from requiring a tenderer, which relied on the capacities of other entities for the performance of the contract concerned, to establish links of a precise legal nature with those entities, so that only those particular links were capable, in the eyes of the authority, of proving that the contractor does in fact have the resources necessary to perform that contract. The municipality required the tenderer, before the award of the public contract, to conclude a cooperation agreement with those entities or to set up a partnership with them. That requirement was ruled impermissible.

 

 

Lessons from the NHS

January 11th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

Cases involving NHS bodies continue to be instructive for local authorities. See R(QSRC Ltd) v NHS Commissioning Board [2015] EWHC 3752 (Admin) on the ability to enter into an interim contract pending the completion of a procurement exercise, even if (paragraph 107) the procurement exercise has been considerably delayed,  provided (paragraph 103) that there is preference of an existing provider over other potential providers; and Keep Wythenshawe Special Ltd v NHS Central Manchester CCG [2016] EWHC 17 (Admin), at paragraphs 62-79 inclusive, on how a consultation exercise should be structured, the manner in which it should be carried out, when there should be a re-consultation, and influences on the requirements of fairness.

 

Termination of contract for breach

January 6th, 2016 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

In BT Cornwall Ltd v Cornwall Council [2015] EWHC 3755 (Comm), a services provider brought a claim against the local authority and other public sector bodies for an injunction to prevent the termination of a potentially long duration £160 million agreement between them.  The claim failed. The agreement covered services such as health, transport, communications and public safety.  It also provided for the creation of new jobs for local residents.

The agreement contained a clause entitling the local authority to waive key performance indicator scores resulting from service failures if it was satisfied that a remedial plan was in place. There were substantial problems with performance.  A number of key performance indicators fell consistently below target level.  A backlog of work accrued.

The parties established an executive forum aimed at resolving the issues. Later, however, the local al authority stated its intention to terminate the agreement for material breach.  It also claimed that the service provider’s failure to meet its annual jobs guarantee gave rise to an obligation to provide a remediation plan, which it had failed to do.  The service provider claimed that a large number of faults had been caused by the local authority.  It also claimed that a separate agreement had been entered into for the backlog to be cleared, with the implication that the key performance indicator results which fell below breach level would not be used to justify termination, and that the local authority was in any event estopped from relying on breaches in terminating for material breach.

Knowles J held that the failure to create new jobs resulted at least in part from the local authority’s failure to secure a health contract, which would have accounted for 70 new jobs. There was no contractual requirement for a remediation plan.  Accordingly, the service provider was not in breach of the agreement in that respect.  Moreover, there was no evidence that the waiver clause in the agreement had been exercised nor was there any reason to imply a waiver.  The service provider was contractually obliged to resolve the backlog and was not entitled to protection from the consequences of its failure to do so.

Knowles J further held that there was no basis for a case on estoppel or affirmation. The fact that the local authority was prepared to engage with the executive forum and to work collaboratively with the service provider was not to be held against it and did not signal that it would refrain from taking action under the agreement.   There had been no material delay on the local authority’s part, and neither its actions nor the passage of time were to be taken as an election not to terminate for material breach.

In conclusion, the service provider had failed to provide the service it had promised to the required standard. There was no capriciousness or bad faith on the local authority’s part in expecting it to clear the backlog or take the contractual consequences if doing so resulted in further breaches of the key performance indicators.  Accordingly, the service provider was in breach of the agreement such as to justify termination.

James Goudie QC

 

Invitation To Tender

December 22nd, 2015 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

In Enfield LBC v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] EWHC 3758 (Admin) the Council’s challenge to a train franchise decision by the SoS pursuant to the Railways Act 1993 to issue an Invitation to Tender containing a particular Train Services Requirement failed before Elisabeth Laing J. 

In connection with a major development, the Council hoped for an improved train service. The Judge found that (1) the SoS had not by his contradictory and confusing messages generated the legitimate expectation sought to be relied upon, (2) even if a legitimate expectation had been created, (i) the Council had not relied upon it to its detriment, and (ii) there were overriding public interests to justify departing from it, (3) the SoS had not acted with conspicuous unfairness, (4) he had not failed to take into account relevant considerations, (5) he had not taken into account irrelevant considerations, (6) he had not acted irrationally, (7) he had not acted unfairly in not allowing the Council to make further representations, and (8) he had complied with the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012.  The SoS’s discretion was a broad one, in a complex, technical, quasi-commercial field.

 

Remedies

December 22nd, 2015 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

In Leeds City Council v HMRC [2015] EWCA Civ 1293 the Court of Appeal held that the Upper Tribunal had been correct to hold that a local authority was not entitled to repayment of overpayments of VAT that were outside the 3 year domestic time limit.   Application of that time limit did not offend EU principles of effectiveness, equivalence, certainty and legitimate expectation.

In Beckford v Southwark LBC,UKEAT/0210/14/JOJ, Langstaff J held that the Court of Appeal announcement of a 10% increase in general damages in most tort actions applied to compensation in an Employment Tribunal for injury to feelings consequent upon discrimination.

 

Public Sector Exit Payments

December 21st, 2015 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

H M Treasury has issued a Consultation Paper, for response by 25 January 2016, on the final draft Regulations pursuant to the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 allowing for the recovery of public sector exit payments when a high earner returns to the public sector shortly after leaving. There are changes including as follows to the previous proposal. 

The Government proposes to replace the stipulation that exit payments are recovered when an individual returns to the same part of the public sector with the proposal that public sector exit payments are recovered when an individual returns to any part of the public sector. The amount paid back will be net of tax paid.

The previous starting point was that recovery would apply only to individuals earning at or over £100,000. The Government now proposes to set the minimum salary at which the recovery provisions apply at £80,000 per annum.

The Government proposes to remove the full recovery period during which exit payments should be repaid in full on returning to a public sector body. As such, the taper begins from the first day after a public sector employee has exited.

 

Parks Constabulary

December 21st, 2015 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

A Council’s Parks Constable is in service as a “member of a constabulary maintained by virtue of an enactment” within the meaning of Section 200(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. He or she is therefore precluded from bringing a claim for unfair dismissal.  By parity of reasoning, Trade Unions representing Parks Constables are precluded by Section 280 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 from pursuing claims for a declaration and a protective award.  In Wandsworth LBC v Viking, UKEAT/0234/13/LA, the EAT (Slade J) has held that the above holds good notwithstanding Articles 8, 11 and 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

The Claimants were dismissed for redundancy. It was not suggested that their selection for redundancy was for any reason which would affect their reputation, their private or professional relationships.  Redundancy, said Slade J, can be regarded as “perhaps the least blameworthy reason for dismissal”.  None of the authorities supported the proposition that dismissal of itself engages Article 8.  In her judgment the claims did not engage Article 8.  Article 14 was inapplicable because Article 8 was not engaged.  It added nothing in the circumstance where the facts of the case were not within the ambit of Article 8.  There were no Article 8 rights to be safeguarded.

As regards Article 11, the right claimed was a remedy for failing to consult the Trade Union, UNISON, over proposed redundancies. Collective bargaining over employees’ interests falls within Article 11.  Loss of employment through redundancy affects employees’ interests.  Collective bargaining over job losses falls within Article 11. While the means of affording unions their Article 11 rights are left to Member States, Article 11 requires that they be given the means of enforcing those rights.  The UK has chosen consultation as the means of Trade Unions protecting employees’ interests in a redundancy situation.  Unlike representation of other local authority employees, the Claimants had been deprived of that right.  Accordingly, subject to Article 11.2, Article 11, taken together with Article 14, was engaged by the claims for protective awards.

The question therefore was whether the restriction on the exercise of rights by members of the police was lawful. This requires the restriction to be, amongst other things, proportionate.  The EAT was not in a position to rule on proportionality.

 

Social Care

December 21st, 2015 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

In R (MM) v Hounslow LBC [2015] EWHC 3731 (Admin) the Council was the local authority responsible for (i) assessing and (ii) meeting the needs for care of an autistic child.  It was alleged that they had failed in both respects.  As Sir Brian Keith explained, the legal framework is well established. Local authorities are under a duty to “take reasonable steps to identify the extent to which there are children in need within their area”: see para 1(1) of Schedule 2 to the Children Act 1989. Guidance on how the needs of such children, including the needs of their families, should be met has been issued over the years. That guidance may be departed from only where there is good reason to do so. Its core feature is that the assessment of a child’s needs should not be an end in itself. Rather, it is a process which will lead to an improvement in the well-being of the child, and the conclusion of the assessment should result in a realistic plan of action, identifying the services to be provided, allocating responsibility for such action as needs to be taken, laying down a timetable for that action, and specifying the mechanism by which that action can be reviewed

A number of authorities have stressed the three stages which should inform the whole process: identifying the needs of the child, producing a care plan which specifies how those needs are to be met, and providing the services which the care plan has identified should be provided. That last stage is a critical element in the process. Once the first two stages of the process have been passed, the duty of the local authority to make provision for the needs which have to be met becomes absolute.

Sir Brian added that there are four other points that need to be made. First, the plan of action has to be a realistic one. It should not be just a vague statement of good intent. Secondly, the needs of parent carers are an integral feature of such an assessment, since providing services which meet the needs of the parents is often the most effective means of promoting the welfare of children in need, particularly disabled children. Thirdly, the maximum timeframe for the assessment to be produced, so that it is possible to reach an informed decision about what needs to be done next, should be no longer than 45 working days from when the assessment was commissioned. Fourthly, a new regime governing the functions of local authorities in respect of children with disabilities, including the provision of their social care needs, had been introduced by the Children and Families Act 2014, but was not material for the present case.

Having said all that, Sir Brian stated that it is important not to expect so much from those who prepare these assessments that we risk taking them away unnecessarily from their front-line duties. Judges should not subject such assessments to an over-zealous textual analysis which might be more appropriate to a document drafted by a lawyer in the context of a legal dispute.