Employment Contracts

July 25th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

In James-Bowen v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2018) UKSC 40 the Supreme Court addressed the implied duty of trust and confidence in employment contracts.  They said:-

“16.    The mutual obligation of employer and employee not, without reasonable and proper cause, to engage in conduct likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence required between employer and employee is a standardised term implied by law into all contracts of employment rather than a term implied from the particular provisions of a particular employment contract (Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20, per Lord Steyn at p 45D). It was described by Lord Nicholls in Malik at p 35A, as a portmanteau concept. In that case the House of Lords considered it the source of a more specific implied obligation on the part of the employer bank not to conduct its business in a dishonest and corrupt manner, the breach of which gave rise to a cause of action for damage to the economic and reputational interests of its employees. Similarly, in Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc [2004] UKHL 35; [2005] 1 AC 503 the House of Lords recognised an obligation on an employer, in the conduct of his business and in the treatment of his employees, to act responsibly and in good faith (per Lord Nicholls at para 11). The implied term has been held to give rise to an obligation on the part of an employer to act fairly when taking positive action directed at the very continuance of the employment relationship (Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703; McCabe v Cornwall County Council [2004] UKHL 35; [2005] 1 AC 503; Bristol City Council v Deadman [2007] EWCA Civ 822; [2007] IRLR 888; Yapp v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2014] EWCA Civ 1512; [2015] IRLR 112; Stevens v University of Birmingham [2015] EWHC 2300 (QB); [2016] 4 All ER 258). Furthermore, any decision-making function entrusted to an employer must be exercised in accordance with the implied obligation of trust and confidence (Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17; [2015] 1 WLR 1661).” Read more »

 

Authorisation and declaration of election expenses

July 25th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Elections and Bylaws

R v Mackinlay (2018) UKSC 42 is a pre-trial appeal concerning a point of pure statutory construction. The Respondents face charges of knowingly making false declarations in relation to election expenses, or aiding and abetting or encouraging or assisting such offences. The parties asked the judge to determine the point on a preparatory hearing.

The question of law certified by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) as a point of law of general public importance is as follows:

“Do property, goods, services or facilities transferred to or provided for the use or benefit of a candidate free of charge or at a discount (as identified in section 90C(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (as amended)) only fall to be declared as election expenses if they have been authorised by the candidate, his election agent or someone authorised by either or both of them?” Read more »

 

Heritage asset

July 24th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

Catesby Estates Ltd v Steer (2018) EWCA Civ 1697 concerned the “setting” of a listed building, a concept recognized by statute, and factors, such as the historic relationship between places, in addition to visual and physical considerations and impact. The Court of Appeal held that in the context of an application for planning permission for a development that would potentially affect a listed building or heritage asset, the duty imposed by the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 s. 66(1) to have special regard to the desirability of preserving the asset or its “setting” required the decision-maker to determine the extent of the asset’s setting and the impact of the development upon it. In doing so, the decision-maker had to take account of social, historical and economic, as well as physical and visual, factors.  The setting of a heritage asset was not statutorily defined and did not lend itself to precise definition.  However, implicit in s. 66(1) was the idea that setting could be affected by development, whether within or outside it. Thus, the decision-maker was required to understand what the asset’s setting was, and whether the development site either lay within it or was in some way related to it. Identifying the extent of an asset’s setting and whether the development would affect it was a matter of applying planning judgment to the circumstances of the case, and unless there was clear error of law in the decision-maker’s approach, the court should not intervene. The decision-maker had to have regard to relevant policy and guidance, and to the principle that considerable importance and weight had to be given to the desirability of preserving that setting.  For a proposed development to affect the setting, there had to be a distinct visual relationship between the two.  That relationship had to be more than remote or ephemeral, and it had to bear on how the asset was experienced in its surrounding landscape. However, that did not mean that other factors were to be ignored.  Economic, social and historical considerations were also relevant.

 

Valued landscape

July 24th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

In determining whether a proposed development site is a “valued landscape” within para 109 of the NPPF it is necessary to consider the site as part of the wider landscape, rather than limit consideration to the site’s particular characteristics. Para 109 “is not confined to landscapes which have a particular designation”. In most cases, a development site is but part of a wider landscape. So held by Ouseley J in CEG Land Promotions Ltd v SoS for CLG and Aylesbury Vale District Council (2018) EWHC 1799 (Admin).

 

Children In Need

July 19th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

The Appeal to the Supreme Court in Williams v Hackney LBC (2018) UKSC 37 concerned the limits of a local authority’s powers and duties to provide accommodation for children in need under s 20 of the Children Act 1989 (“CA”). The Supreme Court holds that there had been a lawful basis for the children’s continued accommodation under s 20. Read more »

 

Employment Contract

July 18th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

It is clearly implicit in a term in an employment contract conferring a contractual right to appeal against disciplinary action taking the form of dismissal that, if an appeal is lodged, pursued to its conclusion and is successful, the effect is that both employer and employee are bound to treat the employment relationship as having remained in existence throughout. This is not a matter of implying terms, but simply the meaning to be given to the words of the relevant contract, reading them objectively. By including a contractual right of appeal in the employment contract, the employer makes available to the employee a facility to seek to overturn the disciplinary decision made against him and to have the dismissal treated as being of no effect. If the appeal is successful, then subject to any other contractual provisions, the employee is entitled to be treated as having never been dismissed, to be paid all back pay and to have the benefit of all other terms of his contract of employment through the relevant period and into the future. Those terms include the usual implied duty of an employer to maintain trust and confidence. Conversely, if the employee exercises his right of appeal under the contract and does not withdraw the appeal before its conclusion, it is obvious on an objective basis that he is seeking to be restored to his employment and is asking and agreeing (if successful) to be treated as continuing to be employed under his contract of employment for the interim period since his previous dismissal and continuing into the future, so that that dismissal is treated as having no effect. It is not a reasonable or correct interpretation of the term conferring a right of appeal that a successful appeal results in the employee having an option whether to return to work or not. If an appeal is brought pursuant to such a term and is successful, the employer is contractually bound to treat the previous dismissal as having no effect and the employee is bound in the same way. That is inherent in the very concept of an appeal in respect of a disciplinary dismissal. Read more »

 

Allocation Policy

July 16th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Housing

In R (TW, SW and EM) v Hillingdon LBC [2018] EWHC 1791(Admin) the Claimants challenged the Social Housing Allocation Policy (December 2016) (“the Allocation Scheme”) of the London Borough of Hillingdon (“the Council”) in so far as it provides: (1) a condition that only households with at least 10 years’ continuous residence in-borough qualify to join the three welfare-based bands (A-C) of its housing register (“the residence qualification”); (2) additional preference for such households who are in Bands C and B of the housing register (“the residence uplift”), and (3) additional preference for those in Bands C and B who are working households on low income (“the working household uplift”). Choudhury J granted permission on three grounds. First, that both the residence qualification and the residence uplift discriminate indirectly and unlawfully under Sections 19 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA”) against persons with the protected characteristic of “race” and that, as Irish Travellers, the Claimants have such a characteristic (Ground 1). Second, that the working household uplift discriminates indirectly and unlawfully under the same statutory provisions against persons with the protected characteristics of “disability” and “sex” (Ground 2). Third, in formulating the three provisions under challenge the Defendant acted in breach of its obligations under Section 11(2) of the Children Act 2004 (“CA”) (Ground 3).

Read more »

 

Homelessness Review

July 13th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Housing

The three appeals [2018] EWCA Civ 1616 raised a common issue concerning what is required of local housing authorities in order to comply with the Review Regulations which apply to a review under Section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 when a reviewing officer sends out a minded-to letter indicating an intention to make a decision contrary to the interests of the applicant for homelessness assistance. In short, the question is whether the letter must specify in terms that the applicant (or a representative) may make representations to the reviewer orally at a face-to-face meeting. The Court of Appeal holds that there is no such requirement.   No more is required for an effective notification than to state that the applicant “may make representations to the reviewer orally or in writing or both orally and in writing”. Nothing more is required in order to conform with the principle of legality and the fundamental requisite of the rule of law that the law should be made known and that individuals must be able to know of their legal rights and obligations. Patten LJ, with whom David Richards LJ agreed, said, at paragraph 24:- Read more »

 

Recovering unpaid tax

July 5th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Council Tax and Rates

Powys County Council v Hurst (2018) EWHC 1684 (Admin) was an appeal by way of case stated to a Divisional Court (Hickinbottom and Singh LJJ) against the decision of a District Judge (“DJ”) that the Council was required to consider proceeding under the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 (“the 1971 Act”) as an alternative method of recovering unpaid council tax before applying to commit the Respondent to prison for non-payment of that tax. The DJ reached his decision on the basis that it was open to the Council to seek an attachment of earnings order in the County Court in respect of the Respondent’s pension. The main issue in the appeal was whether that course was open to a billing authority such as the Council as a matter of law. The Divisional Court held that it was not and allowed the appeal. Read more »

 

Council Resolutions

July 4th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality Duty

R (Jewish Rights Watch) v Leicester City Council (2018) EWCA Civ 1551 concerns a non-binding Full Council Resolution on a controversial matter. The Council resolved “insofar as legal considerations allow, to boycott produce originating from illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank until such time as it complies with International law an withdraws from Palestinian Occupied territories.” Jewish Human Rights Watch argued that the resolution singled out Israel for criticism, and that the Council failed to consider the effect of so doing on the Jewish community in the UK, and in particular in and around Leicester, in breach of the PSED.  The Court of Appeal, upholding the judgment of the Divisional Court, held that on a reading of the Resolution, and of the transcript of the debate which preceded its adoption, it was clear that the Councillors had due regard to the matters set out in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and had thus satisfied the PSED. Read more »

 

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