CHARGEABLE DWELLINGS

February 18th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Council Tax and Rates

In the common situation of a house in MULTIPLE OCCUPATION where each of the bedrooms is ( 1 ) lockable and ( 2 ) EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPIED by a separate tenant, who shares the common parts, STANUSZEK v BUNYAN ( Listing Officer ) ( No 2 ) ( 2025 ) EWHC 255 ( Admin ) holds that each falls to be assessed for council tax purposes under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 as a SEPARATE DWELLING/hereditament. It is irrelevant that the tenants share the common areas of the house, which include a kitchen and a living room. A single hereditament cannot contain discrete parts occupied by different persons. “ Occupation “ of a space in rating law as defined by the Court of Appeal in JS LAING v KINGSWOOD ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE requires exclusive possession of that space. Applying the geographical WOOLWAY v MAZARS Supreme Court test on the identification of an hereditament each bedroom in the HMO was “ capable “ of being a separate and discrete hereditament, AND it was separately occupied.

 

CLARIFICATIONS DURING A TENDER PROCESS

February 18th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

In WORKING ON WELLBEING LTD v SoS (2025) EWCA Civ 127 Coulson LJ (with whom Frazer and Zacaroli LJJ agree) summarises the relevant principles as follows:-

“82.     I consider that the authorities demonstrate that there are three stages to consider when addressing whether or not, in the particular circumstances of any given case, a contracting authority has the discretion to seek clarification, when that discretion becomes a duty, and what the permissible limits are to any response to a request for clarification.

Stage One

  1. The first stage arises only where the error or ambiguity is obvious to the contracting authority and is material to the outcome of the competition. That will be rare, which explains why any duty to seek clarification will only arise in exceptional cases … the only question is whether the error or ambiguity was obvious to the contracting authority: it is not a question of the error or ambiguity being “objectively verifiable”.
  2. All of the cases stress that the error of ambiguity must be “serious” and “manifest”… The error or ambiguity must also be “material” or “significant”: it must be relevant to the “outcome” of the tender process… If the error or ambiguity is immaterial or irrelevant to the final outcome of the competition, no further action is necessary.

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PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN

February 11th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

Under the Government’s FREE EARLY EDUCATION ENTITLEMENT  Scheme ( FEEE ) local authorities have a duty to secure the provision of 570 hours in any year of free early years CHILDCARE PROVISION for eligible children. The primary statutory on local authorities, under Section  7 ( 1 )  of the CHILDCARE ACT 2006 is to ensure that FEEE hours are available to all qualifying parents of pre-school children on a “ free of charge “ basis. Under Section 7 ( 2 )  each local authority has to “ have regard to “ STATUTORY GUIDANCE on “ Early Education and Childcare “. This indicates that authorities have to ensure that childcare providers do not charge parents “ top-up “ fees. These provisions, and the Local Authority ( Duty to Secure Early Years Provision Free of Charge ) Regulations 2014, are considered in R ( BOURNEMOUTH< POOLE and CHRISTCHURCH COUNCIL ) v LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL CARE OMBUDSMAN  ( 2025 )  EWHC 224 ( Admin ) If nurseries were permitted to impose compulsory charges on parents as a condition of accessing FEEE hours, the childcare would not be free of charge. Any proposed charges for FEEE hours have to be voluntary. Arrangements have to be structured so that parents are able to refuse to pay any proposed charges for additional goods or services.

 

WHETHER INFORMATION HELD

February 11th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

A local authority had not been entitled under Regulation 12(4)(a) of the ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS to decline an Information Request for a List or Map of which roads would be subject to a new 20 mph speed limit on the ground that it did not “ hold “ the information. So held in ROBERTS v INFORMATION COMMISSIONER ( 2025 ) UK FTT 111 ( GRC ). The authority held the necessary information, albeit in a different format. Producing a list or map would not require any particular skill or judgment outside that found within its staff. Where information requested under the EIR or the FoIA could be produced only from raw data or building blocks through some processing or other operation, whether the information is “ held “ depends upon the complexity of the operations needing to be performed and the degree of skill and judgment necessary to if a particular building block should be regarded as contributing to the requested information.

 

WHEN DUTY CEASES

February 10th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Housing

In R ( BANO ) v WALTHAM FOREST LBC ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 92 the Court of Appeal holds that a local housing authority’s main housing duty, under Section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, comes to an end automatically upon refusal by the applicant of a private rented sector offer. The authority’s duty under Section 193 ceases as soon as a formal offer of accommodation under Part 6 of the Act  is refused or a private rented sector offer in respect of which the requisite information has been supplied is accepted or refused. The authority does not have to make a a decision that it considers its duty to have ceased or inform the applicant that its duty has ceased.

 

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS ( EIR )

February 7th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

A draft report relating to the Council’s environmental LOW TRAFFIC NEIGHBOURHOOD scheme was the subject matter of GREENWICH RLBC v INFORMATION COMMISSIONER ( 2025 ) UK FTT 85 ( GRC ). This remained a live and contentious issue at the time of the information request. There was the real possibility of litigation. It is held that a document does not have to be legally privileged to qualify for exemption from disclosure under EIR Reg 12(5)(b). The test is whether disclosure would adversely affect the course of justice ( paras 41 & 53 ). Moreover, LPP attaches to documents where the sole purpose is to seek legal advice, including such a document created before legal advice is sought ( paras 37-40 ). Also, Reg 12(4)(d) applied ( paras 44-53 inc  ), the purpose of which is to allow public authorities to think in private.

 

BIAS

February 6th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

A regulatory context does not call for any test for apparent bias to be applied different from that in PORTER v MAGILL and LOCABAIL v BAYFIELD. So held in R ( CYGNET HEALTH ) v CARE QUALITY COMMISSION (2025) EWHC 1 ( Admin ).

 

NPPF

February 6th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

Planning Policy Guidance is a proper aid to clarifying and understanding the meaning of the NPPF. The NPPF can be amended, or altered, by guidance in the PPF. So held in MEAD v SoS (2025) EWCA 32.

 

BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY

February 4th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

In R (JSM) v WESTMORLAND AND FURNESS COUNCIL (2024) EWHC 3362 (Admin) the local authority was held to have breached its duty under Section 42 of the Children and Families Act 2014 to provide special educational provision for a young person with complex needs.  A mandatory order was appropriate.  The duty was absolute.  Speed was of the essence. It was not for the Court routinely to decline to grant relief to compel performance on the ground of inadequate resources.  The Court sets out the factors to consider when determining whether to grant a mandatory order.

 

DECISION MAKING BY SOCIAL WORKERS

January 22nd, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

On the obligations of local authorities to children who may be “ children in need “, for the purposes of Section 17 (10 ) of the Children Act 1989, the Court of Appeal, in R ( TW ) v ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 4, held that the authority did not owe ongoing obligations to a young person as a “ former relevant child “. Even though the authority had helped the claimant, under Section 20, to obtain accommodation, through a third party provider, the authority was not to be regarded as (1) having treated him as a child in need, or (2) having provided him with accommodation. The authority had acted rationally in deciding, on the basis of detailed documentation, that he was not a child in need.

 

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