Legitimate Expectation

February 27th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

In the matter of an application by Geraldine Finucane for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) (2019) UKSC 7 considers substantive legitimate expectation from paragraph 55.  Lord Kerr on behalf of the Supreme Court concluded:-

“62.     From these authorities it can be deduced that where a clear and unambiguous undertaking has been made, the authority giving the undertaking will not be allowed to depart from it unless it is shown that it is fair to do so. The court is the arbiter of fairness in this context. And a matter sounding on the question of fairness is whether the alteration in policy frustrates any reliance which the person or group has placed on it. This is quite different, in my opinion, from saying that it is a prerequisite of a substantive legitimate expectation claim that the person relying on it must show that he or she has suffered a detriment.”

“64.    The onus of establishing that a sufficiently clear and unambiguous promise or undertaking, sufficient to give rise to a legitimate expectation, is cast on the party claiming it …” Read more »

 

Elections

February 27th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Elections and Bylaws

The Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (Amendment) Order 2019, S.I. 2019/350, and The Local Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (England and Wales) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2019, S.I. 2019/351, amend the rules that apply to Combined Authority Mayoral Elections and Local Authority Mayoral Elections. The rules are amended to remove the requirement that each candidate’s home address must be published during the election process and be included on the ballot paper. The instruments also remove the requirement for each candidate’s qualifying address to be published during that process. A candidate’s qualifying address is the address that qualifies the candidate to stand for election. Read more »

 

Time Limits

February 27th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

There is an old joke: “Conservative MPs: Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Walter Bromley-Davenport to name just a few”. In the Piedmont they evidently go in for very long names for parties to litigation. Case C-54/18 is fair enough. But the full title is a bit much: Cooperativa Animazione Valdocco Soc. coop.soc. Impresa Sociale Onlus v Consorzio Intercommunale Servizi Sociali de Pinerolo. That is even before coming to a Second Defendant and a host of Interested Parties.  At any rate, none of this has deterred the CJEU from giving Judgment about a 30-day time limit for applying for a review of decisions to allow tenderers to participate in, or to exclude them from, a public procurement tendering procedure. Read more »

 

Public Procurement

February 26th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

On 22 February 2019, the Cabinet Office has issued a Procurement Policy Note (“PPN”) on “Applying Exclusions in Public Procurement, Managing Conflicts of Interest and Whistleblowing” to “deepen understanding” and “supplement and strengthen existing practices”.

An accompanying Information Note explains:-

“When the UK leaves the EU the public procurement regulations will remain broadly unchanged. If the UK leaves the EU with a deal, the existing scheme of UK procurement rules, which implement the EU public procurement directives, will be preserved under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. If the UK leaves the EU without a deal, the current regulations will be amended to ensure they remain operable and functional on exit.”

The PPN itself addresses Mandatory Exclusion (paragraphs 3-7 inclusive, PCR Regulation 57), Discretionary Exclusion (paragraphs 8-10 inclusive, Regulation 57), Self-declaration of status against the exclusion grounds (paragraphs 11-14 inclusive, Regulation 59), Verification (paragraphs 15-18 inclusive, Regulations 57, 59 and 60), “self-cleaning” (paragraphs 19-21 inclusive, paragraph 57) Conflicts of Interest (paragraphs 22-27 inclusive, Regulations 24, 41, 57 and 84), and “Whistleblowing” (paragraphs 28 and 29).

Paragraph 17 of the PPN emphasizes as follows:-

“In-scope Organisations must request up to date evidence from the winning bidder before award of the contract. If the supplier fails to provide the required evidence within set timeframes, or the evidence demonstrates that a mandatory exclusion ground applies, the award of the contract should not proceed.”

 

 

Equality Act

February 25th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

McNutt v Transport for London [2019] EWHC 365 (Admin) was an appeal by way of case stated against a decision of Hendon Magistrates Court to find Mr McNutt, guilty of the offence contrary to Section 165(7) of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EA 2010”). It raised an important point of statutory construction in relation to the duty, pursuant to Section 165(1)(a) and Section 165(4)(b) of the EA 2010 on the driver of a taxi which has been hired by or for a disabled person in a wheelchair “not to make any additional charge for doing so”. By Section 165(7), it is a criminal offence to make such an additional charge.

A taxi is defined by Section 173(1)(a) to be a vehicle which is licensed under Section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 or Section 6 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (“the 1869 Act”). In simple terms, it means a vehicle plying for hire. Read more »

 

Site Reverter

February 25th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Land, Goods and Services

The School Sites Act 1841 (“the 1841 Act”) was passed in order to encourage and facilitate the provision of up to one acre of land for use as “a site for a school for the education of poor persons, or for the residence of the schoolmaster or schoolmistress, or otherwise for the purposes of the education of such poor persons in religious and useful knowledge”. In the majority of cases it was used to provide land for local Church of England elementary (or what we now call primary) schools. The purposes set out in the 1841 Act are charitable educational purposes all of which specify a particular use of the land conveyed. The grantor is entitled to select between the statutory purposes as the terms of the trust on which the land is conveyed and may even supplement or modify the statutory purposes with provisions of his own choosing. But, it is the statutory purposes specified in Section 2 of the 1841 Act which determine the duration of the grant. If the land ceases to be used for the statutory purposes selected in the conveyance then title to it reverts to the estate of the grantor. Read more »

 

Street Works

February 19th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

Section 50 of the New Roads Street Works Act 1991 provides a power for a street or highway authority to grant a licence, subject to Schedule 3 conditions, to permit a person to undertake street works. The power has been considered by Dove J in Calor Gas Ltd v Norfolk County Council (2019) EWHC 308 (Admin). The claimant’s case proceeded, firstly, on the basis that the policy operated by the Council in relation to Section 50 licences was contrary to the statutory scheme. Dove J said:-

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BREXIT

February 19th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Non Judicial Control

The Local Audit (England and Wales) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 will enable EU qualified auditors currently auditing local public bodies to continue to work in the UK, for a transitional period, in the event of a “no deal”. The Regulations are pursuant to powers in Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and are subject to the negative resolution procedure. There are now 238 Withdrawal Act Statutory Instruments.

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Permitted development

February 14th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

In Westminster City Council v SoS (2019) EWHC 176 (Admin) Ouseley J held that under the GPDO, the whole development for which prior approval as permitted development was sought had to fall within the Class of development relied on. If part fell outside the Class, it was not a permitted development.  Under Schedule 2 Part 16 Class A, a proposed telephone kiosk had to be “for the purpose” of the telephone network.  A kiosk with a large digital advertising panel was not entirely for that purpose and did not fall within the Class.  It was not permitted development.

 

Whether there is a binding contract

February 13th, 2019 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

Whether an agreement was complete and enforceable despite there being no express identification of the event which would trigger the payment obligation was one of the issues before the Supreme Court in Wells v Devani (2019) UKSC 4.  This gave rise to questions whether there was a binding contract and as to whether there was an implied term.

The Supreme Court said as regards whether there was a binding contract:-

“17.    The question whether there was a binding contract between Mr Devani and Mr Wells required a consideration of what was communicated between them by their words and their conduct and whether, objectively assessed, that led to the conclusion that they intended to create a legally binding relationship and that they had agreed all the terms that the law requires as essential for that purpose….

  1. It may be the case that the words and conduct relied upon are so vague and lacking in specificity that the court is unable to identify the terms on which the parties have reached agreement or to attribute to the parties any contractual intention. But the courts are reluctant to find an agreement is too vague or uncertain to be enforced where it is found that the parties had the intention of being contractually bound and have acted on their agreement. …”

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