In R ( BANO ) v WALTHAM FOREST LBC ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 92 the Court of Appeal holds that a local housing authority’s main housing duty, under Section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, comes to an end automatically upon refusal by the applicant of a private rented sector offer. The authority’s duty under Section 193 ceases as soon as a formal offer of accommodation under Part 6 of the Act  is refused or a private rented sector offer in respect of which the requisite information has been supplied is accepted or refused. The authority does not have to make a a decision that it considers its duty to have ceased or inform the applicant that its duty has ceased.

What was in issue in the intentional homelessness case of R (IVORY) v WELWYN HATFIELD BC (2025) EWCA Civ 21 was whether the Council was justified in declining to accept an application under Section 183 of the Housing Act 1996 (the 1996 Act).  The application was rejected on the ground that it was based on the same facts as a previous application.

Between them, Sections 183 and 184 of the 1996 Act impose on a local housing authority, in apparently unqualified terms, an obligation to make inquiries where it has reason to believe that a person who has applied for assistance “may be homeless or threatened with homelessness”.  An authority may, in consequence, have to make the inquiries to which Section 184 refers in relation to successive applications. The fact that the authority has previously rejected an application from the same applicant will not necessarily, or even usually, excuse it from that duty.

On the basis of comparison, Newey LJ said, at para 43:-

“It seems to me that when determining whether a new application can be rejected as based on the same facts as a previous one:

(i) The primary concern is with facts rather than evidence;
(ii) The facts now alleged fall to be compared with the facts as they were found to be on the earlier application;
(iii) Allegations and facts which are trivial or fanciful can, however, be disregarded;
(iv) Where the later application simply repeats an earlier, rejected allegation of fact and is not supported by any new evidence of any significance at all, the fact alleged will be a “new fact but the local housing authority will be entitled to dismiss the allegation as fanciful. To that extent, the question whether there is fresh evidence (and, if so, of what it consists) may be relevant”.

Males LJ, however, said:-

“63.     I agree that this claim for judicial review should succeed and that the Council’s decision to reject Ms Ivory’s application should be quashed.  I do so, save in one respect, for the reasons given by Lord Justice Newey.

64. The point on which I would take a different approach concerns the nature of the comparison to be carried out in order to decide whether a new application must be accepted. Lord Justice Newey says that the relevant comparison is between the facts now alleged and the facts as they were found to be on the earlier application (see [43(ii)] above). In my view the relevant comparisons is between the new application and the earlier application.  If the two applications are the same, the later application need not be accepted.”

Phillips LJ said:-

“110.   As for the comparison exercise involved in determining whether a further application is a fresh application which must be admitted, I agree with Males LJ that the facts of the further application should be compared with the facts alleged in the previous application as at the date it was determined.  Regarding facts as “new” even though they were previously alleged and rejected would, in my judgment, introduce an artificiality in an exercise which should be straightforward to understand and carry out, and would require a further potentially artificial solution by regarding a “new” previously alleged and rejected fact as “fanciful”, even though it may be far from it. I agree with Males LJ, for the reasons he gives, that he authorities do not require us to adopt that approach.

111. I would add that, despite the difference in the routes they take, Newey LJ and Males LJ appear to arrive at the same destination. Put simply, they both recognise that a further application must be accepted if either (i) it is based on a factual assertion which has not previously been made and which is not trivial or fanciful; or (ii) it adduces significant fresh evidence in support of a previously made factual assertion, whether or not rejected.  That appears to be an appropriately straightforward test for a housing authority to apply.”

The question raised by the appeal in HUSSAINI v ISLINGTON LBC (2025) EWCA Civ 22 was whether Mr Hussaini had a “local connection” with the Council, within the meaning of Section 199 of the Housing Act 1996 (the 1996 Act).  Part VII of the 1996 Act, which is concerned with homelessness and comprises Sections 175-218, imposes a number of duties on local housing authorities.  Section 184 obliges an authority which has reason to believe that a person who has applied for assistance may be homeless or threatened with homelessness to make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy itself “(a) whether he is eligible for assistance, and (b) if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part”.  Section 189B provides for an “Initial duty owed to all eligible persons who are homeless”.  It applies where an authority is satisfied that an applicant is homeless and eligible for assistance.  In such a case, the authority must take reasonable steps to secure that “suitable” accommodation becomes available unless it refers the application to another authority.  The “main housing duty” arises under Section 193.  Where an authority concludes that an applicant is homeless, is eligible for assistance, did not become homeless intentionally and has a priority need, it is required by Section 193(2) to “secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant” unless, once again, it refers the application to another authority.  Such accommodation must be “suitable”: Section 206(1).

Section 198 explains when a local housing authority can refer a case to another authority.  That is expressed by reference to a “local connection”, as defined.  A local housing authority which notifies another authority that it considers the conditions for referral to be met may continue to owe an applicant a duty while a decision on the point is made.  Section 199A provides that, if an authority making a referral under Section 198(A1) has reason to believe that the applicant may have a priority need, it “must secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant until the applicant is notified of the decision as to whether the conditions for referral of the applicant’s case are met”.  By Section 200(1) an authority making a referral under Section 198(1) must “secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant until he is notified of the decision whether the conditions for referral of his case are met”.  If in a case of that kind it is decided that the conditions for referral are not met, “the notifying authority are subject to the duty under Section 193 (the main housing duty)”.  If, in contrast, it is decided that the conditions for referral are met, the “main housing duty” will pass to the notified authority.

Newey LJ said, referring to the Code issued by the Secretary of State:-

“38.     Drawing some threads together, a “local connection” exists where a person has a connection in “a real sense” or “real terms” with a local housing authority’s district on account of one of the matters mentioned in Section 199(1) of the 1996 Act.  Those matters (viz. normal residence, employment, family associations and “special circumstances”) relate to “having a place in the community”.  When considering whether on the particular facts a “local connection” has arisen as a result of “special circumstances”, an authority can properly have regard to whether an applicant has a need to live in its district.  The existence of such a need to whether an applicant has a need to live in its district.  The existence of such a need is likely to support a contention that the applicant has a “local connection”, and the absence of one may be thought to make a “local connection” less probable.  Paragraph 10.11 of the Code explains that “special circumstances” “might include the need to be near special medical or support services which are available only in a particular district”. Were an applicant to be unable to access such services without living in the district, it is easy to see how the case for a “local connection” as a result of “special circumstances” could potentially be overwhelming.  Where an applicant has to use such services frequently, that might possibly lead to the conclusion that there is a “local connection” even without the applicant needing to live within the district itself, but a “local connection” may be less likely.

39. While, however, the question whether an applicant needs to live in the district can be relevant to whether a “local connection” exists … a local housing authority is not entitled to impose a threshold requirement to that effect … The legislation nowhere states that such a connection cannot exist, whether as regards “special circumstances” or otherwise, without a need to live in the district, and there is no warrant for inferring such a condition. Nor does paragraph 10.11 of the Code suggest otherwise: it speaks of “special circumstances” including “the need to be near” … services which are available only in a particular district” (emphasis added) implying that it can be enough to be near rather than within the district.  In fact, it is easy to conceive of a situation in which “special circumstances” might create a “local connection” without an applicant having to live in the district… an authority is not entitled to proceed on the basis that there cannot be “special circumstances” giving rise to a “local connection” unless the applicant has a need to live in the district.”