Injunctions

July 1st, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

Valbonne Estates v Cityvalue Estates (2021) EWCA Civ 973 concerns the proper exercise of the Court’s discretion to continue an interim injunction or to re-grant it notwithstanding serious non-disclosure by the applicant when seeking the interim injunction on a without notice basis. At para 47 and following the Court of Appeal sets out the relevant principles. There are no hard and fast rules which must be applied. The Court should take into account all relevant circumstances.

Where there are breaches of the duty of full and fair disclosure on a without notice application, the general rule is that the order should be discharged and the Court should refuse to re-grant it. That is the starting point, especially if the non-disclosure/inaccurate representations are neither inadvertent nor accidental.

 

Certificate of Lawful Use or Development

July 1st, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

In McGaw v Welsh Ministers (2021) EWCA Civ 976 the Court of Appeal states that the General Permitted Development Order exists in order to relieve developers of the regulatory burden of applying for planning permission in categories of case defined in such a way that it can be seen that such permission ought to be granted, and to relieve planning authorities of the burden of dealing with such applications. The classes of cases to which the GPD Order applies are defined so as to set out the parameters for the grant of general permissions while protecting various concerns relevant to planning concerns, including height restrictions and visual amenity and restrictions to limit what can be seen from the highway. The Court of Appeal says, at para 17, that the GDP Order should be approached in the light of its statutory purpose.

Both the words that set out what is permitted and those that limit the scope of the permission should be read in a “broad and common sense way” according to the “ordinary meaning” of the language used.

 

Environmental Information

June 30th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

The operator of Heathrow Airport is not a public authority for the purposes of the Environmental Information Regulations. So held by the FTT in Heathrow Airport Ltd v Information Commissioner, EA/2020/0101, Judgment on 18;June 2021. Although the Airport  had operated as a function of the State prior to its privatisation, and is closely regulated by the Civil Aviation Authority, it is a commercial enterprise. It competes with similar businesses. It is not akin to the provision of a public service.

 

Looked After Children

June 30th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Social Care

In Salford City Council v W (2021) EWHC 1689 (Fam) MacDonald J reviewed the authorities and outlined the approach for determining whether a child was “looked after” for the purposes of Part 3 of the Children Act 1989. It sets out the principles which apply when deciding whether a child has been accommodated by a local authority under Section 20, so that he or she is a “looked after child” within the meaning of Section 22, rather than simply having been placed, pursuant to a private arrangement, with foster parents.

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PSED

June 28th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality Duty

R ( SHEAKH ) v LAMBETH LBC (2021) EWHC 1745 (Admin) concerns an unsuccessful challenge to Orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ( the ROTRA ) restricting the movement of traffic within Low Traffic Neighbourhoods (LTNs). The challenges that failed included that the Orders were not experimental, Tameside, failure to have regard to matters set out in Section 122 of the ROTRA, inadequate consultation, and the PSED. AS regards the PSED, Kerr J said : the function being exercised was the function of initiating an experiment, not introducing the LTNs on a permanent basis : para 145; the duty is to have regard to the need to fulfil the ambitions set out in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 to eliminate unlawful discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between the relevant groups : para 146; if the equality objectives are properly considered and put in the balance, it is for the decision-maker to decide how much weight they should carry : para 147; the duty is not a duty to carry out an assessment, assessment is the tool used to create the evidence base to show performance of the duty, it is not the performance of the duty itself, there is no necessary breach of the duty where no formal assessment has been done : para 148; there is noting in section 149 which prevents, in an appropriate case, performance of the duty by means of a conscious decision to undertake equality assessment on a “rolling” basis : para 163; the more “evolutionary” the function being exercised, the more readily a rolling assessment may be justified : para 164; where the function being exercised is to initiate an experiment, as in the case of a decision to make an Experimental Traffic Order, it may or may not be sufficient, depending upon the facts, to conduct the equality impact assessment on a rolling basis : para 165.

 

Economic Loss

June 18th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton (2021) UKSC 20 is concerned with the scope of the duty of care in negligence in relation to the recovery of damages for the economic loss, and the liability of professional advisers. One looks to see what risk the duty was supposed to guard against and then look to see whether the loss suffered represented the fruition of that risk. The focus should be on identifying the purpose to be served by the duty of care assumed by the advisers.

 

Interim Relief

June 11th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality Duty

In Steer  v Stormsure Ltd (2021) EWCA CIv 887 the Court of Appeal holds that the lack of provision in the Equality Act 2010 for interim relief in discrimination or victimisation claims, as compared with dismissed whistleblower claims, does not breach Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with any of Article 6 on procedural fairness (paras 31-33), Article 8 or Article A1P1. The status of being a litigant in a particular type of case is not a protected status: paras 36-42.

 

Religion or Belief Discrimination

June 11th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality Duty

In Forstater v CGD Europe , UKEAT/0105/20/JOJ, the claimant holds the belief that sex is immutable and not to be conflated with gender identity. The EAT holds that this a philosophical belief within Section 10 of the Equality Act 2010. It is protected by Articles 9 and 1 0 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The relevant principles are that (1) freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of democratic society, (2) the paramount guiding principle in assessing any belief is that it is not for the Court to inquire into its validity, (3) the freedom to hold whatever belief one likes goes hand-in-hand with the State remaining neutral as between competing beliefs, and (4) a belief that has the protection of Article 9 is one that needs to satisfy only very modest threshold requirements.

 

Direct Award of Contract

June 9th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

Regulation 32 (2) (c) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 allows negotiation of a contract without prior advertisement insofar as it is “strictly necessary”. This is provided that is so by reasons of “extreme urgency”. Moreover, the extreme urgency must be brought about by events “unforeseeable” by the contracting authority and it must not be possible for the time limits for other procedures to be complied with. In R ( Good Law Project) v Minister for the Cabinet Office (2021) EWHC 1569 (TCC) O’Farrell J observed, at para 82, that use of the Regulation 32(2)(c) procedure is a departure from the “normal requirement” that public contracts ( above the relevant thresholds) “ must” be subject to an “open, transparent and competitive process.” As such, it should be reserved for “exceptional circumstances”. At para 89 she observed that the burden of proving the requisite circumstances is on the contracting authority and that the derogation must be “interpreted strictly”; at para 90 that in each case it is a question of fact, objectively ascertained, as to whether the necessary circumstances existed at the time the decision was made.; at para 91 that in considering whether there was sufficient time to carry out an expedited procurement exercise the Court may take into account evidence as to the minimum time needed in practice, for preparing tender documentation, evaluating tenders, etc; and at para 93 that even if the derogation is engaged the “scope and duration” of the procurement “must be limited” to what is strictly necessary.

At para 124 the Judge held that the extreme urgency,  for immediately needed public health protection services, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic was unforeseeable, unpredictable, and not attributable to the Defendant.

 

Revocation

June 7th, 2021 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

R (Ocado) v Islington LBC (2021) EWHC i509 concerned the revocation under Section 193(7) of TCPA 1990 of a CLEUD, a Certificate of Lawfulness of an Existing Use or Development, granted under Section 191 of the Act. The grounds for the revocation were that the application for the CLEUD had contained statements which had been false in a material particular and had withheld material information. The judicial review challenge to the revocation was dismissed. Holgate J ruled that Section 193(7) does not require the withholding of material information to have been deliberate.