In CITY OF LONDON CORPORATION v 48th STREET HOLDING LTD ( 2025 ) EWHC 1130 ( KB ) it is held that an “ intermittent occupation “ rates mitigation scheme, designed to secure for the owner of a EMPTY PROPERTY a series of EXEMPTIONS from the liability to pay non-domestic rates, was effective for that purpose. The scheme satisfied the LAING criteria for rateable occupation and did not fall foul of the RAMSAY principle.
AARHUS CONVENTION
May 15th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalIn HM TREASURY v GLOBAL FEEDBACK LTD ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 624 at paras 72-143 inclusive the Court of Appeal holds that a claim falls within the Convention only when there is a contravention of a legal provision which concerns, or has to do with, the environment, its protection or regulation. It does not extend to any decision in breach of any national law which has an effect or impact on the environment.
BIAS
May 13th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsThe test for apparent bias is very well known. The question is whether the (i) “ fair-minded “ and (ii) informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a “ real possibility “ that the tribunal was biased. The judicial bias case of GOSALAKKAL v UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS OF LEICESTER NHS TRUST (2025) EAT 64 ( Lord Fairley P ) is a reminder (paras 65/66) that the “fair-minded observer” test necessitates a “ close focus on the facts and the context” and is an illustration ( paras 76-80 inc) of the importance of identifying the proper context when determining whether the facts are capable of forming the basis for an inference of bias.
ECHR
May 13th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality DutyThe level of a worker’s pay does not engage ECHR Article 8 and is not within its ambit : DJALO v SoS for JUSTICE (2025) EAT 67, para 259. Nor can A1P1 be relied upon : para 260. Moreover, being a claimant in a certain type of claim is not a “ status “ for Article 14 purposes.
DISCLOSURE
May 13th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationSee the decision of Jefford J in NEW LOTTERY CO v GAMBLING COMMISSION (2025) EWHC 1058 (TCC) on loss of LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE arising from INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE of documents during disclosure in litigation and the doctrine of “ honest mistake “, which would prevent LPP being lost, in the context of a heavy disclosure and review exercise.
SUBSIDIES
May 8th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Capital Finance and CompaniesIn AUBREY WEISS v GREATER MANCHESTER COMBINED AUTHORITY ( 2025 ) CAT 27 the Competition Appeal Tribunal has given its first Judgment on the balance to be struck in judicial review kind challenges under Section 70(1) of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 between on the one hand the protection of commercially confidential information and on the other hand procedural fairness and open justice. The CAT held that the balance in all the circumstances of this case required that the Appellant’s principal decision-maker be admitted to a confidentiality ring in order to review GMCA’s confidential decision-making documents in relation to loans made by the GMCA, both GMCA documents and documents, including pricing information, of the Appellant’s development competitor and recipients of the loans.
The CAT from para 18 considered the relevant law in relation to the subsidy control regime; and from para 21 the relevant law on managing particularly sensitive confidential information during litigation and confidentiality rings. The information to which access was sought was ( para 43 ) highly important for assessing the merits of the case and in deciding what points to take or not take. The CAT at para 57 identified what was comprised in the balancing exercise. It imposed protections to mitigate against risks : paras 58-61 inc.
DEPARTURE FROM POLICY
May 6th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsThe first factor is the nature of the policy. There is a spectrum of different kinds of policy. It ranges from the most formal to the most informal. The second factor is the deference that the Court ought to pay to the decision-maker in deciding whether uit had good reason to depart from its policy. Some level of weight should be attached to the judgment of a specialist experienced decision-maker. The required deference is also on a spectrum.
There is no bright line rule that good reasons can be reviewed only if they are irrational or unreasonable. In considering whether a decision-maker had good reason for departing from a policy one considers first where on the spectrum of policies the relevant one lies and where on the spectrum of appropriate deference the particular type of decision lies.
So held in R ( DUKE OF SUSSEX ) v SSHD ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 548 at paras 62-69 inc.
ECHR ARTICLE 5
May 6th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality DutyIn J V NE SOMERSET COUNCIL (2025) EWCA CIV 478 the appeal was concerned with whether a profoundly disabled 14-year-child was deprived of his liberty. The Court of Appeal held that his care arrangements did amount to a deprivation of his liberty. For that there had to be a Court Order under Article 5 . The consent of the local authority to his confinement was not sufficient.
CONSEQUENCE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTICE
April 30th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalSection 57(1) of TCPA 1990 provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of ANY development of land. Section 57(4) however creates an exception. In TITCHFIELD FESTIVAL THEATRE v SoS (2025) EWHC 883 (Admin) it is held that land in respect of which an enforcement notice has been issued is allowed to revert to a previous lawful use, without needing to go through the process of obtaining express planning permission.
INUNCTIONS RESTRAINING SPEECH
April 30th, 2025 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationIn ABBASI v NEWCASTLE NHS FOUNDATION TRUST (2025) UKSC 15 the Supreme Court provides important guidance on injunctions restraining speech on matters of public interest, including injunctions to prevent interference with a public authority’s performance of statutory functions. The Court reaffirmed that, though it may be necessary to protect public servants from offensive, abusive or defamatory attacks calculated to affect the performance of their duties, public servants acting in an official capacity may be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary citizens, and that the requirements of protecting them have to be weighed against the interest of freedom of expression or of open discussion of matters of public concern.