In Vernon Knight Associates v Cornwall Council [2013] EWCA Civ 950 the Council unsuccessfully appealed against a decision that it was liable for damage caused by floodwater escaping from one of the roads in the County when drains it had installed in the road had become blocked.  The road was known to be a high flood risk.  The Council’s system to prevent such blockages was adequate.  However, the Council’s contractor on two occasions did not follow his normal practice.  This caused the flooding. There was no adequate explanation for the failure to attend the road during exceptionally heavy rainfall.

Jackson LJ, having reviewed the authorities in relation to the liability of land owners for non-feasance in respect of natural nuisance, extracted the following principles (para 49):

“(i)        A landowner owes a measured duty in both negligence and nuisance to take reasonable steps to prevent natural occurrences on his land from causing damage to neighbouring properties. 

(ii)         In determining the content of the measured duty, the court must consider what is fair, just and reasonable as between the two neighbouring landowners. It must have regard to all the circumstances, including the extent of the foreseeable risk, the available preventive measures, the costs of such measures and the resources of both parties.

(iii)        Where the defendant is a public authority with substantial resources, the court must take into account the competing demands on those resources and the public purposes for which they are held. It may not be fair, just or reasonable to require a public authority to expend those resources on infrastructure works in order to protect a few individuals against a modest risk of property damage.”

The Council submitted it was only an adjoining owner by reason of its position as a highway authority.  Bearing in mind the many demands upon the Council’s resources, the Court should not impose unduly onerous requirements.  As to this factor, Jackson LJ said (para 57):  “… it is correct that the council is a highway authority with a large network of roads to maintain and the principal duty of preserving the safety of road users. On the other hand, precisely the same measures were needed both to protect motorists against flooded roads and to prevent flood damage occurring to adjacent properties. These measures were to check and clear the drains.”

Jackson LJ said (para 58) that the point made about resources is an important one and cannot be lightly dismissed, but concluded (para 59) that, even after making due allowance for the pressures on local authorities, the duty on the Council did require it to keep the drains functioning properly.  Moreover (para 61) the availability of insurance was not a factor of any great relevance.  At para 63 Jackson LJ said:

“Whilst I accept that there are limits on what can be expected from local authorities in relation to flood prevention, I do not accept that the judge applied too high a standard of care in the present case. He properly took into account all the relevant circumstances. Although he was carrying out a multifactorial assessment, he properly highlighted those factors which were particularly significant. I therefore reject the council’s first and principal ground of appeal.”

R (Attfield) v Barnet LBC [2013] EWHC 2089 (Admin) is a judicial review of the Council’s decision to increase the charges for residents’ parking permits and visitor vouchers in Controlled Parking Zones in its area.  The claim succeeded before Lang J.  She held that the increase in charges, pursuant to s45(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (“the RTRA”) was unlawful, because its purpose was to generate a surplus on the Special Parking Account, maintained under Section 55 of the RTRA, beyond the monies needed to operate the parking scheme, to fund other transport expenditure, such as road repair and concessionary fares.  She rejected the Council’s argument that it was entitled to exercise its powers under s45 (such amount as the authority may prescribe) for the purpose of raising a surplus to use for any transport functions, provided that they come within the scope of s122 of the RTRA.  Lang J said, at para 59:

“The purpose of section 122 is to impose a duty on local authorities to exercise their functions under the Act in accordance with the objects set out therein. It is necessarily couched in general terms because it applies to a remarkably broad range of functions in the RTRA 1984, e.g. traffic schemes, pedestrian crossings, school crossings, street playgrounds, speed limits, bollards, traffic wardens, removal and immobilisation of vehicles, as well as different types of parking facilities. I do not consider that section 122 was intended to authorise a local authority to raise a levy on parking permit holders, pursuant to section 45(2)(b), to fund any project which met the objects set out in section 122. Such an intention is not expressly stated, nor can it properly be implied. The RTRA 1984 is not a revenue-raising or taxing statute.”

Lang J concluded that the amount of the charge is limited to the amount the authority considers appropriate for the purposes of parking regulation, not for other transport purposes.  She observed, however (para 57):

“… the authority has a discretion to set charges to reflect its parking policies.  It is not restricted to levying a charge only to cover the base cost of running the schemes.”

What is a local authority entitled to take into account when deciding whether or not to renew a sex establishment licence for a lap dancing club?  That was the issue before the Court in Thompson v Oxford City Council [2013] EWHC 1819 (Admin).  Haddon-Cave J held that the fact that the character of an area was in the process of changing was a relevant consideration when deciding upon the appropriateness or otherwise of such a licence in accordance with Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, as amended by Section 27 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009.

At paragraph 50 of his Judgment he summarised the general principles to be derived from the authorities regarding the licensing of sex establishments as follows:-

(1)        Local authorities are granted a very wide statutory discretion to decide whether or not a licence should be granted;

(2)        Local authorities can take into account “any strong body of feeling in the locality” which objects to the existence of a sex shop there, although this does not include moral objections to its activities;

(3)        The legislation expressly contemplates that the circumstances in which a licence has been granted or renewed may change and there can be no expectation of annual renewal;

(4)        Local authorities have “a very broad power to make an evaluative judgment” whether the grant of a licence would be inappropriate having regard to “the character of the relevant locality”: this imports “a significant evaluative power” at two levels: first, in assessing whether the grant or renewal of the licence would be “inappropriate” (a very broad and general concept); and, secondly, in assessing the character of the relevant locality, which, again, involves questions of fact and degree and local knowledge which import, at that level also, a broad power of evaluative judgment to be exercised by the local authority;

(5)        There is no radical conceptual divide between “the character of the relevant locality” and “the use to which any premises in the vicinity are put”: the former is a concept calling for “a compendious and general evaluative judgment to be made by the authority”, having regard to a range of factors which may be relevant to that question, including not least the use to which properties within the relevant locality happen to be put, the latter simply provides an additional ground for refusal if, eg, it cannot be said that it would be inappropriate to grant a licence given the general character of the locality, but the use of particular premises within the vicinity does give cause for concern viz eg a church, or primary school;

(6)        The considerations were intended by Parliament to be considerations for the local authority’s own evaluative judgment, subject only to the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction on a claim by way of judicial review.

At paragraph 68 the Judge said:-

“…  licensing decision-makers are entitled to take into account both the present and future “character” of an area. There is no reason to limit the reference to “character” only to the present character of the area. Indeed, it would make no sense to do so in the context of prospective licences which were to be granted for 12 months in the future. Prospective licences required a prospective view. The fact that an area is developing and in a continued state of change is a relevant consideration to why renewal might be inappropriate.”

In Cusack v Harow LBC [2013] UKSC 40 the Supreme Court has held, reversing the Court of Appeal, that the Council as highway authority was not required to pay compensation for the erection of barriers preventing a property owner accessing a public highway from his property.  The Council had power to proceed under Section 80, which does not provide for compensation, rather than Section 66(2) of the Highways Act 1980 (“HA 1980”), which does provide for compensation.  The Supreme Court observed that, albeit the owner of a property adjoining a highway has a common law right of access to the highway, without restriction, from any part of his or her property, that right has been greatly limited by statutory provisions and there is no general right to compensation when action is taken to restrict a property owner’s right of access to an adjoining highway.

Canons of statutory construction, including the principle that a specific statutory provision excludes the application of an inconsistent and more general statutory provision, have a valuable role to play as guidelines embodying logic or common sense.  However, the distinction between general and specific statutory provisions was of no assistance in this case because neither Section 66(2) nor Section 80 of HA 1980  could be regarded as more specific or less general then the other.  HA 1980 is a consolidating statute and is the result of a complex history extending over more than 130 years. It contains a variety of overlapping and sometimes inconsistent powers. The Council was entitled to rely on the clear wording of Section 80 in order to erect the barriers. It did not matter that the Council could use Section 66(2) to achieve the same objective. However, a highway authority’s use of Section 80 could be challenged if, for example, it circumvented the specific prohibitions of the use of the power conferred by Section 66(2).

The Human Rights Act 1998 did not preclude the Council from relying on Section 80 because it involved no breach of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (“A1P1”).  The erection of the barriers would be a control of the use of property, not a deprivation of property. The case concerned land development and town planning, in relation to which the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation. The issue of the proportionality of the interference with A1P1 rights requires a broad judgment as to where a fair balance lies between competing general and individual interests.  The mere fact that another statutory route was available to the Council and that it required the payment of compensation did not itself lead to the conclusion that the Council’s reliance on Section 80 was disproportionate. There is no general rule under A1P1 that, where the State seeks to control the use of property and could do so under two different provisions which have different consequences in terms of compensation, it is obliged to use the provision which carries some (or greater) compensation.

Section 15(4) of the Commons Act 2006 (“CA 2006”), in relation to registration of town and village greens (“TVG”), is compatible with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions pursuant to Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (A1P1).  So the Court of Appeal has held in R (Newhaven Port and Properties Ltd) v SoS for DEFRA, East Sussex County Council and Newhaven Town Council [2013] EWCA Civ 673. The Port did not argue that the TVG scheme as a whole is incompatible with A1P1. It accepted that that argument was barred by Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council [2006] 2 AC 674.  The challenge was to Section 15(4) of CA 2006, which applies (broadly) where (a) a significant number of the inhabitants of any locality indulged “as of right” in lawful sports and pastimes on the land for a period of at least 20 years, (b) they ceased to do so before the time of the application but before the commencement of Section 15, and (c) the application is made within the period of five years beginning with the cessation referred to in paragraph (b). By Section 15(1) any person may apply to the commons registration authority to register land to which Part 1 of CA 2006 applies in a case where subsection (2), (3) or (4) applies.

The Port argued that the effect of Section 15 (4) was to deprive it of the statutory defence by which it could have defeated any application which had been made before the Section came into force, namely by demonstrating that use had not continued until the date of the application. The Port argued that in so doing Section 15 (4) is incompatible with A1P1.  It was common ground that CA 2006 (and Section 15 (4) in particular) is an interference with the Port’s peaceful enjoyment of its possessions because it significantly restricts what activities the owner can carry out on the registered land. Thus A1P1 is engaged. It was also common ground that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has established that A1P1 involves three distinct rules: the general principle of the peaceful enjoyment of possessions; a rule against deprivation of property, and right on the part of states to control the use of property in the general interest but subject to the striking of a fair balance between that interest and those of the property owner.  It was also common ground that registration of a TVG does not involve a deprivation of possessions, because legal title remains with the owner. This was, therefore, a case of control of use, falling within the second paragraph of A1P1. Lastly it was common ground that the interference had taken place subject to conditions provided for by law; in the sense that the law is clear and accessible. The key issues, therefore, were whether the contested legislation pursues a legitimate aim; and, if it does, whether the means by which it does so are reasonably proportionate to achieving that aim.

The Court of Appeal held that Section 15(4) does have a legitimate aim.  The key issue was that of proportionality.  The Court of Appeal held that the means by which Section 15(4) pursued the legitimate aim, including the period of grace being 5 years rather than a shorter period, are not manifestly without reasonable foundation.  It had been open to the Port to prevent the twenty years use as of right from coming into existence at all.  The Port’s bye-laws amounted to consent to the uses on which the local inhabitants relied.  If the Port had displayed the bye-laws on the quayside or the sea wall the whole problem would have been eliminated.  Moreover, all landowners have effectively been put on notice that those using their land for recreational purposes may well be asserting a public right to do so if their use of the land is more than trivial or sporadic.