In Sheffield City Council v Oliver (2007) EWCA Civ 225 the local authority was unsuccessful in its appeal from an Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) decision concerning the funding of major refurbishment works to several blocks of flats of which it is the freeholder.  Most of the flats were let as social housing.  Some, including the respondent’s, were let on long leases. A service charge provision required the respondent to pay a reasonable part of the costs incurred by the local authority in repairing and improving the structure and exterior of her block. The cost of the refurbishment project was more than £11 million.  The local authority had received government funding of almost £3 million from a community energy programme.  However, only part of the estate, which included the block in which the respondent’s flat was situated, fell within the qualifying area. The local authority claimed some £4,400 of community funding for work done specifically to her property. However it decided to recoup the costs of the works from her through the service charge without deducting the sum received in funding.  It considered that the funding should be treated as a contribution to the project as a whole and allocated equally among all long leaseholders, not just among those who were strictly eligible.  The Upper Tribunal held that the service charge provision in the respondent’s lease did not permit that course; that each leaseholder had only to contribute to the cost of works on his own block, not to the estate as a whole, and that the respondent should be credited with the amount of funding attributable to her property. It concluded that the cost of the government-funded work had not been “incurred” by the local authority within the meaning of the lease.  The issue was whether, on a proper construction of the lease, the local authority had to give credit for the third-party funding. Read more »

In Nottingham City Council v Parr (2017) EWCA Civ 188 the Court of Appeal held that it was not unlawful to impose a licence condition restricting the occupation of a house in multiple occupation to full-time students. Although the licensing regime concerned the physical characteristics of the relevant property, the personal characteristics and activities of potential occupiers will often be relevant and require investigation in contexts connected both with HMOs and with housing standards generally.

In Turley v Wandsworth LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 189 the Court of Appeal held that a condition in the Housing Act 1985 s.87(b) which required, up until 1 April 2012, that the long-term partner of a secure tenant had to have resided with the secure tenant throughout the 12-month period prior to the secure tenant’s death in order to succeed them, was not manifestly without reasonable foundation.  Even if the situations of common law spouses and married or civil partnership spouses were analogous for the purpose of ECHR art. 14, the difference in treatment between them was justified and proportionate.

As regards justification, local authority secure tenancies are a valuable and limited resource. Although it has long been policy to grant a limited right of succession to family members for whom the property had also been their home, regard has also to be had to the interests of those on the waiting list and of local authorities in making best use of housing stock. It had therefore been policy to require a degree of permanence in the relevant relationship. That requirement was inherently satisfied in the case of spouses who had entered into a legal marriage or civil partnership. However, there was no such formal commitment in the case of a common law spouse or other family member of the kind defined in s.113. As part of that balance of interests, it was legitimate to seek to limit rights of succession to family members whose relationship was of a permanent character. It was also legitimate, subject to the issue of proportionality, to treat that requirement as sufficiently satisfied in the case of legal spouses, but not by other relationships which did not involve the same formal commitment. Read more »

The substantial issue on the appeal in Dove v Havering LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 156 related to whether the “tenant condition”, pursuant to Section 81 of the Housing Act 1985, was satisfied, in order for the tenancy to be a secure tenancy. The tenancy in this case was a joint tenancy. The first limb of the condition was satisfied because both tenants were individuals. The issue was whether at least one of them occupied the dwelling-house as her only or principal home at the time when the notice to quit would otherwise have taken effect.  Lewison LJ said:-

“17.    There is now a considerable body of learning on what amounts to occupation of a dwelling as an only or principal home. There are two parts to the question: (a) does the person in question occupy the dwelling as a home and (b) if so, does he or she occupy it as his or her only or principal home? Read more »

The purpose of introductory tenancies is to provide what the Housing Act 1996 refers to as a trial period in which the landlord may determine the tenancy without having to establish the grounds for possession required in the case of a secure tenancy. This gives a social landlord an opportunity to form a view about the suitability of the tenant against a background of historic anti-social behaviour without becoming subject to the restrictions imposed in respect of a secure tenancy. The trial period is normally one year but can be extended for a further six months: see ss.125 and 125A.

Although the statutory grounds for possession do not have to be satisfied, the tenant is given a measure of protection by s.128 of the Act which provides that:

“(1) The court shall not entertain proceedings for the possession of a dwelling-house let under an introductory tenancy unless the landlord has served on the tenant a notice of proceedings complying with this section. Read more »