In Western Avenue Properties Ltd v Sadhana Soni (2017) EWHC 2650 (QB) the Court (at paragraph 21) reaffirmed the principles, the Bolkiah principles, applicable to injunctions to restrain professional advisers from acting on the ground that there would be a risk of the unauthorised use of confidential information, as follows.

1. The Claimants must show that the Defendant was, or had been, in possession of information that is confidential to the Claimants, and to the disclosure of which they have not consented.
2. They must then show that the information is or may be relevant to the matters in which the interest of the Defendant’s client, is, or may be, adverse to that of the Claimants.
3. The burden of proof is on the Claimants, but it is not a heavy one.
4. The Court’s jurisdiction to grant an injunction arises out of the Court’s equitable jurisdiction to protect confidential information.
5. The Court must consider whether the Defendant has any confidential information received from the Claimants, which is or may be relevant to the dispute between them and the Defendant’s client. If there is confidential information, but it is clear that it is not relevant to the dispute, there is no risk of the misuse of the confidential information.
6. If the Claimants establish that the Defendant is in possession of confidential information that is, or may be, relevant to the dispute the evidential burden shifts to the Defendant to establish that there is no risk of misuse or disclosure. The risk must be more than “fanciful or theoretical”, but need not be “substantial”.

In Glencore Energy (UK) Ltd v HMRC (2017) EWCA Civ 1716 the Court considered the relationship between Judicial Review and an alternative statutory remedy.  Sales LJ said (paragraphs 54-56 inclusive) that the principle that Judicial Review would be refused where a suitable alternative remedy was available was not disputed.  However, the basis for the principle had to be considered. The principle did not apply as a result of any statutory provision to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court on Judicial Review. The principle was based on the fact that Judicial Review was ordinarily  a remedy of last resort. However, where it was clear that a public authority was acting contrary to the rule of law, the High Court would be prepared to exercise its discretion without waiting for some other remedial process to take its course. In considering what qualified as a suitable alternative remedy, the Court should have regard to the provisions of Parliament. If Parliament had made it clear through legislation that a particular procedure or remedy was appropriate to deal with a standard case, the Court should be slow to conclude that the public interest required it to exercise its Judicial Review function along with, or instead of, that statutory procedure. Unlawfulness might arise which was not of that standard description, in which case the availability of such a statutory procedure would be less significant.  Treating Judicial Review in ordinary circumstances as a remedy of last resort fulfilled a number of objectives. It ensured that the Courts gave priority to statutory procedures as laid down by Parliament, and avoided expensive duplication of the effort which might be required if two sets of procedures were followed in relation to the same underlying subject matter. It minimised the potential for Judicial Review to be used to disrupt the smooth operation of statutory procedures which might be adequate to meet the justice of the case, and promoted proportionate allocation of judicial resources for dispute resolution, saving the High Court from undue pressure of work.