The question in Tinsley v Manchester City Council [2017] EWCA Civ 1704 was whether a person who has been compulsorily detained in a hospital for mental disorder under Section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) and has then been released from detention but still requires “after-care services” is entitled to require his local authority to provide such services at any time before he has exhausted sums reflecting the costs of care awarded to him in a judgment in his favour against a negligent tortfeasor. The Court of Appeal held that he is so entitled. It is not the law that a Section 117 claimant can claim against a local authority for after-care services only once any award for such services against a tortfeasor has been, or is about to be, exhausted. Read more »
Principles and policies
November 1st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsLewis J in R (Lupepe) v SSHD (2017) EWHC 2690 (Admin) considers (paragraphs 48/49) the principle that it is unreasonable, in the public law sense, to disagree with a factual conclusion of an adjudicator who has heard the evidence unless the adjudicator’s conclusion is itself unlawful as a matter of public law (or unless fresh material has become available since the hearing). An illustration of the principle is the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Warwickshire County Council ex p Powergen (1996) 97 LGR 617 where the Court of Appeal held that a highway authority could not depart from the decision of a planning inspector on a planning appeal that a particular development did not give rise to highway safety issues and it could not act on the basis that the proposed development would create highway dangers.
Lewis J also considered (paragraphs 61-66 inclusive) the position with respect to unpublished policies and (paragraphs 67-69 inclusive) procedural fairness (opportunity to make representations). The law governing the application of unpublished policies was considered by the Supreme Court in R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (JUSTICE intervening) [2012] 1 AC 245. The Supreme Court concluded that what must be published “is that which a person who is affected by a policy needs to know in order to make informed and meaningful representations to the decision-maker before a decision is made”. Where there is a policy in existence, and its provisions are material to the exercise of a discretion in a particular case, those provisions must be made public.
Corporate veil
November 1st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Capital Finance and CompaniesIn Persad v Anirudh Singh [2017] UKPC 32 Lord Neuberger reaffirmed, at paragraph 17, that piercing the veil of incorporation is justified only “in very rare circumstances”. It can be justified only where a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control, as made clear by the Supreme Court in VTB Capital v Nutritek [2013] 2 AC 337 and Prest v Petrodel [2013] 2 AC 415. Lord Neuberger further reaffirmed, at paragraph 20, that the fact that a company is a “one man company” is irrelevant: Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. It is a fallacy to suppose that the Court can pierce the corporate veil where the purpose of interposing a company into a transaction is to enable the owner or controller of the company to avoid liability. Lord Neuberger said, at paragraph 21, that use of terms such as “front” or “alias” can too easily be invoked to justify a wrong decision. The company has a distinct legal personality. As Lord Neuberger observed, at paragraph 22, cases such as Gilford Motor Co v Horne [1933] Ch 95 and Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 were distinguishable.
Not only did the person who set up the company in those cases have an existing relevant legal obligation which he was trying to avoid by entering into a transaction involving the company, but also the involvement of the company was unilaterally effected by the person concerned, without the knowledge, let alone the consent, of the other party.
Remedy for breach
November 1st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsIn Case E-16/16, Fosen-Linjen AS v AtB AS, the EFTA Court has said, in a Judgment on 31 October 2017, that damages are available as a remedy for breach of the procurement rules where there is a sufficient causal link between the breach and the damage irrespective of the gravity of the breach. A simple breach of procurement law is in itself says the Court sufficient to trigger the liability of the contracting authority to compensate for damage incurred: paragraph 82. This contrasts with the Supreme Court Judgement in Energy Solutions v NDA (2017) UKSC 34.
Award of contracts
November 1st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsR (Hersi & Co) v Lord Chancellor (2017) EWHC 2667 (TCC) is concerned with the defendant’s conduct of a public procurement exercise for the award of contracts to provide publicly-funded legal services relating to immigration and asylum and mental health work.
As part of the tender, there were 7 particular questions, grouped under the heading ‘Selection Criteria’, which all applicants were required to answer. The claimant answered the first three, but then left blank the answers to Questions 4, 5, 6 and 7. In consequence, the defendant awarded the claimant no points for its answers to those questions and the claimant’s tender failed to gain the required points to justify the award of a contract. The claimant now argues, either that the defendant should have sought clarification of their non-answers, and/or that the answers to the questions were plain from other parts of the claimant’s tender and should have been scored accordingly. In addition, the claimant has a wider case in which it seeks to compare the defendant’s treatment of numerous other applicants on other aspects of their tenders, so as to allege inequality of treatment. Read more »
Planning obligations
October 27th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalAberdeen City and Shire Strategic Development Planning Authority v Elsick Development Company Limited (2017) UKSC 66 raised an important question of planning law. A planning authority foresees and plans for significant growth in its area. Major investment in transport infrastructure is required to accommodate the aggregate of the planned development. The planning authority seeks to achieve this investment by adopting a policy in its development plan which in substance requires developers to enter into planning obligations with it to make financial contributions to the pooled fund to be spent on the infrastructure, including interventions at places where a particular development has only a trivial impact. Is such a policy within the existing powers of the planning authority under current planning legislation? Read more »
Homelessness
October 20th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in HousingIn Hotak v Southwark LBC (2016) AC 811 the Supreme Court ruled that “vulnerable” for priority need purposes connotes “significantly” more vulnerable than ordinarily vulnerable as a result of being rendered homeless. But what is meant by “significantly” in this context? The Court of Appeal has attempted to answer that question in joint appeals Panayiotou v Walsham Forest LBC and Smith v Haringey LBC, (2017) EWCA Civ 1624. It means “at risk of more harm in a significant way”. That is an evaluative judgment in relation to any given set of facts: paragraph 64. Read more »
Direct Action: Natural Justice
October 12th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalA local planning authority has power to take direct action. This is pursuant to Section 178 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (“the TCPA”). That empowers the LPA to enter land and take the steps required by an enforcement notice once the period for compliance with the notice has expired. Read more »
Direct Effect of EU Directives
October 11th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationIn Farrell v Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Case C-413/15, ECJ Judgment on 10 October 2017, the Court has reaffirmed Foster v British Gas and other cases that where a person is able to rely on a Directive against emanations of the State he or she may do so regardless of the capacity in which the public authority is acting, whether as public authority or e.g. employer, and that “unconditional and sufficiently precise” provisions of a Directive, whether or not transposed into domestic law, can be relied on against emanations of the State (such as local authorities).