Consideration has been given by the Supreme Court in R (SPITALFIELDS HISTORIC BUILDING TRUST) v TOWER HAMLETS LBC (2025) UKSC 11 to a provision in the Council’s statutory Constitution, in the form of Standing Orders, with Procedure Rules, adopted by it pursuant to Section 106 of and paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972, which restricted voting by Committee Members at the final Meeting to decide a planning application to those who had been present at the Meeting or Meetings at which the application had been considered. This was, from para 41, per Lord Sales, held to be lawful. It was not contrary to paragraph 39 of Schedule 12. The statutory provisions should be read according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. The right of a Councillor to vote could not be regarded as absolute or fundamental in the sense proposed by the appellant. A Councillor might be disqualified from voting in a particular case by statute or by common law rules, such as a conflict of interest, or appearance of bias.
The issue was not one of individual Councillor’s rights but the promotion of efficient and effective decision-making by the local authority, including by its Committees. The provisions of the 1972 Act dealing with meetings and voting had to be read in the context of the general background rules regarding the entitlement of a Councillor to vote and the context of the underlying purpose of the provisions, which was to enable a local authority to take lawful decisions. The power of a Councillor to vote was implicit in the 1972 Act but was not conferred by para 39, which codified the rule that decisions were taken by a majority of the members attending who could validly vote, but did not otherwise limit the power of a local authority to regulate the conduct of meetings by means of Standing Orders.
The exercise of the power to make Standing Orders pursuant to Schedule 12 para 42 and Section 106 was not unrestricted, but was subject to usual public law constraints. In particular, the exercise of the power had to be rational and for a proper purpose with the contemplation of the legislation. The relevant Standing Orders complied with those public law requirements. A local authority was well-placed to determine whether a measure like the restrictive voting rule in the relevant Standing Orders was desirable and justified. Parliament had recognised that when it conferred on a local authority under para 42 and Section 106 a power, in entirely general terms, to make Standing Orders to regulate its affairs. As a matter of ordinary language, the power for a local authority to make Standing Orders to regulate their “proceedings” or the “proceedings” of their Committees included the power to regulate the circumstances in which a member would be treated as qualified and entitled to vote.
The Supreme Court rejected the submission that a Councillor’s right to vote was so fundamental that the general and clear wording in para 42 and in Section 106 had to be read down by interpolating an unexpressed limitation so as not to permit the making of Standing Orders removing or limiting such a right. The principle of legality had a narrow application and was not applicable as an approach to statutory construction in the absence of a relevant established fundamental right or legal principle. The 1972 Act, under which the right for Councillors to vote implicitly arose, itself included the powers to make Standing Orders. The local authority had power to make the relevant Standing Orders and it had acted rationally and lawfully in doing so.