Following its review of disabled children’s social care law, a Law Commission final report concludes that the area of law has become increasingly complex, inaccessible, outdated, and potentially unfair. It recommends: a simplified and unified legal framework for disabled children’s social care law, sitting within the Children Act 1989; a single, comprehensive piece of statutory guidance on disabled children’s social care law, setting out the rights and responsibilities of disabled children, families, and local authorities; an updated definition of disability; a single duty to meet the social care needs of disabled children, subject to national eligibility criteria; a right to independent advocacy for disabled children; a statutory requirement that planning for disabled children to make the transition to adulthood should start by the age of 14; clarification of the dividing line between health and social care; and a fair, accessible, independent and effective system for resolving disputes about social care for disabled children.

R ( AAM ) v BROMLEY LBC ( 2025 ) EWHC 1565 ( Admin ) holds, at para 142, that in deciding whether there are “ exceptional circumstances “ for the purposes of Section 24(A)(5) of the Children Act 1989 ( assistance may in exceptional circumstances be given by provision of accommodation ) an authority is NOT entitled to take into account the fact that a qualifying young person is being provided with, or might be provided with, NASS accommodation from the Secretary of State under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. That is a legally irrelevant consideration.

In R ( Kensington & Chelsea RLBC ) v NHS NORTH WEST LONDON INTEGRATED CARE BOARD ( 2025 ) EWHC 889 the Administrative Court refused to grant the local authority’s application for Judicial Review seeking to challenge the ICB’s decision to decline to make a financial contribution towards the costs of funding a placement for a young person at a specialist children’s home.

Under the Care Act 2014 the duty to promote an individual’s wellbeing is tailored to that individual’s needs, feelings, beliefs and best interests. This is reinforced by Statutory Guidance. The statutory provisions envisage that personal dignity and protection from abuse and neglect, in addition to other aspects of a person’s wellbeing will be promoted via the detailed needs assessment and care support plan created in each case. In R ( VRP ) v KINGSTON UPON THAMES RLBC ( ( 2025 ) EWHC 504 ( Admin ) the claimant applied for judicial review of the Council’s system for the provision of same-sex personal care for adult females. She argued that the Council had a duty to operate a system  that generally ensured, or had the object of ensuring, the provision of same-sex personal and intimate care for female service users. The argument failed. The Act did not support such a duty. Nor did the Equality Act or ECHR Articles 3 & 8.

Local authorities are required to deliver necessary support to a child in need under the Children Act 1989. In WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL v AB ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 132the Court of Appeal says that a court order should not be used solely to encourage an authority to do that which it is already statutorily obliged to do. Once a full care order is made the Court would not have jurisdiction to review the operation of a care plan or require the authority to adhere to the key elements of any care plan; and the authority could amend or fundamentally alter a Court approved care plan.

Under the Government’s FREE EARLY EDUCATION ENTITLEMENT  Scheme ( FEEE ) local authorities have a duty to secure the provision of 570 hours in any year of free early years CHILDCARE PROVISION for eligible children. The primary statutory on local authorities, under Section  7 ( 1 )  of the CHILDCARE ACT 2006 is to ensure that FEEE hours are available to all qualifying parents of pre-school children on a “ free of charge “ basis. Under Section 7 ( 2 )  each local authority has to “ have regard to “ STATUTORY GUIDANCE on “ Early Education and Childcare “. This indicates that authorities have to ensure that childcare providers do not charge parents “ top-up “ fees. These provisions, and the Local Authority ( Duty to Secure Early Years Provision Free of Charge ) Regulations 2014, are considered in R ( BOURNEMOUTH< POOLE and CHRISTCHURCH COUNCIL ) v LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL CARE OMBUDSMAN  ( 2025 )  EWHC 224 ( Admin ) If nurseries were permitted to impose compulsory charges on parents as a condition of accessing FEEE hours, the childcare would not be free of charge. Any proposed charges for FEEE hours have to be voluntary. Arrangements have to be structured so that parents are able to refuse to pay any proposed charges for additional goods or services.

On the obligations of local authorities to children who may be “ children in need “, for the purposes of Section 17 (10 ) of the Children Act 1989, the Court of Appeal, in R ( TW ) v ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 4, held that the authority did not owe ongoing obligations to a young person as a “ former relevant child “. Even though the authority had helped the claimant, under Section 20, to obtain accommodation, through a third party provider, the authority was not to be regarded as (1) having treated him as a child in need, or (2) having provided him with accommodation. The authority had acted rationally in deciding, on the basis of detailed documentation, that he was not a child in need.

In R (DF) v Essex County Council (2024) EWCA Civ 1545 the Court of Appeal confirms that a child who is homeless for the purposes of Section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 will not necessarily require accommodation for the purposes of Section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The Children Act question whether a child requires accommodation is to be answered as a matter of factual evaluation, applying that phrase in its natural and ordinary meaning, and without reference to the homelessness definition in the Housing Act.

Two FTT decisions consider the above : Little Oaks Grimsby Ltd v Ofsted (2024) UKFTT 889 in England and Pleasant Valley Care Ltd v Welsh Ministers (2024) UK FTT 911 in Wales.

In the English case the appeal to the FTT was against Ofsted’s decision to suspend the registration to provide childcare at Little Oaks Nursery. The right of appeal was under Regulation 12 of 2008 Childcare Regulations, pursuant to Section 69 of the Childcare Act 2006. The applicable test is set out in Regulation, by reference to “ risk of harm “ as defined in Regulation 13, and for a duration in accordance with Regulations 10 and 11. The burden of satisfying the threshold test under Regulation 9 and of justifying the decision in terms of a legitimate public interest objective and proportionality is upon the Respondent. The standard of proof is “ reasonable cause to believe”. That falls somewhere between balance of probability and reasonable cause to suspect. The contemplated  risk must be one of significant harm.

In the Welsh case the appeal was under Section 26 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016. It was against cancellation of registration as a domiciliary care provider in respect of the regulated activity of personal care. Section 4 of the Act sets out the general objectives of the statutory scheme. Sections 14 and 15 relate to cancellation of registration, and sections 16 and 17 to improvement notices. The Tribunal determines the issue afresh as of the time of the appeal. It makes findings of fact about breaches of relevant requirements and decides whether cancellation of registration is a proportionate and necessary step.

The Department of Health and Social Care has updated Guidance on Part 1 of the Care Act 2014. It addresses ORDINARY RESIDENCE. It makes other changes. It notes that the new Government will not be carrying forward its predecessor’s planned ADULT SOCIAL CARE CHARGING reforms.