R (FC) v BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL (2025) EWHC 3227 ( Admin ) concerns Sections 17, 31 and 47 of the Children Act 1989, the Working Together to Safeguard Children Guidance, andcare and supervision of children and significant harm to them. Irrationality challenges fail. So too do human rights challenges under Article 8 of the ECHR based on interferences with both family and private life.

In S v ISLINGTON LBC (2025) EWHC 2780 (Fam) MacDonald J considers the public law and human rights principles applicable in determining a parent’s application (under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction) to prevent a local authority from exercising its power, under Section 33 of the Children Act 1989 (effect of care order) to carry out routine vaccinations in the case of a child the subject of an interim care order.

In JK ( Return Order Under Inherent Jurisdiction ) (2025) EWCA Civ 1309 it is held that that there is no general principle that a local authority cannot invoke the High Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction to secure the return to the UK of a British child in a foreign country if the authority intends thereafter to take care proceedings that it could not otherwise entertain. The relevant principles relating to the Inherent Jurisdiction, its limits and restrictions, are set out.

Following its review of disabled children’s social care law, a Law Commission final report concludes that the area of law has become increasingly complex, inaccessible, outdated, and potentially unfair. It recommends: a simplified and unified legal framework for disabled children’s social care law, sitting within the Children Act 1989; a single, comprehensive piece of statutory guidance on disabled children’s social care law, setting out the rights and responsibilities of disabled children, families, and local authorities; an updated definition of disability; a single duty to meet the social care needs of disabled children, subject to national eligibility criteria; a right to independent advocacy for disabled children; a statutory requirement that planning for disabled children to make the transition to adulthood should start by the age of 14; clarification of the dividing line between health and social care; and a fair, accessible, independent and effective system for resolving disputes about social care for disabled children.

R ( AAM ) v BROMLEY LBC ( 2025 ) EWHC 1565 ( Admin ) holds, at para 142, that in deciding whether there are “ exceptional circumstances “ for the purposes of Section 24(A)(5) of the Children Act 1989 ( assistance may in exceptional circumstances be given by provision of accommodation ) an authority is NOT entitled to take into account the fact that a qualifying young person is being provided with, or might be provided with, NASS accommodation from the Secretary of State under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. That is a legally irrelevant consideration.

In R ( Kensington & Chelsea RLBC ) v NHS NORTH WEST LONDON INTEGRATED CARE BOARD ( 2025 ) EWHC 889 the Administrative Court refused to grant the local authority’s application for Judicial Review seeking to challenge the ICB’s decision to decline to make a financial contribution towards the costs of funding a placement for a young person at a specialist children’s home.

Under the Care Act 2014 the duty to promote an individual’s wellbeing is tailored to that individual’s needs, feelings, beliefs and best interests. This is reinforced by Statutory Guidance. The statutory provisions envisage that personal dignity and protection from abuse and neglect, in addition to other aspects of a person’s wellbeing will be promoted via the detailed needs assessment and care support plan created in each case. In R ( VRP ) v KINGSTON UPON THAMES RLBC ( ( 2025 ) EWHC 504 ( Admin ) the claimant applied for judicial review of the Council’s system for the provision of same-sex personal care for adult females. She argued that the Council had a duty to operate a system  that generally ensured, or had the object of ensuring, the provision of same-sex personal and intimate care for female service users. The argument failed. The Act did not support such a duty. Nor did the Equality Act or ECHR Articles 3 & 8.

Local authorities are required to deliver necessary support to a child in need under the Children Act 1989. In WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL v AB ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 132the Court of Appeal says that a court order should not be used solely to encourage an authority to do that which it is already statutorily obliged to do. Once a full care order is made the Court would not have jurisdiction to review the operation of a care plan or require the authority to adhere to the key elements of any care plan; and the authority could amend or fundamentally alter a Court approved care plan.

Under the Government’s FREE EARLY EDUCATION ENTITLEMENT  Scheme ( FEEE ) local authorities have a duty to secure the provision of 570 hours in any year of free early years CHILDCARE PROVISION for eligible children. The primary statutory on local authorities, under Section  7 ( 1 )  of the CHILDCARE ACT 2006 is to ensure that FEEE hours are available to all qualifying parents of pre-school children on a “ free of charge “ basis. Under Section 7 ( 2 )  each local authority has to “ have regard to “ STATUTORY GUIDANCE on “ Early Education and Childcare “. This indicates that authorities have to ensure that childcare providers do not charge parents “ top-up “ fees. These provisions, and the Local Authority ( Duty to Secure Early Years Provision Free of Charge ) Regulations 2014, are considered in R ( BOURNEMOUTH< POOLE and CHRISTCHURCH COUNCIL ) v LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL CARE OMBUDSMAN  ( 2025 )  EWHC 224 ( Admin ) If nurseries were permitted to impose compulsory charges on parents as a condition of accessing FEEE hours, the childcare would not be free of charge. Any proposed charges for FEEE hours have to be voluntary. Arrangements have to be structured so that parents are able to refuse to pay any proposed charges for additional goods or services.

On the obligations of local authorities to children who may be “ children in need “, for the purposes of Section 17 (10 ) of the Children Act 1989, the Court of Appeal, in R ( TW ) v ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 4, held that the authority did not owe ongoing obligations to a young person as a “ former relevant child “. Even though the authority had helped the claimant, under Section 20, to obtain accommodation, through a third party provider, the authority was not to be regarded as (1) having treated him as a child in need, or (2) having provided him with accommodation. The authority had acted rationally in deciding, on the basis of detailed documentation, that he was not a child in need.