Under the Care Act 2014 the duty to promote an individual’s wellbeing is tailored to that individual’s needs, feelings, beliefs and best interests. This is reinforced by Statutory Guidance. The statutory provisions envisage that personal dignity and protection from abuse and neglect, in addition to other aspects of a person’s wellbeing will be promoted via the detailed needs assessment and care support plan created in each case. In R ( VRP ) v KINGSTON UPON THAMES RLBC ( ( 2025 ) EWHC 504 ( Admin ) the claimant applied for judicial review of the Council’s system for the provision of same-sex personal care for adult females. She argued that the Council had a duty to operate a system  that generally ensured, or had the object of ensuring, the provision of same-sex personal and intimate care for female service users. The argument failed. The Act did not support such a duty. Nor did the Equality Act or ECHR Articles 3 & 8.

Local authorities are required to deliver necessary support to a child in need under the Children Act 1989. In WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL v AB ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 132the Court of Appeal says that a court order should not be used solely to encourage an authority to do that which it is already statutorily obliged to do. Once a full care order is made the Court would not have jurisdiction to review the operation of a care plan or require the authority to adhere to the key elements of any care plan; and the authority could amend or fundamentally alter a Court approved care plan.

Under the Government’s FREE EARLY EDUCATION ENTITLEMENT  Scheme ( FEEE ) local authorities have a duty to secure the provision of 570 hours in any year of free early years CHILDCARE PROVISION for eligible children. The primary statutory on local authorities, under Section  7 ( 1 )  of the CHILDCARE ACT 2006 is to ensure that FEEE hours are available to all qualifying parents of pre-school children on a “ free of charge “ basis. Under Section 7 ( 2 )  each local authority has to “ have regard to “ STATUTORY GUIDANCE on “ Early Education and Childcare “. This indicates that authorities have to ensure that childcare providers do not charge parents “ top-up “ fees. These provisions, and the Local Authority ( Duty to Secure Early Years Provision Free of Charge ) Regulations 2014, are considered in R ( BOURNEMOUTH< POOLE and CHRISTCHURCH COUNCIL ) v LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL CARE OMBUDSMAN  ( 2025 )  EWHC 224 ( Admin ) If nurseries were permitted to impose compulsory charges on parents as a condition of accessing FEEE hours, the childcare would not be free of charge. Any proposed charges for FEEE hours have to be voluntary. Arrangements have to be structured so that parents are able to refuse to pay any proposed charges for additional goods or services.

On the obligations of local authorities to children who may be “ children in need “, for the purposes of Section 17 (10 ) of the Children Act 1989, the Court of Appeal, in R ( TW ) v ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 4, held that the authority did not owe ongoing obligations to a young person as a “ former relevant child “. Even though the authority had helped the claimant, under Section 20, to obtain accommodation, through a third party provider, the authority was not to be regarded as (1) having treated him as a child in need, or (2) having provided him with accommodation. The authority had acted rationally in deciding, on the basis of detailed documentation, that he was not a child in need.

In R (DF) v Essex County Council (2024) EWCA Civ 1545 the Court of Appeal confirms that a child who is homeless for the purposes of Section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 will not necessarily require accommodation for the purposes of Section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The Children Act question whether a child requires accommodation is to be answered as a matter of factual evaluation, applying that phrase in its natural and ordinary meaning, and without reference to the homelessness definition in the Housing Act.

Two FTT decisions consider the above : Little Oaks Grimsby Ltd v Ofsted (2024) UKFTT 889 in England and Pleasant Valley Care Ltd v Welsh Ministers (2024) UK FTT 911 in Wales.

In the English case the appeal to the FTT was against Ofsted’s decision to suspend the registration to provide childcare at Little Oaks Nursery. The right of appeal was under Regulation 12 of 2008 Childcare Regulations, pursuant to Section 69 of the Childcare Act 2006. The applicable test is set out in Regulation, by reference to “ risk of harm “ as defined in Regulation 13, and for a duration in accordance with Regulations 10 and 11. The burden of satisfying the threshold test under Regulation 9 and of justifying the decision in terms of a legitimate public interest objective and proportionality is upon the Respondent. The standard of proof is “ reasonable cause to believe”. That falls somewhere between balance of probability and reasonable cause to suspect. The contemplated  risk must be one of significant harm.

In the Welsh case the appeal was under Section 26 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016. It was against cancellation of registration as a domiciliary care provider in respect of the regulated activity of personal care. Section 4 of the Act sets out the general objectives of the statutory scheme. Sections 14 and 15 relate to cancellation of registration, and sections 16 and 17 to improvement notices. The Tribunal determines the issue afresh as of the time of the appeal. It makes findings of fact about breaches of relevant requirements and decides whether cancellation of registration is a proportionate and necessary step.

The Department of Health and Social Care has updated Guidance on Part 1 of the Care Act 2014. It addresses ORDINARY RESIDENCE. It makes other changes. It notes that the new Government will not be carrying forward its predecessor’s planned ADULT SOCIAL CARE CHARGING reforms.

In MANSFIELD CARE LTD v NEWMAN ( 2024 ) EAT 128 the President of the EAT holds that an ET erred in finding that TUPE was applicable. A care home was closing down. The care home residents were being moved to one of 2 care homes. There were 2 categories of residents: privately funded and local authority funded. The ET found that there were (1) a business transfer, in respect of the privately funded residents and a service provision change in respect of publicly funded residents. The EAT disagreed. The ET’s reasoning did not support the identification of an economic identity divided in that way that retained its identity, or the identification of an organised grouping of employees that had the principle purpose of carrying out services for the publicly funded residents.

In MM v GREENWICH RLBC (2024) UKUT 179 (AAC) Judge Stout holds that a FTT a First-tier Tribunal when considering an appeal in relation to an education health and care plan for a 16 year old boy had failed to consider whether he had capacity to litigate, and should have appointed his mother as alternative person.  The Upper Tribunal gave a guidance on the approach of the FTT to health and social care recommendations under the Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal Recommendations Power) Regulations 2017.

The guidance, at paragraph 108, is as follows.

• Although there was no freestanding right of appeal against the contents of the health and social care sections of the EHCP, once an appeal had been brought under s.51 of the Act, the tribunal’s powers to make recommendations under the 2017 Regulations were an equal part of its jurisdiction.
• The fact that the local authority or responsible commissioning body was only required to provide a reasoned response to the tribunal’s recommendations rather than actually comply was not a reason for the tribunal to regard its decision-making task as any less important.
• The tribunal exercised an inquisitorial jurisdiction in relation to health and social care in the same way as it did in relation to special educational needs.
• The primary burden was on the parties to put before the tribunal the evidence necessary to make out their respective cases. If they failed to do so, the tribunal could decide the case on the evidence before it, or direct further evidence.
• The tribunal was not required before deciding what to order to ensure that the various statutory steps that the local authority should have carried out before making or amending the EHCP had been completed.
• There was no statutory requirement in relation to assessment before health or social care provision could be included in an EHCP, nor did the tribunal have any express jurisdiction to order or recommend that either the responsible commissioning body or the local authority carry out an assessment.
• Although the tribunal was not required to comply with the decision-making frameworks applicable to the local authority or responsible commissioning body, it might be relevant for it to take certain elements into account when making recommendations.
• The social care legislative framework might also inform the tribunal’s approach where there had been a breakdown in relationships between parent and social services.
• As a matter of good practice, in cases where health and social care recommendations were sought under the 2017 Regulations, the tribunal should require the local authority or responsible commissioning body to provide it with the relevant local criteria.
• If the evidence the tribunal had was “thin”, it could adjourn for further evidence, or refuse to make recommendations. There was in principle nothing wrong with making recommendations on a time-limited basis if the evidence available only related to a limited period.

In J ( LOCAL AUTHORITY CONSENT TO DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY ) ( 2024 ) EWHC 1690 ( Fam ) Lieven J hols that a local authority which held parental responsibility for a child under the age of 16, under a Care Order, pursuant to Section 20 of the Children Act 1989, could consent to the deprivation of liberty of that child, as corporate parent, pursuant to section 33 of that Act. No Deprivation of Liberty Order was required, notwithstanding that there was a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the ECHR. The decision to deprive the child of his liberty was an exercise of the authority’s statutory duties to him. There was an obligation as carer to keep him safe. Far from the restrictions amounting to a serious infringement of his rights that no local authority could lawfully consent to, they were restrictions essential to securing his best interests. Indeed they were required by the positive obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR.