In Dunnett Investments Ltd v SoS for CLG and East Dorset Council (2017) EWCA Civ 192 a site had planning permission for new industrial and office premises, but subject to strict conditions, and was used as a business centre. The Claimant sought to develop the site for dwelling houses.

The planning permission was subject to a condition that the site could be used for “no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained”. The issue was as to the lawfulness of this condition. In particular the question arose whether it was sufficiently clear. The Judge and the Court of Appeal held that it was sufficiently clear and was lawful.

The Court of Appeal held that the condition clearly excluded the operation of the General Permitted Development Order, as amended (“the GPDO”). It stated (paragraph 37) that the starting point for consideration of the correct approach to the interpretation of planning conditions was that, as long as appropriate caution was exercised, there was no bar to implying words into conditions, in a planning context as much as any other.  In interpreting a planning condition which was said to exclude the operation of the GPDO, the following themes could be discerned from the authorities: (a) a planning condition could exclude the application of the GPDO; (b) exclusion might be express or implied, however, a grant for a particular use could not in itself amount to an exclusion; (c) to exclude the application of the GPDO, the words used in the relevant condition, taken in their full context, must clearly evince an intention on the part of the local planning authority to make such an exclusion.

Ashdown Forest is a Special Area of Conservation (“a SAC”). This designation, in 2005, was pursuant to the Habitats Directive (“the Directive”). The designation was given for a number of reasons, including the SAC’s extensive areas of lowland heath, which is vulnerable to nitrogen dioxide pollution from motor vehicles. The SAC covers 2,729 hectares and lies wholly within the area of Wealden District Council. This is the local planning authority for Wealden District, save for that part of it (to the south) which falls within the South Downs National Park.

In Wealden District Council v SoS for CLG and others [2017] EWHC 351 (Admin) there was a challenge to quash part of the Lewes District Plan known as the Joint Core Strategy 2010-2030 (“the JCS”). The JCS was jointly prepared under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 by Lewes District Council and the South Downs National Park Authority as local planning authorities.  The JSC forms part of the statutory development plan for the district of Lewes, including the extent of the National Park which falls within it. Read more »

In Samuel Smith Old Brewery v North Yorkshire County Council [2017] EWHC 442 (Admin) Hickinbottom J held that, depending on the specific circumstances of a case, visual impact might be taken into account by a planning decision-maker when considering the impact of a proposed development on the openness of a green belt area. Factors such as visual impact, purpose, and degree of permanence and reversibility, were not matters to which, as a matter of law, a planning decision-maker had to have regard in every case in which a proposed development was in a green belt area, or even in every such case in which openness was an issue. They were factors to which the decision-maker might have regard if, on the facts of the particular case, in the exercise of his judgment and discretion he thought it right to do so. In other words, the decision-maker had a margin of appreciation within which he might decide just which consideration should play a part in his reasoning process.

In Lucas (on behalf of Save Diggle Action Group) v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council (2017) EWHC 349 (Admin) the Council had been granted funding to redevelop a School, the existing buildings of which were in a poor state of repair.  The funding was from the Education Funding Authority (“the EFA”).  The EFA undertook a Feasibility Study (“the Study”).  The Study looked at various options for the redevelopment.  These included relocation at a new site.  The Study designated the new site as the best option.  This was because the new site offered the best value for money.

The Study confirmed, however, that if the Council chose to redevelop the School on its existing site, that would be funded by the EFA, despite being more expensive. Nonetheless the Council adopted the new site option.

The Council as Local Planning Authority did not take into account as a material planning consideration with respect to the new site that there was the option of redeveloping the school at its existing site. Kerr J held that it should have done so.  It was relevant to the proposed development for a number of reasons, not irrelevant as the LPA had believed.

In R (DLA Delivery Ltd) v Lewes District Council (2017) EWCA Civ 58 the Court of Appeal held that the statutory requirement for a Neighbourhood Development Plan (“NDP”) to be “in general conformity with the strategic policies contained in the development plan for the area” did not require the making of a NDP to await the adoption of an up-to-date local plan.  Lindblom LJ addresses the statutory scheme for the preparation of NDPs at paras 4/5 and concludes at para 25 that the making of a NDP does not have to await the adoption of any other development plan document.

In R (Boot) v Elmbridge BC [2017] EWHC 12 (Admin) Amanda Boot sought to quash the Council’s decision to grant planning permission for a new football and athletics facility in Walton-on-Thames in Surrey (“the Site”).  The Site is a 14 hectare former landfill site requiring remediation. It is located within the metropolitan Green Belt, adjacent to the river Thames. The purpose of the planning application was to construct the “Waterside Drive Sports Hub”. This is intended to provide a shared ground for Walton Casuals FC, Walton and Hersham FC and Walton Athletics Club. The proposed development would utilise land that is currently occupied by one football pitch for Walton Casuals FC, an area of informal open space and scrub land. All existing structures on the Site would be demolished.

Two grounds of challenge were advanced: that the Council’s Planning Committee had erred in its interpretation of paragraph 89 of the NPPF; and that the Council had failed to have regard to a material consideration. Supperstone J rejected the latter challenge. However, he upheld the former.  Paragraph 89 provides that a LPA should regard the construction of new buildings as inappropriate in the Green Belt save for the provision of appropriate facilities for outdoor sport and outdoor recreation, “as long as it preserves the openness of the Green Belt and does not conflict with the purposes of including land within it”.

The Claimant contended that the question of law raised by her first ground of challenge was whether a new sports facility could be appropriate development even if it caused harm to the openness and purposes of the Green Belt. This was suggested because the Council found that the new stadium would cause harm to the openness and purposes of the Green Belt, but (despite this) found it was appropriate development and complied with paragraph 89 of the NPPF. The Claimant submitted that the Council’s interpretation of the policy was wrong. Her Counsel contended that if a new sports facility caused harm to the openness of the Green Belt (even limited harm) it was not appropriate development.  He submitted that if a proposal has an adverse impact on openness, the inevitable conclusion is that it does not comply with a policy that requires openness to be maintained. A decision maker does not have “any latitude” to find otherwise, based on the extent of the impact. In the present case the Council concluded that there was an adverse impact on openness, but nevertheless granted permission without giving consideration to whether under paragraphs 87 and 88 of the NPPF there were very special circumstances that would justify it. Supperstone J accepted these submissions.  In his judgment the Council erred in its interpretation of paragraph 89 of the NPPF.

When a local planning policy obliges a developer to provide an element of affordable housing on sites in excess of stated thresholds, an issue may arise as to whether to aggregate two (or more) sites or whether two (or more) sites should be treated as forming part of a larger whole. Absent a definition of sites, the determination of such an issue relates to the application rather than the interpretation of policy, is a matter of planning judgment, and is challengeable only if irrelevant factors are taken into account or if an obviously relevant consideration is not taken into account or if the judgment is otherwise irrational: New Dawn Homes Ltd v SoS for CLG and Tewkesbury Borough Council [2016] EWHC 3314 (Admin), considering the Brandlord case.

 In R (Friends of the Earth) v North Yorkshire County Council (2016) EWHC 3303 (Admin) Lang J dismissed a judicial review challenge to the Council’s decision as Minerals Planning Authority to grant planning permission for fracking. There were two grounds of challenge, the principal one of which related to environmental impact.  Lang J reiterated (para 21) that it is for the authority to assess (i) what information should be in the Environmental Statement (“the ES”) and (ii) whether the information contained therein is adequate, and that the authority’s assessment can be challenged only on public law grounds. The Council had consulted (para 47) and had considered objections and taken them into account when making its decision (para 51). The Officers’ Report fairly set out the legislative and policy framework within which the decision had to be made (para 53), namely (i) European legislation on environmental protection; (ii) National legislation and policy on meeting climate change objectives by cutting greenhouse gases and moving away from fossil fuels (including gas) towards clean renewable energy supplies; (iii) National policy in favour of shale gas; (iv) National planning policy on meeting the challenges of climate change and support for a transition to a low carbon future. The Committee’s Resolution clearly evidenced the Committee’s consideration of the ES and its conclusion that the ES was adequate.

Applying the tests set out in the authorities, Lang J concluded at para 57 that she found it impossible to conclude that the Officers failed to guide the Members sufficiently, or misled them, on a matter essential to their decision. The Committee Members had specialist knowledge, as members of a Mineral Planning Authority which has multiple gas wells in its region. The ES and the Officers’ Report provided them with a detailed account of the proposed scheme. They received detailed objections to the proposal from objectors, which included the increase in greenhouse gas emissions arising from the production of gas at the Site. The real thrust of the objections was that energy requirements ought to be met by other, less environmentally damaging means than gas production and a gas-fuelled electricity generating station. This was essentially a judgment for the Committee to make. They were extensively briefed by Officers on the climate change issues, as well as the Government’s policy in favour of shale gas.

“The legislative regime for tree preservation orders does not stand apart from the comprehensive statutory scheme for land use planning. It is an integral part of that statutory scheme, and an important one”: per Lindblom LJ at paragraph 38 in Barney-Smith v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council (2016) EWCA Civ 1264.

There are two means by which a LPA can achieve formal protection for trees and control over work to trees which have been given such protection: (1) the imposition of conditions on the grant of planning permission; and (2) the making of TPOs. “They can be used in combination with each other, or separately.” That is left to the LPA’s discretion.  An authority’s power to make a TPO, and the consequent statutory protections for the tree(s) included in the TPO, “complement” its functions in making decisions on proposals for development, including its power to impose conditions on grants of planning permission.  See also per Elias LJ at paragraph 60.

R (Skelmersdale Limited Partnership) v West Lancashire Borough Council (2016) EWCA Civ 1260 concerned a claim for Judicial Review of a planning permission granted by the Council for a new retail-led development on a strategic development site of about 5 hectares in the Skelmersdale Town Centre. The challenge was with respect to a condition of the permission, which related to occupation of the retail floorspace, and the meaning of the word “commits” in that condition. Sales LJ (with whom Briggs LJ agreed) said:-

“15.    Guidance as to the interpretation of the terms of a grant of planning permission is given in the judgment of Lord Hodge JSC in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74; [2016] 1 WLR 85, at paras. [33]-[34]. As Lord Hodge explains, there is only limited scope for the use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of a public document such as a planning permission ([33]), but reference to some extrinsic materials, such as the application for permission, may be legitimate ([34]).

16. In fact, however, I consider that the judge was plainly correct in his interpretation of the word “commits” in condition 5(ii), without the need for reference to these extrinsic materials. Lord Hodge explains at [34] that the interpretation of a condition in a planning consent involves asking “what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole”; “This is an objective exercise in which the court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense.”