The owner of a watercourse has a property right in the watercourse. That includes a right to preserve the quality of the water. That right is protected by the common law. The discharge of polluting effluent is an actionable nuisance if the pollution interferes with the use or enjoyment of the property.

A body which exercises statutory powers, such as a sewerage undertaker, is liable in the same way as any other person if it is responsible for a nuisance, trespass or other tort, unless either it: (i) is acting within its statutory powers, or (ii) has been granted some statutory immunity from suit. If a sewerage undertaker interferes with a person’s rights, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between interferences which Parliament has authorised, which are lawful, and interferences which Parliament has not authorised, which are unlawful. When drawing this distinction, two principles are relevant. First, a person’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of its property and to access the courts are protected by both the common law and the Human Rights Act 1998. The principle of legality holds that fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. A statute will, therefore, only authorise what would otherwise be an unlawful interference with property rights, or deprive a person of the right to bring a legal claim, if this is clear from or a necessary implication of the express language used by Parliament. Secondly, Parliament will not be taken to have intended that statutory powers should be exercised, or duties performed, in a way which interferes with private rights, unless the interference is inevitable.

The issue before the Supreme Court in MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL COMPANY LTD v UNITED UTILITIES WATER LIMITED (2024) UKSC was whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Water Industry Act 1991 excluded common law rights of action in nuisance and trespass. The Supreme Court held that it did not.

In TINKLER v ESKEN (2024) EWHC 1490 (Ch) the defendant succeeded in an application to strike out a claim. The claim alleged an unlawful means conspiracy. It raised the same or very similar issues as those raised between the same parties in an earlier fraud claim. The strike out succeeded on two bases. First, the claimant had previously admitted that the conspiracy claim was parasitic on the fraud claim and that it would be an abuse of process for him to proceed with it if the fraud claim failed. A party can be bound by an admission of law in the same way that they could be bound by an admission of fact. To allow him to withdraw the admission would significantly prejudice the defendant and would not be in the administration of justice. Second, in any event, the conspiracy claim would be struck out as a collateral attack on the findings made in the fraud judgment. This was an abuse contrary to the HENDERSON v HENDERSON principle.

In JARVIS v METRO TAXIS ( (2024) EWHC 1452 (KB) it is held that where a Circuit Judge in the County Court has allowed an Appeal against a District Judge’s decision refusing a claim, and goes on to rehear and dismiss the claim, an Appeal against the Circuit Judge’s decision lies to the Court of Appeal, and not to any other Court. That is because it is a second Appeal.

Save in contempt cases, Appeals from a Circuit Judge sitting in the High Court ordinarily lie to the High Court. Permission to bring such an Appeal can be given where the Court considers that the Appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other compelling reason for the Appeal to be held.

On the other hand however Appeals from County Court decisions that are themselves made on appeal lie only to the Court of Appeal. Moreover, permission to bring them is subject to more exacting requirements. These are that the Appeal has a real prospect of success or would raise an important point of principle or practice, or there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. In other words, parties in civil cases who have already enjoyed access to one appeal should be granted a further right of appeal only exceptionally.

In MUEEN-UDDIN v SSHD (2024) UKSC 21 the Supreme Court considers abuse of process.  The Courts have an inherent power to prevent their processes from being misused, or abused, in a way which would be manifestly unfair to one or more of the parties or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute.  The primary purpose of this power is to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.  There are two well-established categories of abusive proceedings. The first is known as “Hunter abuse” following the House of Lords’ decision in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529.  The second is “Jameel abuse” following the Court of Appeal decision in Jameel (Yousef) v Down Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75.

Hunter abuse arises where a claimant uses proceedings to mount a collateral attack on a final decision made by a court of competent jurisdiction in earlier proceedings.  A claimant who wishes to challenge a decision made against him should normally do so by appealing that decision.  The courts should not generally permit him to pursue new proceedings in order to re-litigate matters which he had a full opportunity to contest in the earlier proceedings.  Allowing this would give rise to a risk that the decisions in the two sets of proceedings would be inconsistent, bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

Not every collateral challenge to earlier proceedings will amount to Hunter abuse. The Hunter principle only applies where the earlier proceedings were fair, and where they provided the claimant with a full opportunity to contest the court’s decision.

The Supreme Court rejects a submission that the court can consider matters relevant to Hunter and Jameel abuse together, so that even if neither type of abuse can be established on its own, considerations relevant to each of them can contribute cumulatively to the conclusion that a claim is an abuse of process. Hunter abuse and Jameel abuse protect different aspects of the public interest and have different rationales.  The considerations relevant to each principle cannot therefore simply be lumped together.

GREAT LAKES REINSURANCE v RAV ( 2024 ) UKPC 11 revisits when there is a duty of care in the tort of negligence with respect to an omission to confer a benefit. Restrictive principles going beyond foreseeability and proximity must be applied : para 20. One of the recognized exceptional principles must be established : para 21. Liability may be based on a relevant ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, referring to N v POOLE BOROUGH COUNCIL ( 2020 ) AC 780, and to HXA v SURREY COUNTY COUNCIL, YXA v WOLVERHAMPTON CITY COUNCIL ( 2024 ) 1 WLR 335, where claims for failing to protect children from abuse were struck out for lack of any assumption of responsibility.

In SHAMSAN v LOWNDES SQUARE MANAGEMENT COMPANY ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 436 it was Lowndes’ contractual responsibility to engage managing agents for a building, and they would provide appropriate services. It was NOT Lowndes’ contractual responsibility to provide those services itself.

The managing agents were independent contractors. They could not be liable for negligence by the managing agents. Recent developments in the law of VICARIOUS LIABILITY do NOT undermine the distinction between liability for the acts of an employee and non-liability for acts of an independent contractor.

DAVIES v BRIDGEND COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCIL ( 2024 ) UKSC 15 concerns liability for private nuisance by undue interference with the enjoyment or use of another person’s land. The nuisance arose from the encroachment of JAPANESE KNOTWEED. The dates are important. Mr Davies bought his land in 2004. By then the knotweed had spread on to that land from land owned by the Council. That however was not at that time an actionable nuisance. That did not occur until 2013. That was when the Council became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the risk of damage to Mr Davies’ land. Information became available about knotweed. The Council’s fault was that between 2013 and 2018 it failed to implement a reasonable and effective treatment programme. That was not done until 2018. The question was whether the Council was liable for diminution in the value of Mr Davies’ land during that period. The Supreme Court, allowing the Council’s appeal from ( 2023 ) EWCA Civ 80, ruled that the Council had no damages liability. This was on the basis of lack of causation. The Council’s breach of duty between 2013 and 2018 had not increased or materially contributed to the diminution in value. That had occurred before any breach by the Council arose in 2013. The subsequent breach was not a causative factor. There was no causal link between the breach of duty and the diminution in value claimed.

In TAYTIME LTD v SoS ( 2024 ) EWHC 1053 ( Admin ) Lang J summarises, at paras 55-59 inc, when fresh evidence will be admissible in a judicial or statutory review. Generally the Court does not consider evidence that was not before the decision-maker. Fresh evidence will be admitted only in limited circumstances. These are ( 1 ) to show what material was before the decision-maker, ( 2 ) to demonstrate a jurisdictional fact or procedural error or misconduct by the decision-maker, ( 3 ) where the interests of justice require it, ( 4 ) where there is a legal challenge on the grounds that the decision-maker failed to investigate adequately and the evidence would demonstrate what would have been discovered if due enquiry had been made, or (5) in the consideration of remedy.

Part 8 of the Equality Act 2010 ( Sections 108-112 inclusive ) contains ancillary provisions about liability of employers and principals ( Section 109 ) and liabilities of employees and agents ( Section 110 ). In BALDWIN v CLEVES SCHOOOL ( 2024 ) EAT 66 the School was held liable under Section 209, and it is held that if the conditions for individual liability on the part of an individual employee or agent as set out in Section 110 are satisfied then a contravention of Section 110 must be found. There is no discretion.

According to the structure of the whistleblowing legislation, in order for employers to be fixed with liability, B ought to have some knowledge of what the claimant is complaining or expressing concern about. It is not enough that B knows that the claimant has made a claim to A. So observes Sheldon J in Nicol v World Travel, EA-2023-000036-JOJ.