The Judgment of Fordham J in R (EXR) v SSHD (2026) EWHC 1568 (Admin) contains a passage as follows:-

“The rubric of judicial review

7. Decisions of public authorities must be lawful, in a public law sense. That means – in broad terms – that they must be legal, reasonable and fair. To decide whether they are, the judicial review Court applies objective legal standards. Legality is really concerned with two things: whether the public authority has performed its substantive legal duties; and whether it has made correct conclusions on questions of Fairness is concerned with the legal legitimacy of the public authority’s decision-making process. Reasonableness asks whether an outcome of a decision was beyond the range of responses open to the public authority; and whether the reasoning process involved any recognisable public law error of approach. Sometimes there are nuances and overlaps. There is a species of public law error which involves a material error of an established fact, but nobody says that is relevant to the present case. There is a species of public law error which involves a decision as to a factual question whose lawfulness depends on its correctness, which is highly relevant to the present case.

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The Court of Appeal summarises the law on the proper interpretation of Policies in R ( Ammori ) v SSHD ( 2026 ) EWCA Civ 721, at paras 80/81 : (1) Policies in the field of public administration are to be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in the proper context; (2) The Context includes that they are not statutory texts; (3) They are not rules, but guides; (4) Policies are not to be read in a complicated or excessively analytical way; (5) Some polcies engage relatively specific language and others are expressed in much broader terms which may not require or lend themselves to the same level of legal analysis. The Court also addresses the correct approaches to the proportionality balance and the margin of appreciation at respectively paras 98-103and 104-116.

R ( GOULD ) v DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL (2026) EWCA Civ 687 concerns decisions by the Council to close non-statutory drop-in centres. The Court of Appeal holds that that the Council had been no legal obligation to refer in the Officers Report to obligations in the Care Act 2014 which were not alleged to have been breached. An authority does not have in every case to have regard to a wide range of statutory duties which were (or arguably were) relevant in a broad sense, although not identified in the governing legislation.

On liability and sanctions for contempt of court by a public authority in failing to comply with a FTT Order to disclose information pursuant to FoIA 2000, see CLEASBY v ESSEX UNIVERSITY (2026) UKUT 187 (AAC).

The public law principles of LEGALITY and PROPORTIONALITY do NOT provide an independent free-standing ground for challenging SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION. They are a rule of construction, pursuant to which AMBIGUOUS statutory language can be construed in amanner that preserves FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, including human rights. So held by Saini J in ISMAILOV v SoS (2026) EWHC 1188 (Admin).

R ( GVH ) v Leicester Care Board & Leicester Council ( 2026 ) EWHC 1016 ( Admin ) holds that a COMPLAINTS PROCESS, governed by the Local Authority Social Services & NHS Services Complaints ( England ) Regulations 2009, may be an ALTERNATIVE REMEDY to Judicial Review, leading to a ( discretionary ) refusal of permission to apply for Judicial review. The PROCESS could offer a more effective redress than a quashing order.

In SHAUN THOMPSON v METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMISSIONER (2026) EWHC 915 ( Admin ) a Divisional Court reaffirms that a measure, such as a Policy, must have the “ quality of law “, that is be (1) accessible to the persons concerned, (2) foreseeable as to its consequences, and (3) compatible with the RULE OF LAW. As to foreseeability, the measure MUST NOT CONFER A DISCRETION SO BROAD that its scope is in practice dependent on the will of those who apply it, rather than on the law itself.. It must have sufficient clarity and foreseeability so as NOT to allow ARBITRARINESS, that is decision-making by a public authority on the basis of whim, caprice, malice or predilection. A challenge to the foreseeability of a measure, or its alleged arbitrariness, does NOT, however, a challenge to the PROPORTIONALITY of that measure or its application to a particular case.

In ZHB v CARDIFF COUNCIL (2026) EWHC 913 ( Admin ) Coppel J (1) identifies at paras 17-40 the legal principles to be derived from relevant Strasbourg case law on age assessment processes and (2) holds that the Council was not under an obligation to have regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child when conducting an assessment.

In HARRON v ROTHERHAM MBC ( 2026 ) UKUT 48 ( AAC ) Judge Stout rules that is for the Information Commissioner to decide whether a response to a substituted decision is compliant with FoIA. The FTT is NOT empowered to compel compliance with substituted decision notices. The law of contempt does NOT create any secondary cause of action or open up any new substantive jurisdiction.

Chamberlain J, the Judge in charge of the Administrative Court, has issued an important Administrative Court PRACTICE STATEMENT, in relation to OPPOSED APPLICATIONS FOR  EXTENDING TIME. It sets out the PROCEDURE that will apply to Administrative Court work in London, except in Planning Court cases and in specified circumstances. The Statement indicates that, following feedback, the new procedure may be extended to Administrative Court centres outside London and to Planning Court claims.