Under the Court of Protection Rules 2017 the general rule is that Court of Protection proceedings are to be heard in private unless the Court made an Order permitting other persons to attend. It is a contempt of court to publish information relating to Court of Protection proceedings where the Court was sitting in private, unless the Court ordered otherwise.  The Court can order that a hearing be heard in public where there is good reason for doing so.  The reasons for that regime were that those with mental capacity could deal with their private affairs confidentially and in private and those who lacked mental capacity should be entitled to the same privacy.  The provision encapsulated the rights, under ECHR art 8, of persons who were vulnerable and whose involvement in Court proceedings arose from their vulnerability, not their choice.  However, there will be cases where the public interest in an individual case outweighs the privacy considerations.  The normal practice is for the Court to make a transparency order for the hearing to be in public, of its own motion, but with reporting restrictions to prevent the identification of the person lacking capacity, unless it appeared that there was good reason for not doing so.  So held in W v P (2025) EWCOP 11 (T3).

In IRWIN MITCHELL TRUST CORP LTD v KS ( 2025 ) EWCOP 7 (T2) the Court of protection considered as a preliminary issue whether it retained jurisdiction over the property and affairs of a young person aged 14 ( who lacked capacity and would continue to do so ) after her CHANGE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE from England and Wales to India. Before that jurisdiction derived from the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Court retained jurisdiction. The retention of jurisdiction following the change was consistent with the aim of HAGUE CONVENTION 34 on Jurisdiction etc. There was no gap in protection.

The appeal in NASIR v ZAVARCO plc (2025) UKSC 5 concerned the scope of the longstanding English law doctrine of merger. In short, the question is whether the doctrine, by which a cause of action merges with a judgment in the action, applies to a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court held that it does not.

The doctrine of merger was developed as a means to promote finality in litigation and to prevent duplicative and vexatious litigation. Unlike the standard defence of res judicata in the form of cause of action estoppel, which prevents the contradiction of an earlier judgment as to the existence or non-existence of a cause of action, merger was designed to make a litigant seek his or her remedies in one action by extinguishing a cause of action when judgment has been given on it. Read more »

In R (JSM) v WESTMORLAND AND FURNESS COUNCIL (2024) EWHC 3362 (Admin) the local authority was held to have breached its duty under Section 42 of the Children and Families Act 2014 to provide special educational provision for a young person with complex needs.  A mandatory order was appropriate.  The duty was absolute.  Speed was of the essence. It was not for the Court routinely to decline to grant relief to compel performance on the ground of inadequate resources.  The Court sets out the factors to consider when determining whether to grant a mandatory order.

In R ( CHARNWOOD BOROUGH COUNCIL ) v SSHD ( ( 2025 ) EWHC 33 ( Admin ) the Court upheld a ministerial decision under Section 9 of the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CRIME AND VICTIMS ACT 2004 requiring the local authority to conduct a DOMESTIC HOMICIDE REVIEW ( DHR ). The authority was the lead authority for the local COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP. They were responsible for deciding whether to conduct a DHR.

Section 9 sets out the criteria for a DHR. These include where a death appeared to have resulted from violence, abuse or neglect by a partner.

Stacey J said that Section 9 was deliberately open textured. It used non-legalistic language. The evidential threshold is low. It is less than a balance of probabilities test.

A useful synonym for APPEARS is “ looks like “. There was no benefit in defining it further, It was an objective test.

For something to RESULT from something else, there had to be a causal connection. However, it did not have to be the primary or sole cause. A looser connection, a material or sufficient contribution, was significant.

The word NEGLECT bore its ordinary and natural meaning. That was the fact of not giving enough care or attention. Nothing more technical or sophisticated was required. One incident could be sufficient to amount to neglect. Criminal law definitions helpful.

In HOWELLS v NEWPORT CITY COUNCIL [2025] EWHC 22 (Ch) the Claimant said that a hard drive containing the private key to his Bitcoin was deposited in error at a Landfill Site owned and operated by the Council. He said that without the hard drive containing the private key he was unable to access the Bitcoin. He wants the landfill to be excavated in order to find the hard drive. The Council has refused. His claim against the Council failed and was dismissed. Judgment was given for the Council.

The issue was as to the ownership of, and rights of access to, the Claimant’s Hard Drive that went into the Council’s Landfill. The Council’s case, that succeeded, was that it, the Council, owned the Hard Drive, and that the Claimant had no right to have it or to gain access to it. The Judge agreed. This was because the Control of Pollution Act 1974 Section 14(6)(c) provides that “anything” delivered to the authority by another person in the course of using the facilities “shall belong” to the authority and may be dealt with accordingly. This was (paras 28, 34 and 37) a “complete answer to the claim”. “Belong” was (para 30) a normal English word. The words “shall belong to the authority” are (para 32) “unqualified and unrestricted”, and the words “and may be dealt with accordingly” are important and confer a “practical right”. The authority is not concerned with the possible existence of competing proprietary interests in the deposited waste.

The Judge added (para 33) that there was no proper basis for implying any limitation into the words of the provision, and every reason for not doing so. The authority’s freedom to deal with items delivered to it as refuse cannot sensibly be contingent on things on which it has no knowledge or control.
A proprietary restitution claim was (paras 39 and 41) “misguided”. An equitable proprietary claim and/or a case based on constructive trust (para 46 and following) had no realistic prospect of success. The Council (para 54) had regard to its own wider responsibilities and the interests of the people of Newport.

In ABACUS v SoS (2024) EWHC 2753 (Admin) Chamberlain J refused to stay judicial review proceedings challenging provisions of primary legislation. The legislation itself  had completed its Parliamentary process and received Royal Assent. However, it had not yet been commenced. In the particular circumstances, the balance of convenience test applied and favoured allowing the claims to proceed, at least until the stage of determining whether permission to apply for Judicial Review should or should not be granted.

In THURROCK COUNCIL and ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL (2024) EWHC 2750 (KB) Bourne J considered, at paras 40-58 inc,  principles emerging from the case law which are relevant to disputes about PROTEST ACTIVITY taking place on or affecting the USE OF THE HIGHWAY. Whilst the public generally has a licence to to be on the highway, if they exceed that licence by doing something on that land which they do not have permission to do, such as TUNNELLING, they commit TRESPASS. Trespass is a tort of STRICT LIABILITY. A Claimant does NOT have to show that have to show damage. The exercise of ECHR rights pursuant to Arts 10 & 11 cannot normally justify a trespass. It is a PUBLIC NUISANCE to obstruct or hinder the FREE PASSAGE of the public along the highway.

In APPLICATION BY JR 222 FOR JUDICIAL Review (2024) UKSC 35 the Supreme Court from para 72 considers statutory interpretation, including the principle that Courts should seek to avoid an interpretation that produces an ABSURD result. They say that absurdity is to be given a “ very wide meaning “. It covers, amongst other things, unworkability, impracticality, inconvenience, anomaly or illogicality. The Supreme Court also considers when reliance may be put on Hansard.

In PAN v MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2024) UKPC 31 Lady Simler said at paragraphs 37-39 on the duty to provide reasons that, whilst there is no general duty universally imposed on all decision-makers to give reasons, the Courts have recognised ” many circumstances ” in which procedural fairness requires that reasons should be given to a person  adversely affected by a decision, even in a statutory context in which no express duty to give reasons is imposed. Lady Simler said that the benefits of giving reasons are clear : they concentrate the mind and impose a discipline which may contribute to better, more transparent decision-making. The trend of the law has been towards an increase d recognition of the duty to give reasons. There has been a ” strong momentum” in favour of greater openness and transparency in decision-making. The touchstone for what fairness requires in this context is often judged by the ability to make effective the right to challenge an adverse public law decision by judicial review. Even where reasons are given voluntarily, they should be reviewed by reference to the same standards as are applied to reasons given in accordance with an established duty to provide them. Lady Simler added at para 40 that there is no uniform standard or threshold which reasons must satisfy in every case. What is required inevitably depends on the context and the circumstances of the individual case. The nature of the decision itself will affect what is required by reasons.