In R (Bridgerow Ltd) v Cheshire West and Chester Borough Council [2014] EWHC 1187 (Admin) a local authority’s decision refusing to renew a sexual entertainment venue licence under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, as amended, was set aside where, in breach of the authority’s Constitution, the decision was taken by the full panel of twelve councillors instead of the three to whom it was delegated under the Constitution.  Stuart-Smith J emphasized that it is important that the manner in which executive functions are carried out is transparent and reliable.  A decision being taken by the wrong persons is a serious procedural irregularity, especially when political proportionality is involved.

There is an area within Harrogate known as the Stray.  It is proposed as the finish of the first stage of the Tour de France 2014.  There is a snag.  The Stray is governed by the Harrogate Stray Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”).  The Stray is owned by the Duchy of Lancaster and managed by the Harrogate Borough Council (“the Council”).  Council wishes to use GPOC under Section 1 of the Localism Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”), but this is prevented by Section 2 of the 2011 Act, on account of the 1985 Act.  The Council asked the Secretary of State (“the SoS”) to use his powers under Section 5 of the 2011 Act to make an Order temporarily (23 June – 8 July 2014) to disapply or amend parts of the 1985 Act to enable the Stray to be used for the sole purpose of hosting the Tour de France.  The SoS has, following a 6 week consultation, agreed.  He has issued a draft.  The Harrogate Stray Act 1985 (Tour de France) Order 2014, to be laid before Parliament, in accordance with Section 7(2) of the 2011 Act, and an accompanying Explanatory Document.  The SoS is satisfied that the draft Order serves a purpose under Section 5(1) of the 2011 Act, that the conditions under Section 6(2) have been met, and that the appropriate consultation has been carried out in accordance with Section 5(7).

This is the first time the SoS has used his powers under Section 5 of the 2011 Act.  Appendix A to the Explanatory Document details the Parliamentary scrutiny procedure that follows the laying of the draft Order (the negative resolution procedure).

With respect to GPOC, the Explanatory Document stated that the Council had presented a “compelling case” to host the Tour de France 2014: “the general power of competence is a broad power and the economic merits of hosting the Tour are significant”.  GPOC applied, because an individual with full capacity would have the power to hold a cycle race on someone else’s land, subject to complying with any applicable legal restrictions and obtaining the landowner’s consent.

The SoS considered whether to seek to amend the 1985 Act.  However, this would likely take more time than is available and involve more public resource, including more Parliamentary time.  The 2011 Act was expressly drafted to allow for the temporary repeal by Order of primary legislation, and so is “ideally suited to the purpose”.

The Explanatory Document observes that no precedent is set for any future events on the Stray.  If the Council wished again temporarily to disapply Sections of the 1985 Act in order to use GPOC to host an event on the Stray, another Order under the 2011 Act would be required again to amend the 1985 Act for that purpose, and the same statutory process would apply to any such future 2011 Act Order.

The SoS’s decision making process was governed by considerations of “proportionality” (para 3.5 of the Explanatory Document), “fair balance” between public and private interests (para 3.6), “necessary protection” (para 3.7), and “reasonable expectation” of being able to exercise “rights and freedoms” (para 3.8).  Further, the SoS is satisfied that the draft Order under the 2011 Act is compatible with ECHR rights (para 3.16) and with legal obligations arising from membership of the EU (para 3.17).

Chapter 4 of the Explanatory Document sets out in detail the consultation undertaken. Those who supported the proposal included the Duchy of Lancaster.

As Cranston J observed at the outset of his Judgment in Bishops Stortford Civic Federation v East Hertfordshire District Council [2014] EWHC 348 (Admin) the case was a judicial review that raised some “important issues” about the “lawful operation of local government and the role of the Courts”.  The main issue arose out of the intervention by Councillor Tindale at a (Planning) Committee Meeting.

Cranston J set out the following principles:-

1. Unless there is an express provision in the Council’s Constitution or other documents preventing attendance, any Councillor can, with the Committee’s permission, in principle attend and address it: para 30;
2. There are, however, limits, as where the Councillor has a disqualifying interest, but participation in the development of policies and proposals should not normally exclude from decision making Meetings: para 31;
3. Councillor Tindale’s motives were irrelevant in law: para 33;
4. As regards whether Councillor Tindale’s address had “polluted the well”, a detailed analysis of what Members said is neither necessary nor appropriate: “the cut and thrust of political debate is not conducive to refined textual analysis”: para 37;
5. In the case of a collective decision, one has to consider the “general tenor of the discussion” rather than the individual views of Committee Members, “let alone the precise terminology used”: para 39;
6. “The taking of statements when councillors are asked to explain their voting is especially to be deplored”: Prudence is the sensible judicial approach in this context”: para 41.

PSED claims continue to be pursued.  In R (Rotherham MBC and others) v SoS for BIS (2014) EWHC 232 (Admin) the claim succeeded (paras 84-93 inc): (i) there is no duty to carry out a formal EqIA; (ii) the duty is at most to consider undertaking an EqIA, along with other means of gathering information, and to consider whether it is appropriate to have an EqIA; (iii) the requirement is to have “due regard” to the statutory requirements in s149(1) of the Equality Act 2010; (iv) that is regard that is “appropriate in all the circumstances”; and (v) if an authority’s decision is a high level budget decision a PSED may be carried out “further down the line”; BUT (vi) the decisions in this case were “in no sense preliminary or provisional”; and (vii) an after the event assessment “cannot save the decision making”.  This was an instance of a PSED challenge succeeding where other challenges (to the Regional allocation of EU Structural Funds) failed.  In R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2014] EWHC 218 (Admin) all the challenges (to ET and EAT fees) failed, including (paras 57-69) PSED and (paras 70-90 inc) indirect discrimination, failed, notwithstanding that it is a “continuing duty”; “the … importance of the duty”, and the facts that the duty is “an essential preliminary to public decision-making”, is not a matter of ticking boxes, and “must be undertaken conscientiously and with rigour”, and that the authority “must collect, collate and consider all relevant information as to the likely impact of the proposals”.  However, “the weight to be given to countervailing factors is a matter for the assessment of the public authority and not for the Court, unless that assessment can be challenged on conventional public law grounds as being outwith the range of reasonable conclusions”; and “it is for the public authority to decide what is relevant and irrelevant, subject only to challenge on conventional grounds”; and an authority “cannot be expected to speculate, investigate or explore matters ad infinitum” or “to make assessments with a degree of forensic analysis which a QC might deploy in Court”.  The Divisional Court approved the summary of the principles applicable to the s149 duty by Wilkie J in R (Williams) v Surrey County Council [2012] EqLR 656 at para 16.  It could not be maintained that the Lord Chancellor did not consider the differential impact on groups with various protected characteristics merely because he dismissed those concerns.  Any defects in his conclusions which triggered a public law remedy should be dealt with in the substantive grounds of challenge, and not by way of criticism of the lengthy and detailed review undertaken in the assessment before the conclusions were reached.

R (Buck) v Doncaster MBC (2013) EWCA Civ 1190 raises important issues as to the division of powers between a directly elected executive and the full council of a local authority.  At first instance Hickinbottom J made the general observation that, if, by an appropriately worded budget amendment, the full Council could override executive decisions of the Mayor, and replace those decisions with their own, the ultimate executive decision-making power would not lie with the Mayor, but with the full Council, contrary to the intention of the Local Government Act 2000 governance scheme.  The Court of Appeal agreed.  The Master of the Rolls said (at para 17) that, in view of the objective of the relevant provisions of the 2000 Act, it would be extraordinary (and frustrate the evident intention of Parliament) if the full Council could direct the Mayor whether and, if so, how to spend the money which had been authorised by the budget.  It would mean that the full Council could take over responsibility for almost any executive matter, simply by writing some sufficiently specific provision about it in the annual budget.  If the budget-setting powers of the full Council extend to prescribing exactly what expenditure is to be incurred in what specific respects, then it can use those powers to determine exactly what the executive authority will do.  Nor is there any limit to the degree of detail into which such prescription could descend.  This kind of micro-management by the full Council was plainly not intended by the 2000 Act. 

Full Council has no power to interfere with the executive function of the Mayor, except where the Mayor proposes to exercise the function in a way that is (i) contrary to, or not wholly in accordance with, the authority’s budget, or (ii) is contrary to a plan or strategy adopted or approved by the authority.  So what does determining a matter in a manner “contrary to or not wholly in accordance with the authority’s budget” mean?  At para 20, the Master of the Rolls, with whom McCombe LJ and Gloster LJ agreed, said: “In my view, it means determining a matter which will result in incurring expenditure in excess of that for which budget approval has been given by the full council.  That does not only mean that the executive may not incur expenditure in excess of the aggregate of the entire budget, although it certainly includes such a restriction  on the executive’s spending power.  …  it also means that the executive may not incur expenditure in excess of heads of expenditure specified in the budget.” 

To summarise, the full Council may allocate more or less funds than are requested by the Mayor in his proposed budget.  It is the final arbiter of what goes into the budget.  The budgetary process is geared to avoiding any budget deficit by ensuring that the revenue expenditure will not be exceeded.  But it does not allow the full Council to micro-manage the authority’s functions and interfere with the executive functions of the Mayor.  The full Council cannot require the Mayor to expend money in a particular way, or, unless he proposes to act in a way contrary to the plans and strategies reserved to the full Council, to expend money on a particular function. 

As regards “contrary to a plan or strategy”, the Master of the Rolls said:

“24.       … The language of “plan or strategy”,  read in the context of the Functions Regulations, denotes something that operates at a general level.  It cannot embrace any and every decision that may be taken on an individual issue.  If it did, it would undermine the basic distinction between executive and non-executive functions which lies at the heart of the relevant part of the 2000 Act.  The basic idea is that the full council may in certain respects set the policy framework for the authority, but its detailed implementation is a matter for the executive (provided that what it does is not contrary to and is wholly in accordance with the budget).” 

In R (T) v Sheffield City Council [2013] EWHC 2953 (QB) 4 mothers challenged by judicial review the decision of the Council to stop paying subsidies to 20 nurseries.  They did so on 5 grounds: (1) failure to consult fairly; (2) breach of the PSED; (3) breach of the best value duty; (4) breach of duties imposed by the Childcare Act 2006 (“CA 2006”); and (5) irrationality.  All the challenges failed.

As regards flawed consultation, Turner J observed (para 30) that whether consultation is undertaken at a formative stage “is bound to be fact sensitive” and that “the important point” is that “when the process starts the ultimate decision should still be fully capable of being moulded and influenced by the response”.  At paras 32 and 35 he stated:-

“32. It is also important to put the issue of consultation into context. There will be many cases in which it will not be possible precisely to time the beginning (or even the end) of the consultation process. For example, it is by no means unusual for particular proposals to have been preceded by earlier different but related proposals upon which there has already been some level of pertinent consultation. The existence of the prior period of consultation does not, of course, obviate the need to consult further but it may have an important influence on the timing, content and duration of the process of consultation which follows.”

“35. The time reasonably to be allowed for a response to a consultation process is, again, a highly fact sensitive issue. Once more, context is important. Where, as here, the issue upon which consultation is to take place is one in which interested parties have already been recently engaged the time reasonably required for any formal consultation period may well be shorter than in circumstances where the proposal is without precursors.

As regards the PSED, under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, Turner J said (para 53):-

“Of course, a mere generic, background level of concern is not of itself sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Act but it is not insignificant that those responsible for taking the decision in this case were not approaching their responsibilities from a position of ignorance about the social and demographic context in which they were operating. Further, Cabinet members were engaged in the process of assessing and developing proposals as part of a continuous process and the records of meetings are snapshots only of the route which they are following.

As regards the best value duty under Section 3 of the Local Government Act 1999, and Guidance issued by the Secretary of State, Turner J concluded (para 67):-

“There is no substance in the complaint that the defendant impermissibly distorted the outcome of its decision making process in a way calculated to preserve funding for itself as opposed to the nurseries. In any event the Guidance, thankfully, does not require a formulaic “pound for pound” approach. …”

As regards CA 2006, Turner J said:-

“70. Section 1 of the 2006 Act is described as a “general duty” and cannot be approached in the context of the position of an individual or individuals. It is necessary to look at the population of those affected as a whole. In this case, it was perfectly open to the defendant to conclude that the decision to prioritise intervention over subsidy would have the overall effect of improving the well-being of young children and to reduce inequalities in the well-being of young children in the Sheffield area. It is not for the court to substitute its own views for that of the democratically elected local authority.”

“71. Much the same can be said of section 3(2). I do not see how it can be contended that redistributing resources away from nursery subsidies and towards individual cases of need cannot, at least arguably, result in a better integrated provision of early childhood services and a maximisation of the benefit to be derived by young children and their parents. Whether it actually does or not is a matter upon which the defendant is in a far better position than this court to judge.

72.Within the factual parameters of this case it is difficult to see how section 3(3) could be any more than peripherally relevant if at all. This sub-section too applies to all those children and parents affected by the actions of the decision maker and cannot be applied to a limited class in isolation. The withdrawal of funding from twenty nurseries does not on the face of it constitute a general failure to identify parents or prospective parents who would otherwise be unlikely to take advantage of early childhood services. There is simply no evidence in support of this contention and it is misconceived as a matter of law.

73. The duty under section 6 is more obviously pertinent to the issues arising in this case but it is subject to the constraints of reasonable practicability. This issue was clearly and directly considered by the defendant. The requirements of section 6 are also set out in the overarching EIA. There is simply no legitimate basis in this case upon which this court can substitute its own view as to what is or is not reasonably practicable for that reached by the defendant.”

As regards irrationality, Turner J said:-

“77. I am in no doubt that the claimants genuinely believe that the defendant’s decision was irrational in the sense that they consider that the balance of argument was firmly weighted in favour of the retention of the grants, at least for some further period, and they cannot understand why this did not happen. It is not, however, for this court to attempt to re-balance the arguments and form its own conclusion on their respective merits.”

Turner J’s conclusion was as follows:-

78. The twenty nurseries affected by this decision which provide valuable facilities to the families which they serve are to be commended on the contribution they have made and continue to make to their local communities. I hope that, despite the termination of the subsidies, they are all able to survive and flourish but I must recognise that some may not. In an ideal world, it would not be necessary to make hard choices about the distribution of funds between competing but thoroughly meritorious causes but, particularly in the present economic climate, sacrifices even of highly socially desirable initiatives are sometimes unavoidable. Councils are democratically elected to make decisions and some of these are bound to be contentious and unpopular. Ultimately, however, the decision in this case, controversial as it undoubtedly was, complied with the standards imposed by public law and must remain undisturbed.”

R (Nash) v Barnet LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1004 (“Nash”) concerned whether a decision and an impending decision by Barnet Council to outsource a high proportion of its functions and services to private-sector organisations was lawful.  The judicial review challenge was brought by a local resident.  There were three grounds of challenge: non-compliance with “best value” consultation obligations; breach of the PSED; and breach of fiduciary duty to council tax payers.  A procurement challenge was not pursued. 

The challenge failed at a rolled-up hearing: [2013] EWHC 1067 (Admin), (2013) LGR 515.  The Court of Appeal dismissed the Claimant’s appeal. 

The first question was whether the claim was in time.  The Claimant sought to rely on the House of Lords decision in R (Burkett) v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 1593 (“Burkett”), where outline planning permission had been preceded by a resolution approving the award subject to certain conditions, and the resolution was subject to, amongst other things, completion of a Section 106 agreement; and where property rights were affected. 

The Court of Appeal said (para 45) that the Council “was entitled to emphasize the general importance of compliance with the time limits set for judicial review proceedings, given the various public interests generally involved in public law cases”. 

The essence of the argument on behalf of the Claimant was that even if she could have raised her challenge at an earlier stage, there was no obligation on her to do so, that Burkett permitted her to raise the legal challenge at the time of the final decision to do the act, that all the Council had decided to do in 2010/2011 was to initiate a procurement process, and thereafter move on from time to time to the next stage of the process, and that the Council had not committed to awarding any contract, let alone any particular contract, until its December 2012 decision. 

The Court of Appeal, however, ruled that Burkett, properly analysed, “simply will not bear so open-ended an application”.  They agreed with the first instance Judge as follows:- 

“I do not believe that Burkett is authority for the proposition that in every situation in which a public-law decision is made at the end of a process which involves one or more previous decisions – what I will refer to as “staged decision-making” – time will run from the date of the latest decision, notwithstanding that a challenge on identical grounds could have been made to an earlier decision in the series. In my judgment it is necessary in such a case to analyse carefully the nature of the latest decision and its relationship to the earlier decision(s). I believe the true position to be as follows. If the earlier decision is no more than a preliminary, or provisional, foreshadowing of the later decision, Burkett does indeed apply so that the later, “final”, decision falls to be treated as a new decision, the grounds for challenging which “first arise” only when it is made. But if the earlier and later decisions are distinct, each addressing what are substantially different stages in a process, then it is necessary to decide which decision is in truth being challenged; if it is the earlier, then the making of the second decision does not set time running afresh. I accept that the distinction may in particular cases be subtle, but it is in my view nonetheless real and important.” 

Burkett was concerned with a merely provisional decision.  In Nash the Council was not provisionally resolving to enter any outsourcing contract at all.  What the Council was doing was actually deciding to enter into a procurement process by way of competitive dialogue.  That process then, and in accordance with the Public Contracts Regulations (“the PCR”) 2006, proceeded in stages.  Thus, in contrast with the initial resolution in Burkett, work was lawfully and foreseeably done and money was expended precisely because of such decisions.  The decisions thus had and were intended to have legal effect: not, of course, in terms of sanctioning a binding contract in terms of authorising and causing the initiation of the procurement process, with attendant inevitable heavy expenditure and significant use of time and resources.  Without such decisions, those things could not and would not have been done.  Those decisions are thus properly to be regarded as substantive.  They are not to be regarded as contingent or provisional, even though there was no guarantee at all that any outsourcing contract or contracts might ultimately result.  A failure to comply with the procedure at any stage inevitably undermines the integrity of all that follows. Accordingly, the right of action is complete immediately and cannot be improved by allowing the procedure to continue to a conclusion. Where there has been a failure to comply with the proper procedure the later award of the contract does not constitute a separate breach of duty; it is merely the final step in what has already become a flawed process. The approach adopted in Burkett can simply be transposed to a procurement challenge whether under the PCR or by way of judicial review. 

The Court of Appeal further observed that there was “nothing in fairness or certainty” such as to justify the Claimant not issuing proceedings until after the final decision.  The prior decisions had been made at public meetings, had been published and were widely known.  On the contrary, considerations of fairness and certainty “all weigh strongly in favour of the Council”.  The Court of Appeal added:-

“It is inconceivable that the Council (or the potential tenderers) would have gone down the very costly and time-consuming process of procurement and competitive dialogue had it been envisaged that a challenge on the grounds of lack of consultation on the whole strategy of outsourcing might at the very end of the day be made. That is quite different from the inherent and understood risk that the procurement process might not ultimately result in any concluded procurement contract.”

Were a decision and an impending decision by Barnet Council, to outsource a high proportion of its functions and services to private-sector organisations, lawful? That was the issue in R (Nash) v Barnet LBC, [2013] EWHC 1067 (Admin), a judicial review challenge brought by a local resident.  The challenge failed at a rolled-up hearing. There were three grounds of challenge: non-compliance with best value consultation obligations; breach of the PSED; and breach of fiduciary duty to council tax payers. A procurement challenge was not pursued.

The first question was whether the claim was in time.  The Claimant sought to rely on the House of Lords decision in R (Burkett) v Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 1593, where planning permission had been preceded by a resolution approving the award subject to certain conditions.  However, the Judge said, at para 41:

“… I do not believe that Burkett is authority for the proposition that in every situation in which a public-law decision is made at the end of a process which involves one or more previous decisions – what I will refer to as “staged decision-making” – time will run from the date of the latest decision, notwithstanding that a challenge on identical grounds could have been made to an earlier decision in the series. In my judgment it is necessary in such a case to analyse carefully the nature of the latest decision and its relationship to the earlier decision(s). I believe the true position to be as follows. If the earlier decision is no more than a preliminary, or provisional, foreshadowing of the later decision, Burkett does indeed apply so that the later, “final”, decision falls to be treated as a new decision, the grounds for challenging which “first arise” only when it is made. But if the earlier and later decisions are distinct, each addressing what are substantially different stages in a process, then it is necessary to decide which decision is in truth being challenged; if it is the earlier, then the making of the second decision does not set time running afresh. I accept that the distinction may in particular cases be subtle, but it is in my view nonetheless real and important.”

On that basis, the challenge on the basis of failure to consult was out of time. Nor was it appropriate to extend time.  The same applied to breach of fiduciary duty, and to the primary case on the PSED.  Permission therefore was largely refused, but the Judge went on to express his views on the substantive issues. 

As to the best value consultation duty, under Section 3 of the Local Government Act 1999, as amended by the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007, the Judge said, at paras 74 and 75:

“74 …  It is hard to see why authorities should be entitled to fulfil their duty to consult in a way which avoided seeking views on the central issues raised by the substantive duty.

75.   I do not believe that the view which I have taken would put authorities under any unreasonable burden. The statutory language leaves them with a very broad discretion as to how to satisfy the obligations under section 3, as indeed it appears that the Government intended. I would make four particular points:

(1)        I fully accept that it cannot have been the statutory intention that every time that an authority makes a particular operational decision, by way of outsourcing or otherwise, it is required by section 3 to consult about that decision simply because that could be said to be part of “the way in which” it performs its functions. … in this context that phrase connotes high-level issues concerning the approach to the performance of an authority’s functions, and it is about those and not about particular implementation that consultation is required.

(2)        Because here the Council never set out to consult about its outsourcing programme at all, the present case is not a good occasion to offer guidance on the form that such a consultation might have taken. The essential is simply that the representatives should have been given the opportunity to express views or concerns about outsourcing the functions or services in question that could inform the Council’s decision-taking both on whether to proceed and on matters requiring attention in the arrangements eventually made. I repeat that that does not mean that it should have consulted on all the particular decisions, great or small, that fell to be taken by way of implementation …

(3)        … useful responses are most likely to be obtained if consultees are informed of the broad context in which outsourcing decisions have to be taken, …  consultation is best timed as part of the annual budgetary process. …

(4) The statute provides for consultation with representatives “of the four classes specified.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                

As to the PSED under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, the Judge said, at para 80:  

“The Claimant submits first that the Council should have conducted an EIA prior to making the 2010/2011 decisions. … If I had granted permission I do not believe that I would have found a breach of the public sector equality duty in this respect. Such impact as the outsourcing of the functions and services in question might have on persons with protected characteristics was not liable to affect the basic decision to proceed: detailed consideration would only be required when the details of the outsourcing arrangements were being worked out.”

As regards a particular contract and the PSED, the Claimant’s case was that the Council had inadequate information about the potential impact of the changes.  The Judge did not believe that there was an arguable breach of duty.  The Judge observed, at para 85:

“Public sector equality challenges are rather too easily advanced in vacuo. …”

Finally, as regards breach of fiduciary duty, the Judge said, at para 88:

“Views can no doubt legitimately differ about the degree of financial analysis appropriate before taking a decision to proceed with outsourcing as opposed to the other options which were appraised.  But the evidence does not come close to establishing the kind of reckless disregard of the principles of financial planning or management that is necessary to make good a claim of this kind.”

In R (Buck) v Doncaster MBC [2012] EWHC 2293(Admin) Hickinbottom J considered the respective powers of an Elected Mayor and his Executive Cabinet on the one hand and the Full Council on the other hand and the division and demarcation between them.  He held that the Executive had acted lawfully in declining to implement a purported direction by a two thirds majority of Full Council relating to the provision of library services.  This was an executive function.  It made no difference that the direction was by way of an amendment by Full Council to the authority’s annual budget as proposed by the Mayor.  The Mayor’s decision not to spend the allocated funds in accordance with the terms of the amendment was not “contrary to or not wholly in accordance with, the budget”. 

The starting point of course is that under the Local Government Act 2000 the default position is that a function being an executive function is the default position.  That is the case save where specific provision provides that they are non-executive.  This generally resolves itself in England into a matter of interpretation of the Local Authorities (Functions and Responsibilities) (England) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2853, as frequently amended.  The vast majority of an authority with executive arrangements business is executive business. 

There are, however, a range of non-executive functions.  These include approving the authority’s budget and adopting various plans and strategies. 

Nonetheless, the role of the Full Council in the budget process is limited to the allocation of resources to meet the authority’s potential expenditure for a future period (usually the next financial year), which enables it to set an appropriate level of council tax.  This means that executive functions cannot be exercised in a way which means the budget would be exceeded.  It does not mean that the obligation to estimate revenue expenditure that will be incurred by the authority in the following year entails a power for Full Council to prescribe that certain expenditure must be spent by the executive in certain ways.  The legislative regime as to how executive and non-executive functions should be divided cannot be upset by provisions relating to the calculation of council tax.  The budgetary process is geared to ensuring that there is no budget deficit.  It does not allow Full Council to micro-manage the authority’s functions and interfere with executive functions, only to allocate more or less funds to the Mayor. 

As Hickinbottom J put it at para 64:- 

“It is open to the full Council to amend the budget, wholly or in some of its constituent parts, downwards, thereby depriving the Mayor of the available funds to do what it might otherwise wish to do in the way in which it might wish to do it. If the budget is cut, that will not of course force the Mayor to perform an executive function only in the way the full Council may wish; he may decide to perform it in a different way, with the reduced funds allocated to him. Similarly, the full Council might amend the budget upwards, making additional funds available to the Mayor to spend in exercising his functions; but, equally, that does not force the Mayor to perform the executive function only in the way the full Council may wish.” 

            At para 75 Hickinbottom J concluded:- 

            “If, as I have found, the true construction of the regulatory scheme is that the decision as to how to provide library services is an executive decision for the Mayor, and not a decision for the full Council, it cannot have been improper for the Mayor to come to his own decision, as charged by the statute, rather than complying with the direction of the full Council, who had no proper part to play in that specific decision at all. Indeed, as Mr Giffin submitted, for the Mayor and the Cabinet to have merely followed the direction of the full Council, treating it as binding on them (as the Claimant contends it was) would itself have been unlawful, as it would have improperly fettered the decision-making discretion of the executive in relation to those facilities.”

In Anderson v London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority, UKEAT/0505/ 11/SM, the EAT considered whether a term in a Collective Agreement with respect to the third year of a three year pay deal was apt to be incorporated in the contracts of employment of the Authority’s employees, and, if so, how that term should be interpreted. The Authority’s Collective Agreement with the Trade Unions gave the employer two options for the pay increase in the third year. It did not state which took precedence. The EAT held that the term had been incorporated.

The term was not insufficiently certain, either because it provided for a pay increase to be determined partly by reference to a sum to be agreed between third parties, or because it provided for the paying party to choose between two alternative methods of calculation.

The EAT however upheld the ET’s dismissal of the employees’ claims. The ET did not err in holding that the subjective intentions of the parties to the Collective Agreement were irrelevant when considering its interpretation. Nor did they err in having regard to the wording of the Collective Agreement rather than the negotiations which led up to it, even if paying the higher of the two options had been discussed. Nor was it material that the Union negotiator told the ET that he would not have agreed that management could choose the pay increase option which was most advantageous for them.

The EAT regarded the meaning of the relevant provision of the Collective Agreement as being clear. “Or” meant what it said. The Authority fulfilled their contractual obligation by paying in accordance with one alternative. The Authority was not obliged to pay whichever alternative would give the higher increase.