The test for apparent bias is very well known. The question is whether the (i) “ fair-minded “ and (ii) informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a “ real possibility “ that the tribunal was biased. The judicial bias case of GOSALAKKAL v UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS OF LEICESTER NHS TRUST (2025) EAT 64 ( Lord Fairley P ) is a reminder (paras 65/66) that the “fair-minded observer” test necessitates a “ close focus on the facts and the context” and is an illustration ( paras 76-80 inc) of the importance of identifying the proper context when determining whether the facts are capable of forming the basis for an inference of bias.

The first factor is the nature of the policy. There is a spectrum of different kinds of policy. It ranges from the most formal to the most informal. The second factor is the deference that the Court ought to pay to the decision-maker in deciding whether uit had good reason to depart from its policy. Some level of weight should be attached to the judgment of a specialist experienced decision-maker. The required deference is also on a spectrum.

There is no bright line rule that good reasons can be reviewed only if they are irrational or unreasonable. In considering whether a decision-maker had good reason for departing from a policy one considers first where on the spectrum of policies the relevant one lies and where on the spectrum of appropriate deference the particular type of decision lies.

So held in R ( DUKE OF SUSSEX ) v SSHD ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 548 at paras 62-69 inc.

In R (GRANTCHESTER PARISH COUNCIL) v GREATER CAMBRIDGE PARTNERSHIP and CAMBRIDGESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL and others (2025) EWHC 923 (Admin) Lieven J states, at para 46, that the parameters of what statements can give rise to a legitimate expectation and in what circumstances are complex, with a large number of authorities on various different factual situations. She observes: “When considering these cases it is important to have regard to the precise factual legal context in which many of the judicial pronouncements were made”. At para 47, she identifies 3 key stages: (1) Was there a clear and unambiguous commitment? (2) Was it reasonable and legitimate for the promisee to rely upon it against the public authority? (3) Would it be inappropriate to allow the promisee to enforce the commitment? At para 49 she states that the burden of establishing a commitment which is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification rests on the person asserting it; at para 50 that a distinction is drawn between what will be required in cases of substantive legitimate expectation rather than procedural expectation; and at para 56 that if the promise would interfere with the public authority’s statutory duty it cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation.

In R (AB) v BRISTOL CITY COUNCIL and ES and JX v DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL (2025) EWCC 1 a judicial review challenge failed to the entry by the Councils into “Safety Valve Agreements” with the Department of Education in relation to deficits in the Dedicated Schools Grant pursuant to Section 14 of the Education Act 2002.  The allegations included breach of the duty to consult under Section 27(3) of the Children and Families Act 2014 and of the PSED.  Linden J accepted (para 18) that there was a “powerful reason” for the Councils to take steps to address their deficits at the times when they decided to participate in the Safety Valve Programme and to enter into their SVA.

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The purpose of the qualified exemption from disclosure in Section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs, is to protect, subject to the public interest balancing test, the free and frank provision of advice and the effective conduct of public affairs : GARRARD v ICO ( 2025 ) UK FTT 00343 ( GRC ) at para 128. However, the exemption was held not to apply.

The automatic suspension of contracts in procurement proceedings was lifted in MILLBROOK HEALTHCARE LTD v DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWHC 744 ( TCC ). Damages were an adequate remedy for the Claimant. This was held to be so even if the Council’s alleged breach was not sufficiently serious to result in damages.

Consideration has been given by the Supreme Court in R (SPITALFIELDS HISTORIC BUILDING TRUST) v TOWER HAMLETS LBC (2025) UKSC 11 to a provision in the Council’s statutory Constitution, in the form of Standing Orders, with Procedure Rules, adopted by it pursuant to Section 106 of and paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972, which restricted voting by Committee Members at the final Meeting to decide a planning application to those who had been present at the Meeting or Meetings at which the application had been considered. This was, from para 41, per Lord Sales, held to be lawful. It was not contrary to paragraph 39 of Schedule 12. The statutory provisions should be read according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. The right of a Councillor to vote could not be regarded as absolute or fundamental in the sense proposed by the appellant. A Councillor might be disqualified from voting in a particular case by statute or by common law rules, such as a conflict of interest, or appearance of bias. Read more »

Changes made by the Procurement Act 2023, in force from 24 February 2025, include ( 1 ) a new MANDATORY EXCLUSION ground for participating in a cartel, ( 2 ) a DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION ground for potential competition infringements, and ( 3 ) the introduction of a CENTRAL DEBARMENT Register. Suppliers who breach competition law risk ( i) exclusion from individual public procurements and ( ii ) being added to the Central Debarment Register, resulting in EXCLUSION FROM ALL CONTRACTS subject to public procurement, for 5 years. The COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY has, on 26 February 2025, published a INFORMATION NOTE on “Exclusion and Debarment on Competition Grounds.”

On 24 February 2025 the Cabinet Office has issued GUIDANCE on the role of the Procurement Review Unit (PRU).  The PRU will have responsibility for “oversight” of the new regime under the Procurement Act 2023. Its initial aim will be to ensure that the changes introduced by the Act are “embedded within contracting authorities”. The PRU will investigate (1) contracting authorities, to ensure compliance with  the Act and (2) suppliers, for possible addition to the Debarment List.  Private utilities and some NHS personal care services are, however, out of scope of the PRU. The Guidance states that the PRU is designed to deliver the following benefits:-

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A Welsh Government publication provides Guidance on Frameworks under the PROCUREMENT ACT 2023, both framework agreements and the new “ open frameworks “, and on call-off contracts.