SC v East Riding of Yorkshire Council and CW v East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Valuation Tribunal, 27 May 2014, were the first relating to council tax discretionary relief under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 heard since the Local Government Finance Act 1992 had replaced council tax benefit with the requirement for each local billing authority to have a council tax reduction scheme.  They provided the opportunity to consider and define the nature and scope of such appeals.  At paragraph 5 of the decision the President of the Tribunal, Professor Graham Zellick QC, noted that (i) discretionary relief is applicable both to those who have been awarded a reduction under a council tax reduction scheme and those who have not, (ii) as schemes must stipulate a procedure for applying for a reduction, authorities must consider every such application on its merits, and (iii) whereas there must be a formal published scheme for council tax reduction, there is no requirement for a scheme governing discretionary relief, unless there has been a determination that a class of case is to be reduced in accordance with that determination.

At paragraph 16 the President stated that his own Practice Statement, Council Tax Reduction Appeals, was incorrect.  It is to be amended and reissued.

At paragraph 23, the President stated that the Tribunal’s approach is the same as in every other appeal.  He stated as follows (emphasis added):-

“24.    Thus, it is for the appellant to raise doubt as to the correctness of the authority’s decision and to argue what the correct decision should have been. The authority may then defend its decision and the panel will decide the appeal on the balance of probabilities. There is no inhibition on the Tribunal’s substituting its view for that of the authority, but any such substitution must be soundly and solidly based.

25.     The following points … are designed to assist billing authorities, council tax payers and Tribunal members and clerks in dealing with these appeals:

(1)        The focus of an appeal as opposed to a review is fundamentally different: full appeal reaches further and assesses the actual merits of the decision reached.

(2)        Some deference should, however, be paid to the view of the original decision-maker and an effort made to understand how that decision was arrived at, but that cannot prevent the Tribunal from substituting its view for that of the authority provided that the Tribunal can articulate cogently why it is doing so and how it has arrived at its conclusion.

(3)        The authority’s decision does not have to be unreasonable in the Wednesburysense before it can be set aside, but the Tribunal should intervene only where there are strong grounds for doing so.

(4)        It may not be an exact parallel, but the Court of Appeal will allow an appeal against sentence only where the sentence is wrong in principle. This suggests that some restraint should be exhibited by the Tribunal before disturbing a billing authority’s decision.

(5)        Procedural defects may recede in importance, or be completely effaced, since the Tribunal will be chiefly concerned with the actual merits of the decision. Earlier defects in process may therefore be cured or superseded by the appeal, and a decision may be adjudged correct despite defects in process.

(6)        Although a scheme or policy is not required by statute, it is difficult to see how such an open-ended discretion can be satisfactorily exercised in the absence of one.

(7)        Any such policy should be scrutinised by the authority’s lawyers before promulgation.

(8)        Compliance with a formal published policy or scheme, if there is one, cannot preclude the Tribunal from allowing an appeal.

(9)        Any such scheme is not immune from challenge in the Tribunal as, for example, is a council tax reduction scheme… . It is not the Tribunal’s business to impugn any scheme as such but rather that its own powers cannot be inhibited or circumscribed by a scheme.

(10)      Failure to comply with a substantive element of a scheme to the detriment of the applicant is likely to lead to the overturning of the decision unless there are good reasons for having departed from it.

(11)      However, compliance with a scheme or policy may help in persuading the Tribunal that the original decision was correct.

(12)      The Tribunal should be slow to interfere with a decision that properly flows from a determination made under section 13A(7).

(13)      An authority cannot as a matter of law fetter its discretion and must therefore consider every application on its merits whatever the policy or scheme says.

(14)      Suppose, for example, there is a provision that non-essential expenditure should be disregarded when calculating legitimate outgoings and determining disposable income. The Tribunal could conclude that the item was wrongly so characterised and should be included. Or that on its specific facts it should be included. Thus, mobile phones might normally be treated as a luxury but might become a necessity if the appellant is a carer who might need to be contacted urgently when not at home. Or a subscription to a satellite television service might have to be accepted if the appellant is locked into a contract that pre-dates his financial difficulties.

(15)      A factor which cannot have any relevance for the Tribunal is an overall budget created by the authority for the totality of discretionary applications in a given year so that any application will be considered in relation to the available budget and once that sum is exhausted no further applications can be granted. I do not see how in law this can be a cash-limited exercise. The merits of an appeal cannot be affected by the existence of any such budget. A “budget” is in any event a somewhat artificial concept in view of the fact that the authority is forgoing income and not spending existing funds.

(16)      Where the Tribunal is minded to allow the appeal and order a recalculation but is unsure of the actual amount to substitute, the appeal may either be adjourned for the parties to supply whatever further information is needed to reach a decision or it may conclude the appeal by quashing the calculation and ordering the authority to recalculate properly. The former is likely to be the better course in most cases.”

The Strasbourg Court has on 4 March 2014 given Judgment in the case of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v UK, Case 7552/09.  The Church alleged that the denial of the exemption from business rates, under the Local Government Finance Act 1988, reserved for buildings used for public religious worship, in respect of its Temple at Preston, Lancashire, gave rise to violations of its rights under Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, both taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.

On 30 July 2008 the House of Lords had unanimously held, [2008] UKHL 56, that, as a matter of UK domestic law, a place of “public religious worship” must be one that is open to the general public. Four of the five Law Lords further dismissed the applicant’s arguments under the ECHR, holding that the liability to pay 20% business rates on the Temple did not fall within the ambit of Article 9, since Mormons were still free to manifest their religion and since the statutory requirement to be open to the public applied equally to all religious buildings and did not target Mormons in particular

The Strasbourg Court held, by a majority, that the complaint under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 was admissible. However, the Court held, unanimously, that there had been no violation.  There was no differential treatment.  Moreover, any prejudice caused to the Church was reasonably and objectively justified, and any interference was within the UK’s wide margin of appreciation with respect to the public interest and matters of general social strategy.

The conclusion was expressed at para 35 as follows:-

“In conclusion, insofar as any difference of treatment between religious groups in comparable situations can be said to have been established in relation to tax exemption of places of worship, such difference of treatment had a reasonable and objective justification. In particular, the contested measure pursued a legitimate aim in the public interest and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between that aim and the means used to achieve it. The domestic authorities cannot be considered as having exceeded the margin of appreciation available to them in this context, even having due regard to the duties incumbent on the State by virtue of Article 9 of the Convention in relation to its exercise of its regulatory powers in the sphere of religious freedom. It follows that the Court does not find that the applicant Church has suffered discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 9.”

In Corkish (Listing Officer) v Wright [2014] EWHC 237 (Admin), a statutory appeal from a Valuation Tribunal, the issue for the Tribunal had been whether an annex was part of a building which was constructed or adapted for use as separate living accommodation, so as to be amenable to a separate charge for council tax.  Popplewell J derived the following principles from the authorities:

(1) The question is whether the effect of the construction or adaptation is such as to make the relevant building or part of a building reasonably suitable for use as separate living accommodation. What matters is its fitness for that purpose by reference to contemporary standards of what is reasonable, not merely whether it might conceivably be used for such purpose however remote the possibility.

(2) The question is to be answered by reference to the physical characteristics of the building. This is sometimes referred to as a “bricks and mortar test”, but the epithet does not accurately capture the wide range of physical characteristics which may be of relevance including services and fixtures.

(3) This is an objective test. The test is not concerned with when, how or why those characteristics were achieved. The purpose of the construction or adaptation is irrelevant. The test is addressed to the result of the building work, not the circumstances in which it was carried out. Intention is irrelevant.

(4) Whether the test is met is a matter of fact and degree for the Tribunal.

(5) Actual use may in some cases be of some relevance. However actual use is not the test, and even in cases where it may be of some relevance it will not usually be a factor of significant weight. At most it may reinforce a decision reached by reference to the physical characteristics of the building.

(6) If what is being considered is part of a building, the physical characteristics to be considered include those of the remainder of the building as well as the part being considered. Access is one aspect of such characteristics. Separate public access may be a pointer to the part being separate living accommodation; whereas if access is through the remainder of the building this may tell against the part being separate living accommodation. In the latter case different weight may be attached where access is through the living areas of the remainder of the building from the weight to be attached where it is through a hallway. But access is not a factor which can be determinative without considering the other physical aspects of the building. The weight to be attached to it is a matter for the Tribunal.

The Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/165, made by the Secretary of State pursuant to Sections 8 and 20 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, and amending the Local Authorities (Standing Orders) (England) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/3384, were laid before Parliament on 31 January 2014 and will come into force on 25 February 2014.  The Amendment Regulations are “localism” in reverse, imposing “best practice”.  They require that the votes at key budget decision meetings by local authorities are recorded, something of course which it is already open to local authorities to do.  There is a diktat that in the Minutes of such meetings there must be a record of how each member present voted on the budget ie voted on the council tax or the issuing of the precept in the case of precepting authorities.  Moreover, the Explanatory Notes state (para 8.3) that CLG’s “expectation” is “that all councils will follow this practice at their budget meetings even where these are held in advance of the practice becoming mandatory”.

The Non-Domestic Rating (Designated Areas) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/98 form part of the scheme for local retention of non-domestic rates.  The purpose of the Regulations is to designate areas in relation to which a proportion of the non-domestic rating income (as calculated in accordance with the Regulations) is to be retained by the local authority all or part of whose area falls within the designated area.

The Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Rate Relief) (England) (Amendment) Order 2014, SI 2014/43 (“the 2014 Order”), amends the Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Rate Relief) (England) Order 2012 (“the 2012 Order”) to provide for a temporary extension to the increase in small business rates relief in England until 31 March 2015 and to extend the scope of the relief where small businesses expand.

The 2012 Order prescribes the conditions for eligibility for small business rate relief and the rates of relief in relation to eligible hereditaments.  A hereditament is only eligible where it is the sole hereditament occupied by the ratepayer, but additional hereditaments are disregarded where their rateable value is not more than £2,599 and the aggregate rateable value of all hereditaments occupied by the ratepayer does not exceed £25,499 if situated in Greater London or £17,999 if situated outside Greater London.  The 2014 Order substitutes new provisions for Articles 3(6) and 4(7) of the 2012 Order so that where a ratepayer starts to occupy an additional hereditament, the ratepayer does not lose the benefit of the relief for the first 12 months of occupation.

Where the eligibility criteria are satisfied a ratepayer’s daily liability for non-domestic rates in respect of that hereditament is determined under Section 43(4A) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988.  Section 43(4A) provides for the calculation in accordance with the formula (A x D) divided by (C x E) where: A is the rateable value of the hereditament; D is the small business non-domestic rating multiplier for the financial year; C is the number of days in the financial year; and E is such amount as is prescribed in relation to the hereditament by the Secretary of State by Order. Article 4 of the 2012 Order prescribes the amount of E for the financial years beginning on 1 April 2012 and 2013 and Article 3 of the 2012 Order prescribes the amount of E for subsequent financial years.

The 2014 Order amends the 2012 Order to apply Article 4 of the 2012 Order to the financial year beginning on 1 April 2014.  The effect of this amendment is to extend the temporary doubling of the level of small business rate relief for a further year.  Article 4 will also continue to apply in respect of days falling within the financial years which started on 1 April 2012 and 1 April 2013.

The purpose of the Billing Authorities (Anticipation of Precepts) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/35, is to enable billing authorities in England making council tax calculations in accordance with Section 31A of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”) to anticipate a precept from a local precepting authority.  The legislative context is that Sections 73 to 79 of the Localism Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) made amendments to the calculations which billing authorities, major precepting authorities, and local precepting authorities in England must make to determine their basic amounts of council tax for a financial year. The obligation to calculate a budget requirement for a year was replaced with an obligation to calculate a council tax requirement. Under the new provisions an authority’s council tax requirement for a financial year is the amount the authority requires from council tax alone in order to finance its budget for the year and this amount is used to calculate the authority’s basic amount of council tax. Section 74 of the 2011 Act inserted a new Section 31A into the 1992 Act requiring a billing authority to calculate its council tax requirement each financial year, and Section 32 of the 1992 Act was modified to apply to Wales only rather than to England and Wales. The Regulations make a minor amendment consequential on the changes made by the 2011 Act to update the definition of “calculations” in the Billing Authorities (Anticipation of Precepts) Regulations 1992 in relation to England to refer to the new Section 31A inserted by the 2011 Act.. This will enable billing authorities in England making their calculations in accordance with Section 31A of the 1992 Act to anticipate a precept from a local precepting authority under Section 41 of the 1992 Act if that precept has not been issued in time for their calculations.

The Local Government Finance Act 1988 (Non-Domestic Rating Multipliers) (England) Order 2014, SI 2014/2, has been made in exercise of the powers conferred by paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 7 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”). In relation to England and for the financial year beginning on 1st April 2014 (“2014-15”) the Order specifies an amount which is to be used in the calculation of the non-domestic rating and the small business non-domestic rating multipliers for that year.

Schedule 7 to the 1988 Act establishes a procedure by which the non-domestic rating and the small business non-domestic rating multipliers are calculated for a chargeable financial year. In relation to England and a year at the beginning of which new rating lists are not compiled, the small business non-domestic rating multiplier is calculated in accordance with paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 to the 1988 Act. The non-domestic rating multiplier for the year is then calculated in accordance with paragraph 3A of Schedule 7 to the 1988 Act by reference to that multiplier.

The calculation in paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 to the 1988 Act includes a variable referred to as “B”. Unless an order made by the Treasury provides otherwise, B is the retail prices index for September of the financial year proceeding the year concerned, which in relation to 2014-15 was 251.9.  Paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 7 to the Local Government Finance Act 1988 enables the Treasury by order to specify a different amount for B. Where the Treasury exercises this power the amount specified must be less the retail prices index for September of the financial year proceeding the year concerned.

For 2014-15 the Order specifies B as 249 for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 to the 1988 Act. This represents a 2% cap.  Otherwise the figure would have been 3.2%.

Premises will be “wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes”, for the purposes of assessing whether a registered  charity is entitled under Section 43(6)(a) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 to mandatory charitable relief from non-domestic rates only if the charity makes extensive use of the premises for charitable purposes.  In Public Safety Charitable Trust v Milton Keynes Council [2013] EWHC 1237 (Admin) Sales J held that merely some charitable use of the premises was not enough, following Kenya Aid Programme v Sheffield City Council [2013] EWHC 54 (Admin).

Does the fact that no more than a minute fraction of the area encompassed within premises is used (by the presence of blue-tooth apparatus) prevent occupation being rateable occupation?  No, holds Wilkie J in Sunderland City Council v Stirling Investment Properties Ltd [2013] EWHC 1413 (Admin).  Wilkie J further holds, applying Arbuckle Smith v Greenock Corporation [1960] AC 813, that it is not relevant, for the purpose of rateable occupation, that the nature of the use to which the hereditament is put is different than that which was described in the rating list. There is nothing in the legislation which limits the ability of a local authority to levy rates to occupation for a purpose which is identical to the description of the hereditament in the rating list. The issue of any apparent disconnect between the nature of the occupation of an hereditament and its description in the rating list is a matter for the valuation officer to address if he thinks that a new, or additional, hereditament may have been brought into existence.