Stone v Environment Agency (2018) EWHC 994 (Admin) concerned an offence under the Environmental Permitting Regulations of knowingly permitting the operation of a regulated facility without being authorised by an environmental permit. The regulated facility was a “waste operation” for the storage of waste. There were two questions: whether there was a continuing waste operation; and whether the accused had to have taken a positive act during the relevant period, or simply to have known that a waste operation was taking place. Nicol J held that there was a continuing waste operation; and that “knowingly permitting” did not require proof of a positive act. Read more »
ECHR Articles 9 and 14
May 1st, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality DutyIn R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society) v Senior Coroner for Inner North London (2018) EWHC 969 (Admin) a Divisional Court (Singh LJ and Whipple J) observed (paragraph 94) that in Eweida v UK the ECtHR emphasized the importance of the rights set out in Article 9, and stated that there are several things of importance to note about the terms of Article 9:-
“96. First, it does not protect only freedom of religion. It protects freedom of all thought (including the beliefs of those who have no religious faith) and freedom of conscience.
Judicial Review
April 26th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and LitigationSection 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act was introduced by Section 84 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, coming into effect on 13 April 2015. It provides:
“(2A) The High Court –
(a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review … if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.”
The forms of relief referred to in Section 31(1)(1) include “(a) a mandatory, prohibiting or quashing order” and “(b) a declaration or injunction under subsection (2)”. Subsections (2B) and (2C) state:
“(2B) The court may disregard the requirements in subsection (2A)(a) and (b) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest.
(2C) If the court grants relief … in reliance on subsection (2B), the court must certify that the condition in subsection (2B) is satisfied.” Read more »
Termination of Employment Contract
April 25th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsThe issue in Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v Haywood (2018) UKSC 22 was when the notice period begins to run, if an employee is dismissed on written notice posted to his home address. If the answer is not specified in the contract of employment, is it (i) when the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of post; (ii) when it was in fact delivered to that address; or (iii) when the letter comes to the attention of the employee and he or she has either read it or had a reasonable opportunity to do so? Read more »
Interpretation and Implication
April 24th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalIn Lambeth LBC v SoS for CLG (2018) EWCA Civ 844 considered again the interpretation of planning permissions (paragraphs 23-37) and implication (paragraphs 63-75). Lewison LJ (with whom Hamblen and Coulson LJJ agreed) said as to the interpretation of a condition that the ultimate question was what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole. This is an objective exercise in which the Court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense. It is not right to regard the process of interpreting a planning permission as differing materially from that appropriate to other legal documents.
Variation of Employment Contracts
April 24th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsDoes an employee continuing to work following implementation of a pay freeze constitute acceptance of a variation of contractual provisions in collective agreements giving entitlement to pay progression? It all depends on the circumstances of the case, says the Court of Appeal in Abrahall v Nottingham City Council (2018) EWCA Civ 796. Underhill LJ reviewed Rigby v Ferodo, Jones v Associated Tunnelling, Selectron, Khatri, and Cartwright v Tetrad. Underhill LJ described Khatri as “significant”, including because of its endorsement that conduct relied upon to constitute an acceptance must be “only acceptable to the employee having accepted the proposed variation”. Underhill LJ said:-
Village Greens
April 18th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and LeisureDid the concept of “statutory incompatibility” defeat an application for the registration of land as a town or village green under Section 15 of the Commons Act 2006? That question arose in each of two appeals, R (Lancashire County Council) v SoS for the Environment and R (NHS Property Services) and Surrey County Council v Jones, (2018) EWCA Civ 721. No, ruled the Court of Appeal, unless there was an inherent inconsistency between the statutory purpose for which the land was held and the use for public recreation. The use of land for educational or healthcare purposes was not incompatible with its use as a village green.
Prejudice to commercial interests
April 18th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsIn Case No. EA/2017/0057, Hartlepool Borough Council v The Information Commissioner, the FTT was concerned with whether under FoIA Section 43(2) disclosure would or would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any party and if so whether the public interest in maintaining that exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The FTT upheld the Commissioner’s Decision that the disputed information must be disclosed. The Borough Council’s Appeal was dismissed.
The request was for information in relation to the transfer of ownership in 2003 of what was then Teesside International Airport (“TIA”). TIA had been owned by 6 Tees Valley local authorities, including Hartlepool. In 2003, Peel Group reached an agreement with them to acquire a 75% shareholding in TIA. TIA became Durham Tees Valley Airport (“DTVA”). The 6 local authorities retained a combined 25% shareholding in DTVA, with Peel Investments Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Peel Group, being the majority shareholder. The aggregate shareholding of the 6 local authorities in DTVA is currently 11%. Read more »
Permission on Erroneous Basis
March 27th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalIn R (Thornton Hall Hotel Ltd) v Wirral MBC (2018) EWHC 560 (Admin) unconditional and permanent planning permission for the erection of three marquees on a green belt site was quashed where it had been granted on an erroneous basis, namely the omission of conditions including a five-year time limit which had clearly been envisaged by the local authority’s planning committee in approving permission. To allow the marquees to remain in place would subvert the public interest in the integrity of the planning process. Read more »
Underground Car Park
March 26th, 2018 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsIn Case E-4/17, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway, Judgment on 21 March 2018, the EFTA Court considered a tender procedure launched by the Municipality of Kristiansand for the construction and operation of an underground car park. The issue was whether the contracts constituted a public works concession. The Court concluded that the contracts were of pecuniary interest (paragraph 73), they were of direct economic benefit to the municipality (paragraph 74), and constituted a public contract (paragraph 75); that the construction of the car park constituted works (paragraph 76); that the titles given to the contracts cannot be decisive (paragraph 77); that the crucial objective of the contracts was the construction of the car park, but there was an element of services inherent in the contract, the services element could not be singled out in a separate procedure, and the works and services elements of the contracts formed an indivisible whole (paragraph 79); that when contracts include elements of both works and services, it is the “main object” of the contract which determines the body of rules to be applied (paragraphs 80-82); that the main object was the works (paragraphs 83-84); and that the contracts were public works contracts (paragraph 85). Read more »