In R (Idolo) v Bromley LBC it was held that the Council had not failed in its duties under the Care Act 2014, nor breached its positive obligations under ECHR Article 8,  notwithstanding delay in rehousing a disabled resident into accommodation that was suitably adapted or adaptable. Rehousing needs being duly identified through the Care Act route could not shortcut the detailed system of balanced priorities under the allocation and homelessness provisions of the Housing Act 1996 and the Council’s lawful policies and scheme. The Court also made observations about human rights damages claims.

In Sutton v Norwich City Council (2020) UKUT 90 (LC) a company and its director appealed against financial penalties and a prohibition order imposed on them by a local authority. The lengthy Judgment considers a range of questions: whether a building was within the ambit of the HMO; whether improvement notices were valid; the power to penalise a director of a company; whether the individual was the manager of the building for the purposes of the HMO Regulations; what may constitute a reasonable excuse for non- compliance; the correct approach to penalty; quantum for breaches of the Regulations; quantum for non-compliance with improvement notices; and the validity of a prohibition notice. The authority was found to have applied its policy in a way that imposed disproportionate penalties without proper consideration of the facts.

The appeals in McMahon v Watford BC and Kiefer v Hertsmere BC (2020) EWCA Civ 497 raised the question of the interaction between a determination whether an applicant for homelessness assistance is “vulnerable” and compliance with the PSED. Lewison LJ said, at paras 45/46, that although there is a substantial overlap between between a vulnerability assessment there are also differences, the most important not of which is that whether a person has a disability is to be assessed without reference to measures being taken to correct or treat that disability, whereas vulnerability is to be assessed taking into account such measures. At para 62 he concluded that it is clear that a homelessness reviewing officer need not make findings about whether a homeless applicant does or does not have a disability, or the precise effect of the PSED. At para 89 he observed that there is a real danger of the PSED being used as a peg on which to hang a highly technical argument that an otherwise unimpeachable vulnerability assessment should be quashed.