ECHR ARTICLES 8 AND 10

May 16th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Human Rights and Public Sector Equality Duty

In BERG v TOWER HAMLETS LBC (2024) EWFC 92 the Court granted applications by journalists who sought the disclosure of transcripts and orders from deprivation of liberty safeguarding proceedings concerning an individual who had been subject to a deprivation of liberty order as a child, so that they could report on their contents.  It was in the public interest to know that the High Court was making orders restricting the liberty of children and young people and to be provided with the opportunity to understand the difficult decisions the Courts had to make and the competing considerations that had to be balanced when making such decisions. The former child (C) wished to contribute to the programme.

On a reading of Section 97 of the Children Act 1989 and Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of the Orders made in respect of C would not of itself be contempt of court, except where a Court having the power to do so had expressly prohibited the publication.  However, the publication of the transcripts of the hearings in respect of C and of the documents utilised at those hearings, or extracts, quotations or summaries of the same, would be a contempt of court unless expressly authorised by the Court.  When considering whether to relax the protection afforded by Section 2, the Court had to balance competing ECHR rights and to consider the proportionality of the potential interference with each right. The Court also had to consider carefully whether the Order sought was proportionate having regard to its aim.  Where Article 10 was engaged and fell to be considered in the balancing exercise, the Human Rights Act 1998 required the Court to have particular regard to the importance of Article 10 and, where the material in question was journalistic in nature, to the extent to which that information was already in the public domain or the extent to which it was, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published.

By reason of C’s agreement to the disclosure and publication of the information sought, the rights engaged did not compete as starkly as in some cases.  However, where the material in issue was rendered confidential by operation of Section 12 of the 1960 Act, where the rights engaged were nonetheless in tension with each other to a degree, and in circumstances where the rights of other respondents to the proceedings were also engaged, it remained the Court’s responsibility to consider carefully the comparative importance of the competing rights and to consider the justification for interfering with or restricting each right.

The ambit of C’s Article 8 right to respect for private life was wide, encompassing the narrow concept of personal freedom from intrusion and her psychological and physical integrity, personal development and the development of social relationships and physical and social identity.  C made plain that she struggled with her mental health and has had difficulties adjusting to life as a young adult and forming relationships.  On the face of it, importance attached to C’s Article 8 right when placed in the balance. However, there were powerful justifications for interfering in those rights and in balancing the competing rights particular regard should be paid to the importance of the Article 10 right.

Here, C’s own Article 10 right was firmly engaged and constituted a powerful justification for interfering with her Article 8 right and the Article 8 rights of others.  That conclusion was reinforced where the BBC was providing psychotherapeutic support to C to safeguard her psychological integrity. Further, were was an important public interest in the public being able to understand and scrutinise the operation of the family courts.  That interest was particularly acute where the family court scrutinised and endorsed, or refused, intervention in family life by the State.  Similarly, there was a particular public interest in the applicants being able to publish information regarding orders restricting the liberty of children and young people, some of which, whilst lawful, were being made outside any statutory regime that had been the subject of democratic consultation and approval by Parliament.  Regarding proportionality, the interference in C’s Article 8 rights and the rights of other respondents was proportionate.  However, prohibiting the publication of the information sought would be a disproportionate interference with the Article 10 rights engaged (paras 30-52).

 

CREMATORIUM

May 13th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

In WATHEN-FAYED v SoS and TANDRIDGE DC ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 507 the Court of Appeal held that a proposed development would not inevitably contravene the provisions of the CEMATORIUM ACT 1902 ( the 1902 Act ). Section 2 of the 1902 Act defines “ crematorium “. It means  “ any building fitted with appliances for the purposes of burning human remains “. That is expressed to include “ everything ancillary or incidental thereto “. Section 5 of the 1902 Act prohibits construction of a crematorium nearer to any dwelling-house than 200 yards ( except with the consent of the occupier ), or within 50 yards of any public highway, or in the consecrated part of a burial ground. The proposed development comprises a crematorium with a ceremony hall, memorial areas, a garden of remembrance, and associated parking and infrastructure. The site consists of 4.5 acres of open fields.

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VICARIOUS LIABILITY

May 10th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

In SHAMSAN v LOWNDES SQUARE MANAGEMENT COMPANY ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 436 it was Lowndes’ contractual responsibility to engage managing agents for a building, and they would provide appropriate services. It was NOT Lowndes’ contractual responsibility to provide those services itself.

The managing agents were independent contractors. They could not be liable for negligence by the managing agents. Recent developments in the law of VICARIOUS LIABILITY do NOT undermine the distinction between liability for the acts of an employee and non-liability for acts of an independent contractor.

 

PRIVATE NUISANCE LIABILTY

May 8th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

DAVIES v BRIDGEND COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCIL ( 2024 ) UKSC 15 concerns liability for private nuisance by undue interference with the enjoyment or use of another person’s land. The nuisance arose from the encroachment of JAPANESE KNOTWEED. The dates are important. Mr Davies bought his land in 2004. By then the knotweed had spread on to that land from land owned by the Council. That however was not at that time an actionable nuisance. That did not occur until 2013. That was when the Council became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the risk of damage to Mr Davies’ land. Information became available about knotweed. The Council’s fault was that between 2013 and 2018 it failed to implement a reasonable and effective treatment programme. That was not done until 2018. The question was whether the Council was liable for diminution in the value of Mr Davies’ land during that period. The Supreme Court, allowing the Council’s appeal from ( 2023 ) EWCA Civ 80, ruled that the Council had no damages liability. This was on the basis of lack of causation. The Council’s breach of duty between 2013 and 2018 had not increased or materially contributed to the diminution in value. That had occurred before any breach by the Council arose in 2013. The subsequent breach was not a causative factor. There was no causal link between the breach of duty and the diminution in value claimed.

 

MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS

May 8th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

Section 38 ( 6 ) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires that if regard is to be had to the Development Plan for the purposes of any determination to be made under the Planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the Plan, unless MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS , including national policy as expressed in the NPPF, indicate otherwise. In MID-SUFFOLK DC v SoS ( 2024 ) EWHC 930 ( Admin ) the Judge observes, at paras 122-138 inc, that there is however no prescribed format as to the way in which the reasoning on the considerations should be set out. The question is whether Section 38 ( 6 ) has been applied as a matter of substance. Mere failure to mention factors does not mean that there was a failure to take them into account in making the decision, provided that it is apparent that the decision-maker was well aware of each of these factors and was taking them into account.

 

FRESH EVIDENCE

May 8th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

In TAYTIME LTD v SoS ( 2024 ) EWHC 1053 ( Admin ) Lang J summarises, at paras 55-59 inc, when fresh evidence will be admissible in a judicial or statutory review. Generally the Court does not consider evidence that was not before the decision-maker. Fresh evidence will be admitted only in limited circumstances. These are ( 1 ) to show what material was before the decision-maker, ( 2 ) to demonstrate a jurisdictional fact or procedural error or misconduct by the decision-maker, ( 3 ) where the interests of justice require it, ( 4 ) where there is a legal challenge on the grounds that the decision-maker failed to investigate adequately and the evidence would demonstrate what would have been discovered if due enquiry had been made, or (5) in the consideration of remedy.

 

LIABILITY of AUTHORITIES and INDIVIDUALS

May 7th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Judicial Control, Liability and Litigation

Part 8 of the Equality Act 2010 ( Sections 108-112 inclusive ) contains ancillary provisions about liability of employers and principals ( Section 109 ) and liabilities of employees and agents ( Section 110 ). In BALDWIN v CLEVES SCHOOOL ( 2024 ) EAT 66 the School was held liable under Section 209, and it is held that if the conditions for individual liability on the part of an individual employee or agent as set out in Section 110 are satisfied then a contravention of Section 110 must be found. There is no discretion.

 

PUBLIC LAW OBLIGATIONS

May 7th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and Contracts

Friends of the Earth v Secretary of State ( 2024 ) EWHC 995 ( Admin ) concerns the process to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and carbon budgets. Clive Sheldon J says at para 117 that there is no free-standing obligation in public law that information about risk is to presented in a particular way. How the risk is presented to the decision-maker can be impugned only if the content of what is provided does not enable a statutory evaluation exercise to be carried out lawfully. At para 127 he says that Wednesbury unreasonableness may be made out when there is an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion reached by the decision-maker.

 

APPEAL AGAINST ENFORCEMENT NOTICE

May 3rd, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Planning and Environmental

The basic question in SECRETARY OF STATE v CALDWELL ( 2024 ) EWCA Civ 467 was whether an Inspector who determined an Appeal  against an Enforcement Notice issued under SECTION 172 of TCPA 1990 misapplied the important principle in the MURFITT case and the established limitations upon that principle.. The Notice required the cessation of residential use on land and the demolition of a bungalow built upon it. The principle is that LPAs when enforcing against against a material change of use can require the removal of operational development connected to the change of use for the purpose of restoring the land to its condition before the development took place.

The Court of Appeal identified a number of points from para 39. First, the MURFITT principle must not be overstated. It must be operated within the bounds of the statutory scheme. Second, the principle does not extend to works that are more than ancillary or secondary to the change of use. Third, the principle is “ narrow “. Fourth, the principle does not support the removal of a building or other operational development that is a separate development in its own right.  Fifth, whether the principle is engaged in a particular case will always be a matter of fact and degree.

 

TRAFFIC ORDER

April 30th, 2024 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and Leisure

One of the questions in R ( DAW ) v STAFFORDSHIRE COUNCIL ( 2024 ) EWHC 963 ( Admin ) was whether there was a lawful delegation to the Council Officer who made the Order pursuant to Section 101 ( 2 ) of the Local Government Act 1972. This was not a case in which the nature of the function was such that even in the absence of express delegation one officer may be regarded as having authority to act on behalf of another officer who is authorised to exercise the function. Of course, an officer who has been authorised may not sub-delegate the performance of that function to another officer. The Judge concluded that on the proper interpretation of the Council’s Constitution and Scheme of Delegation the Scheme was effective to delegate power to make the decision to the Officer who made the Order, provided that he exercised the power in accordance with the restrictions in the Scheme, as he did in the circumstances.