In Serpes v City of London, Judgment on 2 March 2017, the Court held that demand notices for non-domestic rates, reminder notices, and summonses, were all served properly at the appellant’s last known address, in accordance with Section 233 of the Local Government Act 1972. It was immaterial that she did not in fact receive them. There had been no procedural impropriety or unfairness. The Council was not obliged to make inquiries to discover her location. If she wished to be served at another address it was for her to inform the Council accordingly. Liability for the rates had not necessarily passed to someone else.
Alternative School Site
March 7th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Planning and EnvironmentalIn Lucas (on behalf of Save Diggle Action Group) v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council (2017) EWHC 349 (Admin) the Council had been granted funding to redevelop a School, the existing buildings of which were in a poor state of repair. The funding was from the Education Funding Authority (“the EFA”). The EFA undertook a Feasibility Study (“the Study”). The Study looked at various options for the redevelopment. These included relocation at a new site. The Study designated the new site as the best option. This was because the new site offered the best value for money.
The Study confirmed, however, that if the Council chose to redevelop the School on its existing site, that would be funded by the EFA, despite being more expensive. Nonetheless the Council adopted the new site option.
The Council as Local Planning Authority did not take into account as a material planning consideration with respect to the new site that there was the option of redeveloping the school at its existing site. Kerr J held that it should have done so. It was relevant to the proposed development for a number of reasons, not irrelevant as the LPA had believed.
Rateable Value
March 7th, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Council Tax and RatesSection 56 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 (“LGFA 1988”) incorporates Schedule 6 to LGFA 1988. Schedule 6 sets out the statutory basis on which the rateable value of a non-domestic hereditament is determined. It sets out statutory assumptions for determining rateable value. What is required is an assessment of “the rent at which it is estimated the hereditament might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year”. The hereditament means the hereditament, as a whole, not part or most of it. So emphasized in Hobbs v Gidman (VO) , (2017) UKUT 63 (LC).
Affordable Housing
March 3rd, 2017 by James Goudie KC in HousingIn York City Council v Trinity One (Leeds) Ltd [2017] EWHC 318 (Ch) the claimant LPA sought payment from the respondent property developer pursuant to a s106 agreement to pay a sum of money in lieu of providing affordable housing. The developer then applied to modify the s106 agreement by removing the affordable housing payment obligation. The LPA dismissed that application. The dismissal was subject to appeal. The Judge held that if the appeal was successful that would extinguish the payment liability with retrospective effect.
Rateable Value
March 2nd, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Council Tax and RatesDoes a commercial building which is in the course of redevelopment have to be valued for the purposes of rating as if it were still a useable office. Paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 6 (“Non-domestic rating: valuation”) to the Local Government Finance Act 1988, as amended by the Rating (Valuation) Act 1999, provides that the rateable value of a property is an amount equal to the rent at which it is estimated it might be expected to be let from year to year, subject to the assumption, in para 2(1)(b), that, immediately before the tenancy begins, the property is in a state of reasonable repair, but excluding from that assumption any repairs which a reasonable landlord would consider uneconomic. The issue of general public importance to the law of rating and valuation in Newbigin (Valuation Officer) v SJ & J Monk (2017) UKSC 14 was whether a property should be rated in accordance with the para 2(1)(b) assumptions or in accordance with its physical condition on the relevant date for determining rateable value on an application to alter the rating list. On that date the property was stripped to a shell in the course of renovation works. The Supreme Court held, allowing an appeal from the Court of Appeal, that the property had been stripped out beyond reasonable repair and should be rated as a “building undergoing reconstruction” and the rateable value reduced to the nominal amount of £1 from £102,000, not on the assumption that it was in reasonable repair as “offices and premises”. Read more »
Decision Making and Contracts
March 1st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Decision making and ContractsThe Council succeeded in Milton Keynes Borough Council v Viridor (2017) EWHC 239 (TCC) in obtaining rectification of a waste-recycling contract on the basis that payment terms offered in a tender had been unequivocally accepted but later the wrong tender document had been incorporated into the contract by common or unilateral mistake.
Allocation
February 22nd, 2017 by James Goudie KC in HousingIn R (Osman) v Harrow LBC [2017] EWHC 274 (Admin) the Claimant applied for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant to award the Claimant Band C priority for the purposes of the allocation of housing accommodation. The award was made in accordance with the Defendant’s amended housing scheme (the Amended Scheme) under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996 (the 1996 Act). The Claimant contended that the scheme as amended was unlawful, as is its application to the Claimant, on the grounds that it unlawfully discriminated against those in the private rented sector including the Claimant and her family by denying equivalent priority to those in the public sector contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. Accordingly the Amended Scheme did not secure that a reasonable preference was given to persons occupying overcrowded housing or otherwise living in unsatisfactory housing conditions including the Claimant and her family contrary to Section 166A(3) of the 1996 Act.
The application for judicial review was refused. The Judge concluded that the preference given to the Claimant’s group in the scheme banding was a reasonable preference for the purposes of Section 166A(3) of the 1996 Act, and pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate for the purposes of the ECHR.
Compulsory Purchase Compensation
February 22nd, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Land, Goods and ServicesIn Homes and Communities Agency v J S Bloor (Wilmslow) Ltd (2017) UKSC 12 raised questions concerning the Pointe Gourde or “no-scheme” rule, by which compensation for compulsory acquisition is to be assessed disregarding any increase or decrease in value solely attributable to the underlying scheme of the acquiring authority. The particular issue concerned the relationship between the general provisions, in the Land Compensation Act 1961, as explained and expanded by judicial interpretation, for the disregard of the scheme, and the more specific provisions relating to planning assumptions.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and reinstated that of the Upper Tribunal. The Tribunal were entitled to regard the underlying policies, including the allocation in the development plan, as potentially relevant also to the development apart from the scheme. The assessment of their significance in the no-scheme universe was pre-eminently a matter for the Tribunal. They did not ignore potential policy considerations. Their reasoning disclosed no error of law.
The right to claim for potential development value is long established. The specific statutory provisions relating to planning assumptions do not preclude account being taken under the general law of the prospect (certain or a hope) of planning permission for valuable development. Moreover, the application of the Pointe Gourde principle may result in changes to the assumed planning status of the subject land. The application of the general law may produce a more favourable result for the claimant than the statutory planning assumptions.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Upper Tribunal’s decision in this case was a powerful illustration of the potential complexities generated by the by the 1961 Act in its unamended form. It was to be hoped that the amendments currently before Parliament will be approved.
Roadside Trees
February 21st, 2017 by James Goudie KC in Environment, Highways and LeisureIn Cavanagh v Witley Parish Council, Queen’s Bench Judgment on 14 February 2017, the Parish Council was found liable in negligence when a large mature lime tree on its land, with severe and extensive decay in the root system extending into the base of the trunk, fell across a road and onto a bus, causing the driver severe injury. It was a busy public road. The tree, which leant towards the road, and was over 20 metres high, was in a high risk position alongside the road, albeit, on cursory observation, in a healthy condition. It required regular inspection by a competent arboriculturalist. The Council’s three-yearly inspection policy with regard to its tree stock was “inadequate”. Inspection should have been more frequent. The Council had been advised to do the survey every two years. The local Borough Council had at the relevant time been operating a one-year inspection in respect of trees in high-risk areas, including apparently healthy trees. Read more »