In R (GRANTCHESTER PARISH COUNCIL) v GREATER CAMBRIDGE PARTNERSHIP and CAMBRIDGESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL and others (2025) EWHC 923 (Admin) Lieven J states, at para 46, that the parameters of what statements can give rise to a legitimate expectation and in what circumstances are complex, with a large number of authorities on various different factual situations. She observes: “When considering these cases it is important to have regard to the precise factual legal context in which many of the judicial pronouncements were made”. At para 47, she identifies 3 key stages: (1) Was there a clear and unambiguous commitment? (2) Was it reasonable and legitimate for the promisee to rely upon it against the public authority? (3) Would it be inappropriate to allow the promisee to enforce the commitment? At para 49 she states that the burden of establishing a commitment which is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification rests on the person asserting it; at para 50 that a distinction is drawn between what will be required in cases of substantive legitimate expectation rather than procedural expectation; and at para 56 that if the promise would interfere with the public authority’s statutory duty it cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation.

The purpose of the qualified exemption from disclosure in Section 36 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs, is to protect, subject to the public interest balancing test, the free and frank provision of advice and the effective conduct of public affairs : GARRARD v ICO ( 2025 ) UK FTT 00343 ( GRC ) at para 128. However, the exemption was held not to apply.

The automatic suspension of contracts in procurement proceedings was lifted in MILLBROOK HEALTHCARE LTD v DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWHC 744 ( TCC ). Damages were an adequate remedy for the Claimant. This was held to be so even if the Council’s alleged breach was not sufficiently serious to result in damages.

Consideration has been given by the Supreme Court in R (SPITALFIELDS HISTORIC BUILDING TRUST) v TOWER HAMLETS LBC (2025) UKSC 11 to a provision in the Council’s statutory Constitution, in the form of Standing Orders, with Procedure Rules, adopted by it pursuant to Section 106 of and paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972, which restricted voting by Committee Members at the final Meeting to decide a planning application to those who had been present at the Meeting or Meetings at which the application had been considered. This was, from para 41, per Lord Sales, held to be lawful. It was not contrary to paragraph 39 of Schedule 12. The statutory provisions should be read according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. The right of a Councillor to vote could not be regarded as absolute or fundamental in the sense proposed by the appellant. A Councillor might be disqualified from voting in a particular case by statute or by common law rules, such as a conflict of interest, or appearance of bias. Read more »