Public interest in the protection of the environment is firmly established. The AARHUS CONVENTION requires that party states, including the UK, ensure that members of the public have access to challenge acts and omissions which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment. To that end, the AARHUS COSTS REGIME is designed to ensure that environmental claims are not prohibitively expensive AND that there is REASONABLE PREDICTABILITY. In GREEN LANE ASSOCIATION LTD v CENTRAL BEDFORDSHIRE COUNCIL ( 2025 ) EWHC 2251 ( Admin ), concerned with Traffic Regulation Orders, the Court says, at para 14 : “ The rules place clear demands on both parties. Claimants must claim the Aarhus costs protection at the very beginning of a claim and must supply the relevant financial information at the inception of a clai. Defendants must notify any disagreement or desire to vary the costs cap at their earliest opportunity, namely the filing of the AoS form. It is the incumbent on the Court to make an early decision on the dispute before more significant costs are incurred. The rules are strict so as to ensure reasonable predictability at an early stage. “

From para 36, the Court addresses the question of the test for assessing whether or not a claim falls within Aarhus. The claim was found to fall within the regime.

The Judgment of the Court of Appeal in SOMANI HOTELS LTD v EPPING FOREST DC, the Bell Hotel case, is now available at ( 2025 ) EWCA Civ 1134. The Court of Appeal addresses the statutory duty and engagement of the Secretary of State at paras 50-87 inc, and the approach to interim injunctions from para 88. At para 122, the Court referred to the desirability of preserving the STATUS QUO, saying ( emphasis added ) “ Both as a matter of planning law ( because an enforcement notice cannot be used to prevent an anticipated future breach ) and as a matter of general AMERICAN CYANAMID principles there is a GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN APPLICATION TO PREVENT A CHANGE OF USE WHICH HAS NOT YET OCCURRED AND AN APPLICATION WHERE THE ALLEGED BREACH HAS BEEN GOING ON, INTERMITTENTLY< FOR SEVERAL YEARS.”

On 29 August 2025 the Court of Appeal has allowed an appeal against the interim injunction granted to EPPING FOREST DC blocking the use of the BELL HOTEL in its area to accommodate asylum seekers pending a full hearing in October 2025. The Judge’s approach to the balance of convenience exercise and a range of public interest factors had been seriously flawed in principle and in a number of respects. In particular, it was desirable to preserve the status quo, and undesirable to incentivise protests.

In EPPING FOREST DC v SOMANI HOTELS LIMITED (2025) EWHC 2183 (KB) Eyre J from paragraph 25 sets out the relevant planning framework in relation to making a planning application for a material change in the use of buildings or land and when that will and will not amount to “development” requiring planning permission. There are two questions: whether a use is a change from the permitted use; and, if so, whether it is a change which is “material” in terms of planning considerations. The questions of whether there has been a change of use and, if so whether the change is material, involves matters of law and fact. Both questions are ultimately fact-specific and call for the application of planning judgment in particular circumstances.

There were in this case a number of factors which operated against a finding that there had been a change of use , and a number of other factors which supported such a finding. Questions as to whether interim relief is appropriate in a particular case will be “highly fact-sensitive”.

In R ( Moakes ) v Canterbury City Council (2025) EWCA Civ 927 it is held that the breach of a procedural rule, even if expressed in mandatory terms, does not necessarily render the resulting decision unlawful. To establish procedural unfairness a claimant has to establish that they had suffered material prejudice.

In R ( Save Wimbledon Park Ltd ) v Mayor of London (2025 ) EWHC 1856 ( Admin ) it is held that it is not ordinarily a material consideration to the determination of a planning application that the applicants would, if granted planning permission, need to overcome legal obstacles in order to implement the authorised development.