On 18 November 2025, MHCLG has issued a Consultation, for response by 13 January 2026, on reforming the role of STATUTORY CONSULTEES in the planning system in England.

In R ( Luck ) v Bracknell Forest Council ( 2025 ) EWHC 2984 ( Admin ) , concerned with the detailed procedure for the operation pf the self build housing exemption, Lieven J says, at para 59, that :-

1. CIL is akin to a tax;
2. The purpose of CIL is to provide funding for necessary development and to provide certainty to developers and the collecting authority as to when and how such liability arises.
3. The statute (Planning Act 2008) and the 2010 Regulations ( Part 6 of which deals with exemptions and reliefs) form a DETAILED STATUTORY CODE which is SELF CONTAINED.
4. The imposition of CIL is NOT discretionary.
5. There is a STRICT PROCEDURE, set out in Reg 54B, which is OBLIGATORY;

Liability for CIL MUST be PRECISELY and RELIABLY calculated on an OBJECTIVE basis.

HAYTOP COUNTRY PARK LTD v AMBER VALLEY BC (2025) EWCA Civ 1442 is concerned with the overlap between the licensing of caravan sites, under the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960, and planning control, and the determination of an application for a caravan site licence, not in conflict with a planning permission, and disregarding “ purely planning considerations”. Holgate LJ states, at para 107, that the site licensing regime must be operated “ in harmony with “ the planning permission, which is the prerequisite for the grant of a site licence. The licensing regime cannot be used so as to extend the rights conferred by the planning permission or to relax the conditions to which it is subject. He says, at para 114, that if a licensee wishes to operate a caravan site outside the parameters of the planning permission on which the licence is based, he needs to make an application for a fresh grant of permission or a variation.

In EPPING FOREST DC v SOMANI HOMES LTD ( 2025 ) EWHC 2937 (KB), the Bell Hotel case, the Council’s claim is dismissed by Mould J in an over 300 paragraps Judgment. The Council, as LPA, applied for a FINAL INJUNCTION to restrain the Defendant from using the Bell Hotel to provide ACCOMMODATION for ASYLUM SEEKERS , on the basis that the use for that purpose constituted a BREACH OF PLANNING CONTROL. Mould J set out the legal principles about development and MATERIAL CHANGE OF USE (paras 28-38), enforcing planning control (paras 39-60), Section 187B of the Town & Country Planning Act 1990 (paras 159-166), determining whether a breach of planning control has taken place and the distinction between hotel use and hostel use (paras 169-175, 182 & 205), the correct approach to whether an injunction is an appropriate remedy (paras 206/207), environmental harm and urgency (paras 227/228 and 232-270), counervailing factors ( paras 271-275 and 281/282), and striking the balance and whether an injunction is a COMMENSURATE REMEDY (para 283-291).

The Judge concluded at paras 295/296, that this is NOT a case in which it is just and convenient for the Court to grant an injunction. The current use of the Bell, as contingency accommodation for asylum seekers, does constitute a CHANGE in the USE of those premises, which REQUIRES PLANNING PERMISSION, BUT an injunction is NOT a COMMENSURATE RESPONSE or appropriate. The breach was far from being flagrant. The degree of planning and environmental harm resulting from the current use of the Bell is limited. “ The continuing need for hotels is an important element in the supply of contingency accommodation to house asylum seekers in order to enable the Home Secretary to discharge her statutory responsibilities is a SIGNIFICANT COUNTERVAILING FACTOR.” The Judge also (paras 297-300) declined to give the Council declaratory relief.